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Summary 
It has widely been presumed that children between the ages of 4 and 6 years do not 
possess the cognitive capacity and experience to understand constructs such as ability and 
personal competence. Identifying the aetiology of such understanding is a primary 
objective of achievement motivation research considering the behavioural implications of 
these constructs, in relation, for example, to participation level (Roberts, Kleiber & Duda, 
1981). Evidence was produced by the present research which challenged some 
assumptions which have been made about the limitations of children's conceptual 
understanding and behaviour in the physical domain. Previous research by Nicholls (1978) 
has indicated that in the academic domain, young children (4-7 years) do not differentiate 
between effort and ability as causes of outcome. He suggests that children only gradually 
differentiate between these two constructs to employ ability in their verbal explanations at 
a later age. When Nicholls' (1978) protocol for assessing this conceptual development was 
employed in the physical domain, using children aged between 4 and 13 years, current 
investigations revealed the same developmental trajectory. However, when effort cues 
were removed, children aged between 4 and 6 years used ability as a referent in relation to 
academic but not physical tasks. Contrary to previous assumptions, this suggests that 
young children may perceive effort and ability as discrete constructs and that some 
children are able to verbalise their beliefs about academic ability from an early age. Their 
beliefs, or their capacity to verbalise these beliefs, appears to be specific to the domain 
under consideration. This, and other findings which are described below, support current 
suggestions that behavioural indices are more appropriate than verbal, interview based 
methodologies for assessing young children's conceptual understanding. Behavioural 
measures do not require the child to verbalise their beliefs, a capacity which does appear 
to be limited, particularly in relation to physical tasks. Interpretational differences by 
individuals at different developmental levels may also be ameliorated by the use of 
behavioural measures. Both Fogel & Thelen (1987) and Piaget have suggested that 
behavioural measures can be used to identify change. In the present research a behavioural 
measure was used to indicate the stability of different levels of effort and ability 
understanding. Attempts were made to relate stability of conceptual developmental stage 
to behavioural stability on a motor task, based on the theoretical proposals of, for 
example, Fogel & Thelen (1987). These authors suggest that developmental phenomena 
exhibit alternate periods of stability and instability which is mirrored in, and can be 
measured by, stability of the individual's behaviour during different developmental stages. 
Perhaps due to factors such as insufficient sensitivity of the method employed to detect 
these feasibly small shifts in stability, only limited evidence was produced to support the 
proposal that effort and ability understanding demonstrates alternate periods of stability 
and instability. However, this experiment did lead to further investigations of the 
behaviour of children between 4 and 6 years of age when they were offered rewards for 
successful performance attempts on a motor task. Findings contradicted previous 
assumptions made about the maturity of young children's achievement related behaviour. 
When fixed payoff rewards were used to increase the saliency of young children's 
performance outcomes their behaviour suggested an increased awareness of, and capacity 
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to, assess their own competence level. Subsequent investigations which examined young 
children's task related behaviour when they were offered variable payoffs as rewards also 
revealed more advanced behaviour than would be suggested by previous research. In this 
context, young children could provide behavioural estimates of their perceived 
competence which were accurate and could select levels of task difficulty which offered 
them realistic levels of challenge. This behaviour suggested an understanding of the 
competence required to achieve success on tasks of varying degrees of difficulty and 
whether or not their own competence matched these required levels. These children also 
seemed to understand the incentive value, and their probability, of succeeding on different 
levels of task difficulty. It appears that, given certain circumstances, young children can: 
employ ability related explanations for performance outcomes; accurately assess their own 
competence, and appropriately use task related information to adopt personal levels of 
challenge which are compatible with their own level of task competence. 
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Introduction 
The main issues which are investigated in this thesis are the developmental changes 
involved in effort and ability conceptualisation and methodological concerns about the 
measurement of young children's perceptions of their competence. 
Chapter One discusses previous research by Nicholls (1978) which has examined the 
nature of this conceptual development when children are asked to apply their reasoning to 
academic tasks. Also discussed in Chapter One are features of development such as 
multidimensionality (for example, Baltes, 1987) and domain specificity (for example, 
Fischer & Canfield, 1986) which do not allow direct extrapolation of findings from one 
domain to other domains (for example, from the academic to the physical domain). The 
present research is concerned with children's application of this conceptual understanding 
to physical settings. However, the multidimensional and domain specific nature of 
development does not permit Nicholls'(1978) findings in the academic domain to be used 
directly to explain how children apply their knowledge of these concepts to performance 
outcomes on physical tasks. Empirical assessment was required to determine the 
developmental changes involved when children were asked to apply their conceptual 
understanding to physical tasks. Chapter Two describes an experiment which investigated 
the nature of this conceptual development when children were asked to discuss these 
concepts in the context of physical tasks. The methodology employed was based on 
Nicholls'(1978) protocol (which is described in more detail in Chapters One and Two) but 
adapted to use physical tasks. To explore the developmental changes in this conceptual 
understanding, children from a range of chronological ages were interviewed and the 
results from this study were compared with those from Nicholls' (1978) original study. 
This comparison revealed that effort and ability understanding demonstrates similar 
developmental trajectories when reasoning is applied to academic and physical tasks. 
Although the same general trends were evident, results of this experiment indicated that 
Nicholls, (1978) finding that very young children equate effort with ability may not be the 
only available explanation for their beliefs about these concepts. Their equation of effort 
and ability may instead be an artefact of the explicit effort cues with which young children 
are presented during this method of assessment, coupled with the emphasis which is 
placed on effort in their day to day environment. Furthermore, some young children's 
interview responses indicated that they may not interpret questions about ability in the 
same way as do adults. Reported in Chapter Two are experiments in which children aged 
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between 4 and 6 years were asked to explain performance differences on academic or 
physical tasks when effort cues were removed and interview questions did not explicitly 
refer to ability. Subjects were able to cite ability related factors as explanations for 
performance differences on academic but not physical tasks. However, in neither context 
did children cite effort as an explanation for different performance outcomes. Results of 
these studies indicated that in relation to academic and physical tasks, young children's 
apparent equation of effort and ability may not accurately reflect their beliefs about these 
concepts. Their equation of effort and ability may be a response to the cues presented to 
them by the methodology employed to assess effort and ability understanding. Where 
physical tasks are concerned, young children appear to possess a limited capacity to 
verbalise ability and possibly to conceptualise this construct. These limitations of both 
methodologies and children's verbalisation are investigated towards the end of the thesis 
and will be discussed in more detail further on in this introduction. Results from this study 
provided direct evidence concerning children's use of effort and ability as outcome 
explanations. Using these findings, suggestions were then made about how young children 
perceive the meaning of ability. 
Prior to the investigation of these methodological and verbalisation issues, the thesis 
maintains its focus on effort and ability conceptualisation but examines this understanding 
from a somewhat different perspective. Having established the developmental pattern of 
effort and ability understanding which is exhibited when children apply their knowledge to 
physical tasks, this continuum of understanding was examined from a number of 
theoretical perspectives. In Chapter Three, various developmental theories are discussed, 
which, although demonstrating different aetiologies, present similar approaches to the 
nature of developmental change. These theories share one common feature which is most 
pertinent to the present research. They describe development as a series of alternating 
periods of stability and instability, proposing that the development of novel, more 
advanced states occurs as a result of experienced periods of instability. 
Thelen (1989) suggests a method of addressing this issue in general and it is this method :: o 
which was employed in the current thesis. She suggests that the stability of individuals' 
behavioural responses to experimentally induced perturbations from the norm provide an 
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indication of the stability of their developmental stage. A stable developmental phase is 
indicated by stable responses within the individual and within the group. During unstable 
phases, behavioural responses demonstrate less stability and mean responses deviate from 
those exhibited during stable phases. Chapter Four describes an experiment which utilises 
this hypothesis to explore whether or not this approach can be employed to measure the 
development of effort and ability understanding using behaviour as an index of stability. 
The experimental disruption administered was in the form of manipulated performance 
information on a perceptual motor task which children representing all levels of this 
conceptual development played. Their behavioural responses to the disruption were 
indicated by their choices of task difficulty level following this disrupted performance 
information. 
A priori proposals were made about the stability of different developmental stages of 
effort and ability conceptualisation by considering the stability of the child's schema 
throughout different levels of this conceptual understanding. As a result, it was proposed 
that levels one and four represent stable stages of this continuum whereas levels two and 
three represent an unstable stage. How these proposals were determined is described in 
detail in Chapter Three. As Chapter Four discusses, only limited support was provided for 
these proposals. Although not conclusively demonstrated, children from levels one and 
four did exhibit greater stability of behavioural response than those from levels two and 
three. Some incongruencies between actual and expected results were revealed which are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Four and later in the thesis in relation to other findings. 
One incongruence which was investigated further was the behaviour of children who had 
reached only level one of effort and ability understanding. Although their behaviour 
exhibited the pattern which was predicted, its intensity did not result in statistical analyses 
reaching traditional levels of significance. It was suggested that this result reflects young 
children's inconsistent regard for the outcomes of their previous performance attempts 
when making decisions about their future courses of action. Therefore an investigation 
was carried out to examine the effects on approximately 5 year old children's behaviour of 
increasing the salience of their previous performance attempts. The experimental 
disruptions used in the previous experiment were administered but children were also 
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offered sweets as a reward for successful performance attempts. This reward was 
expected to increase the children's awareness of their previous performance attempts and 
subsequently make the relative success and failure of previous performance outcomes 
salient to them. Results of this experiment indicated that children's behavioural response to 
experimentally disrupted performance information does demonstrate change when 
performance outcomes are made salient, compared with when they are not. Of greatest 
interest was the finding that even when performance information indicated that success 
could be easily achieved, these children appeared unwilling to select challenging levels of 
the task (as a similar group had done previously when performance outcomes were not 
made salient) if there was a risk of losing the reward which was offered. The children's 
behaviour also suggested that they possessed fairly accurate perceptions of the 
competence required for successful completion of different levels of task difficulty. Such 
knowledge seems likely to be accompanied by an understanding of personal level of 
competence. As a result, it was then decided to further explore young children's risk 
taking behaviour whilst simultaneously examining the methodological and verbalisation 
issues discussed previously. These latter issues were examined in relation to the accuracy 
of young children's perceptions of their own competence. Irrespective of its inherent 
interest, this phenomenon appears to provide an ideal vehicle by which to address 
problems associated with methodology and young children's capacity to verbalise ability 
related constructs. Chapter Five presents a review of literature and research which 
discusses various issues concerning the nature of young childreds perceptions of their own 
competence. Theoretical approaches to risk taking behaviour and research which has 
examined this behaviour are then considered in Chapter Six. 
Subsequent to this discussion, the following proposals were made concerning these 
phenomena. it was firstly hypothesised that when young children are offered variable 
payoffs for successful task performances they will exhibit more realistic risk taking 
behaviour on a perceptual motor task compared with children who are not. A variable 
payoff system is one which provides increasing amounts of reward as the difficulty level of 
the task increases. Realistic risk taking behaviour is indicated by the selection of tasks 
which are appropriate for the individual's ability level and which present them with an 
optimal level of challenge. Variable payoffs increase the individual's awareness of the 
incentive value of success and provide opportunities to assess competence in relation to 
task difficulty. By offering this system of reward, it was expected that young children 
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would employ the information provided about personal competence, task difficulty, and 
incentive value of success to select tasks which presented optimal levels of challenge and 
which indicated realistic levels of risk taking. 
Two factors were expected to lead to greater accuracy of competence estimates in the 
reward than the non reward group. Behavioural indices of perceived competence were 
expected to eradicate the problems of construct verbalisation and interpretation which are 
encountered when verbal measures are used with young children. A variable payoff system 
provides the children with an incentive to accurately assess their competence. They must 
choose levels which match their own competence in order to maximise the amount of 
reward they receive. Empirical work which examined these hypotheses is described in 
Chapter Seven. According to expectations, but counter to many previous findings about 
young children's capacity to be realistic about their competence, when offered variable 
payoffs, young children demonstrated realistic risk taking. Furthermore, the variable 
payoff system, combined with a behavioural index of perceived competence, revealed that 
children are able to accurately assess personal competence in this situation. 
The main findings from this final experiment were as follows: young children will select 
optimal levels of personal challenge and demonstrate realistic risk taking behaviour when 
they are offered variable payoffs for successful task performances, and when behavioural 
measures are combined with an incentive to accurately assess competence, young children 
will provide accurate estimates of their own competence on a perceptual motor task. This 
last finding addresses the methodological concerns mentioned previously. It appears that 
methodologies which require young children to verbalise their beliefs may not be wholly 
appropriate. Due to their limited capacity to verbalise their beliefs, behavioural measures 
may be more suitable when assessing young children's understanding of the construct of 
ability and their personal competence level. 
The final chapter, Chapter Eight, provides an overview of the areas with which this thesis 
is concerned and empirical investigations which addressed these concerns. Following this, 
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the findings of these experimental endeavours are briefly presented, as are the theoretical 
premises on which they were based. A suggestion is made in this discussion that young 
children's understanding of issues such as task difficulty, ability and personal competence 
are more advanced than previous work has indicated. Possible implications of these 
empirical findings are then discussed. For instance, these findings indicate that the 
suitability of methodologies which are used to assess young children's conceptual 
understanding should be examined. The present findings also support the statements of 
authors (such as Baltes, 1987) that the domain specificity of methodologies is an 
imperative consideration. Such comments are made pertinent when the findings from 
experiments two and three are considered. These studies indicated that young children's 
understanding of ability in relation to outcome and effort expenditure demonstrates 
domain specificity. 
Finally, Chapter Eight suggests possible avenues of future research which have emanated 
from these findings. Such directions include: a more thorough examination of the domain 
specificity of young children's beliefs about ability; an examination of whether or not 
stages of effort and ability understanding exist further to those identified by previous 
research as current findin2s indicate may be the case; an assessment of the efficacy of 
employing behavioural measures to explore young children's conceptual understanding, 
and, using a different approach from that adopted in the present thesis to investigate 
whether or not different stages of effort and ability understanding demonstrate differential 
degrees of stability as the present thesis suggested. 
xiii 
CHAPTER ONE. 
DEVELOPING CONCEPTUALISATIONS 
OFEFFORTAND ABILITY. 
1.1.1. Introduction 
Effort and ability are seen as influential causes of success and failure by both 
Heider (1958) and Weiner (1972; 1974). Although an individual's concepts of 
effort and ability remain the same regardless of whether reasoning is applied to the 
self or to others (Nicholls & Miller, 1984), developmental changes in the meaning 
and implication of ability have been observed. Nicholls (1989) sees these changes 
in conceptions of competence as the crux of understanding achievement 
motivation. Changing conceptions of ability, difficulty and associated concepts 
should subsequently result in changes in achievement affect and behaviour 
(Nicholls, 1978). Ability has been defined by Nicholls (1978) as a reference to 
someone's current capacity but we can only use observed task performance to 
assess ability if optimal effort has been exerted. Hence, effort and ability are 
logically interdependent concepts (Nicholls, 1978) and cannot be studied in 
isolation from each other. Before 11/12 years of age, children are unable to 
conceptualise ability as a capacity, a phenomenon which will receive further 
consideration in the following section. Nevertheless, children as young as 2 are 
able to understand that individuals possess the means to produce successful or 
unsuccessful outcomes (Nicholls, 1989). Moreover, by 5 years of age, most 
children recognise that in a competitive context, only one person can win. 
1.2.1. Developing conceptualisations of effort and ability in the academic 
domain 
Investigations which have examined the development of children's understanding 
about effort and ability concepts have mainly focused on children's applications of 
their knowledge to academic tasks. Initial research by Kun (1977) revealed 
indications of the developmental changes which are involved in the child's 
understanding of effort and ability concepts. She demonstrated that first grade 
children infer hi her effort input when ability levels are presented as high, and vice 
versa. Third graders on the other hand infer less effort expenditure when 
outcomes are said to be the result of high rather than low ability. However, as 
Nicholls (1989) suggests, such research findings may indicate whether children 
generally associate effort with ability and not how they perceive the meanings of 
these constructs. Nicholls (1978) extended Kun's (1977) investigation by 
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systematically examining changes in children's conceptualisations of effort and 
ability over a cross-section of chronological ages. Within a causal framework, 
Nicholls (1978) examined the development of this reasoning, revealing that this 
conceptual development involves movement through four hierarchical levels. A 
description of his method of investigation follows. 
Subjects between 5 and 13 years of age were shown three films, each depicting 
two children in a classroom working on an academic task. One of these children 
worked continuously throughout, whereas the other child, although not displaying 
disruptive behaviour, worked intermittently. They were both said to score 10 out 
of 10 in the first film and 2 out of 10 in the second. However, in the third film, the 
child working continuously and the child working intermittently were said to 
score 2 and 8 out of 10, respectively. After each of the films, the following set of 
questions was asked about the models, which, although standardised, was 
amended in response to the subjects' answers. 
(1) Was one working harder or were they working the same? 
(2) Is one cleverer or are they the same? 
(3) How come they got the same when one worked hard and one didn't? [For film 
three: How come this child scored more but didn't work as hard? ] 
(4) If they both worked really hard, would one get more than the other or not? 
Duda (1987) and Nicholls (1978; 1989) surnmarised the levels of reasoning which 
the children's answers to the above questions revealed. These levels are presented 
below. 
Level 1 (4-6 years): 
During this period, children are unable to differentiate between the concepts of 
effort, ability and outcome. Focusing on either effort or outcome, the young child 
believes the focus of their attention to be synonymous with ability. Explanations 
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for outcomes are tautological. Regardless of outcome, higher ability is inferred 
from a hi I rv rt . Dher effort 
input and similarly, irrespective of obse ed effo 
expenditure, more effort input is inferred when success level is high. An enduring 
belief in the capacity to succeed and exert personal control over outcomes ensures 
a period of psychological security for these children. Evidence of tl-ýs is seen in 
the optimistically exaggerated perceptions of competence found in young children 
(for example, Harter & Pike, 1984), a finding which is questioned in Chapters 
Five and Seven of this thesis. Nicholls (1989) suggests that these competence 
perceptions are maintained in part by the child's inability to conceptualise ability as 
a capacity. 
This description of the young child's beliefs about effort and ability mirrors Lewis' 
(1994) comments that the young child's construals are widely recognised as 
illogical, constrained by content and context, idiosyncratic, and subjectively 
determined. Similarly, Kagan (1984) suggests that the child's interpretation of the 
meanings of constructs are always subjective and unconventional. However, 
Freyd (198-3)) claims that when children construct a verbal response relating to 
their beliefs, the meanings of concepts are altered to make "objective sense". 
Level 2 (7-9 years): 
Effort and outcome are now linked as cause and effect, a feature which 
distinguishes level two from level one reasoning. Moreover, effort is believed to 
be the major cause of outcomes. As such, if the effort expenditure of two 
individuals is equal, resulting levels of success are also expected to be equal. 
Differences in achievement gained through equal amounts of effort input are 
commonly attributed to compensatory or misapplied effort. Although not yet 
employed as a causal referent, individual differences in ability are acknowledged 
at this level. For example, children are able to recognise that, in comparison to 
another, the harder working, lower achiever is the less able of the two. Although 
he asserts that children at level two do not perceive ability as a current capacity, 
Nicholls (1978; 1989) lacks clarity on the issue of how these children do perceive 
ability. It is apparent that they do acknowledge individual differences in ability as 
they are able to correctly classify individuals in relation to their effort expenditure 
and level of success. 
3 
Although they recognise 
.. the reality of the situation.. (Nicholls, 1978, p. 812), 
these children do not use the concept of abilityper se to explain equal outcomes 
gained through unequal effort input. However when Nicholls writes about this 
issue in later works, for example, 1989, he pays little attention to the question of 
how the child at this level of understanding conceptualises ability. His sole focus is 
on the way in which the child perceives the relationship between effort and 
outcome. It appears that Nicholls' (1978) earlier writing provided some indication 
that these children recognise the existence of ability and individual differences in 
ability but in his later writing (1989) he affords this question scant consideration. 
This is therefore an issue of contention, the only firm evidence which can be 
presented is that these children do not conceptualise ability as a current capacity 
in the same way that older children do. 
Level 3 (9-10 years): 
Children no longer believe that effort expenditure is solely responsible for 
performance outcomes, and they now intermittently attribute performance 
outcomes to ability. As a result, these children are able to partially differentiate 
between effort and ability as outcome determinants. At this level, Nicholls (1989) 
believes that, unlike in previous levels, the child now sees ability as a current 
capacity, for example, being faster or smarter. This understanding is characterised 
by the knowledge that high ability can compensate for lack of effort whilst low 
ability limits the effects of effort expenditure on the level of a performance 
outcome. However, such principles are not yet systematically applied, for 
instance, the child may still assert that equal effort input will result in equal 
outcomes although previously they used ability related statements. It appears that 
Nicholls (1978; 1989) proposes that a huge cognitive change takes place in the 
transition from level two to three. In Nicholls' (1978; 1989) terms, the individual 
advances from possessing a limited understanding of the existence of ability and 
its influence on the outcome of a performance attempt, to the belief that ability is 
a current capacity, although this reasoning is, as yet, not consistently applied. 
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Level 4 (11/12 years onwards): 
Individuals can now completely differentiate between effort and ability as 
outcome determinants and recognise that ability is a capacity. Such 
comprehensive understanding of how the interactional relationship between effort 
and ability influences performance outcomes allows systematic application of 
these principles. Children at this stage of reasoning realise that if high, ability 
enhances the effects of effort on performance, and if low, limits this effect. When 
success is gained through little effort, an inference of superior ability is made. 
Werner (1957) has proposed a principle of development known as the 
orthogenetic principle. This principle describes development as a progression from 
relatively global and undifferentiated states to states which display increasing 
differentiation, articulation and hierarchic integration. The developmental 
progression of effort and ability understanding which Nicholls (1978) describes 
appears to follow this principle. The reasoning exhibited throughout this 
continuum also demonstrates the pattern of cognitive development described by 
Piaget. According to Crain (1992), Piaget defined four stages of general cognitive 
development: sensorimotor; preoperational; concrete operational and formal 
operational. All individuals do not necessarily experience these stages at exactly 
the same chronological age but they do progress through them in a universal, 
invariant sequence. Each stage represents a general pattern of thought which is 
qualitatively different from that displayed in the remaining stages. To a certain "D =1 IZ 
extent, knowledge of the child's present developmental stage allows us to predict 
their behaviour on a variety of tasks. These predictions are limited however by the 
fact that individuals can reach different developmental stages in different areas at 
the same time, a phenomenon which Piaget referred to as d6calage (see section 
1.3.1. on multidimensionality-page 15- for further comments on this and related 
concepts). 
Before approximately 7 years of age, children's thinking is described by Piaget as 
preoperational. They are able to use symbols, for example, words and gestures, 
and internal mental images but cannot think logically or systematically. Centration 
and egocentrism are characteristic of preoperational thought. The former occurs 
when an individual focuses on one salient feature of an event or object whilst 
ignoring its other features. For instance, the individual focuses their attention on 
only one dimension of an object such as its height but does not consider its other 
features such as depth. Egocentrism is an inability to see events and objects from 
the perspective of others, or even to realise that others may have a perspective 
which differs from one's own. During this stage, children will concentrate on what 
appears to be reality rather than what actually constitutes reality. For instance, 
when a stick is placed in water, the young child believes it is bent although it was 
clearly straight before entering the water (Miller, 1993). Evidence of 
preoperational thought is seen in children's reasoning at level one, in the 
centration, tautology and egocentricity of their responses to interview questions. 
Concrete operational thinking is manifest from around 7 until II years of age. 
Reasoning is now systematic but can still only be applied to concrete, tangible 
entities. This is exemplified in the ability to comprehend the notion of 
conservation of matter. Such a focus on concrete entities is seen concerning effort 
and ability concepts. During Nicholls' (1978) levels two and three, in particular 
level two, the main feature of the child's schema is effort and other concrete, 
visible factors such as speed of task completion. 
From approximately 11 years of age children enter the formal operations stage. 
Now they are capable of extending their thinking to the realms of the abstract. 
They are able to formulate hypotheses, make deductions and reason beyond what 
exists before them in the present to what is probable and possible. Reasoning of 
this nature is apparent at level four when the individual is able to comprehend, and 
cope with, the abstract concept of ability. They can now make ability inferences 
which follow logical and systematic patterns and take all relevant factors into 
account. 
6 
In general terms, throughout both Piaget's general cognitive developmental stages 
and Nicholl's continuum of effort and ability understanding, the emphasis moves 
from the concrete and tangible to that which is abstract and hypothetical. 
Children! s self-understanding displays the same changing pattern of emphasis, 
from the concrete to the abstract. Initially, their self-descriptive statements are 
based on physical attributes and activities in which they participate. With 
advancing age and cognitive development, these statements refer more to the 
child's inner, psychological attributes such as personality than to their more 
observable attributes (Broughton, 1978; Guardo & Bohan, 1971; Keller, Ford & 
Meacham, 1978; Secord & Peevers, 1974; Selman, 1980). 
The child's early focus on concrete events and objects is reflected in the absence 
of a measurable self-worth construct before 8 years of age (Harter, 1986). During 
this period children are able to make self evaluations of their cognitive and 
physical competence. However this takes the form of a general competence factor 
as the children are unable to differentiate between their competence in the two 
domains (Harter, 1986). It is possible that the more tangible nature of cognitive 
and physical competence, in comparison with self-worth, enables them to evaluate 
this but not general self-worth. Alternatively, the lack of a general self-worth 
measure could simply be attributed to the young child's inability to verbalise this 
construct. Further investigation is required into this issue as Marsh, Craven & 
Debus (199 1) claim that self-worth can be measured before eight years of age and 
that young children are able to differentiate between their cognitive and physical 
competence. 
Although maturational forces, such as the child's general cognitive development, 
influence the development of effort and ability understanding, the influence of 
contextual factors cannot be overlooked. A number of theorists emphasise that to 
understand child development the child must not be considered as a 
decontextualised organism. For instance, Thelen (1989, p. 92) claims that, 
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we cannot define the system removed from the context. 
In other words, the child's environment, comprising of varied influences, 
contributes towards their development. This proposal is encompassed in one of 
Baltes' (1987) family of perspectives which he refers to as, " Contextualism as 
paradignf'. This perspective suggests that development does not depend only on 
the individual themself but on dynamic interaction between the individual, age- 
graded influences, history graded influences and non-normative influences. No 
one of these factors takes precedence over the others. Hence, just as the life-span 
approach to development which is adopted by Baltes (1987) sees plurality and 
complexity in the nature of development, plurality and complexity in the forces 
which influence developmental change is evident. Age-graded influences include, 
for example, cognitive developmental stages, the temporal sequence of which is 
relatively fixed across all individuals, and age-graded socialisation processes. 
Within their culture individuals experience these influences at approximately the 
same chronological age (Hetherington & Baltes, 1988). 
Developmental changes in social comparison methods and the type and amount of 
self-evaluations made by children have been observed. With increasing age, social 
comparison and self evaluation increase (Butler, 1989; Dweck & Elliott, 1983; 
Frey & Ruble, 1987) as does the emphasis placed on normative evaluation (for 
example, Stipek & Tannatt, 1984). Throughout school, the emphasis changes 
from personal mastery and trying one's best to achieving in comparison with 
others, for example, Blumenfeld, Pintrich, Meece & Wessels (1982). Such 
messages conveyed by significant others could affect the child's notions of the 
role of effort and ability in determining outcomes of performance attempts. 
Subsequently, the changes in self-evaluation and social comparison use which 
have been documented may reflect this socialisation process. It is possible that 
these changes parallel and influence the child's developing conceptualisations of 
effort and ability. Hetherington & Baltes (1988) refer to this phenomenon as 
organismic contextualism whereby development arises as a result of interaction 
between the active, organised individual and its equally active and organised 
environment (for example, Overton, 1985). This interaction occurs at different 
contextual levels, for example, the individual themself, their family and their wider 
community. Within these different contextual levels, children encounter 
socialisation processes and individuals which effect these processes. For instance, 
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the teacher at school and the child's parents and grandparents. Fogel & Thelen 
(1987) suggest that the information which individuals receive is internally 
organised so that it can be understood and to maintain an equilibrium between 
existing knowledge and externally received information. Children are therefore 
likely to organise effort and ability related information which they receive from 
significant others to strengthen their present schema about these concepts. Kelly 
(19ý5) has discussed the mechanism by which an individual's construction system 
of events and concepts develops. He proposes that individuals constantly 
experience both different events and variations of the same event and that the 
emphasis on different factors within these contexts changes throughout 
development. Subsequently, the way in which we construe these events and 
concepts which they involve is continually altered. Therefore the experience of 
developmentally related events, such as the emphasis placed on normative 
evaluation and effort could influence the individual's interpretation of these issues 
and their beliefs about effort and ability. 
It is evident therefore that maturational change such as the child's movement 
through general stages of cognitive development is unlikely to be the only factor 
which influences children's developing conceptualisations of effort and ability. A 
likely explanation is that contextual factors, such as the child's social environment 
and the socialisation processes embodied by their particular culture, influence the 
developmental changes observed by Nicholls (1978). 0 
1.2.2. The importance of effort 
It is evident from Nicholls' (1978) results that effort is the focal point of the young 
child's schema, representing an indicator of ability level and an influential outcome 
determinant (Whitehead, Anderson & Mitchell, 1987). Alongside material 
incentives, effort is a salient factor to the young child (O'Sullivan, 1993) and plays 
a primary role in their understanding of both self and others' behaviour (Stipek & 
MacIver, 1989). Previous research has demonstrated this saliency of effort to the 
young child. Pre-schoolers, from 2.5 years upwards did not accept help when 
faced with difficulties, instead they chose to increase their own effort input 
(Heckhausen, 1984). 5 and 6/7 year olds believe that increased effort expenditure 
can facilitate memory and recall, respectively (Wellman, Collins & Glieberman, 
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198 1; Howe, O'Sullivan & March, 1992). The young child's focus on effort has 
been attributed to both parental treatment (Kurtz, Schneider, Carr, Borkowski & 
Rellinger, 1990) and pre-school experiences (Stipek & MacIver, 1989). Parents 
often convey the impression to their children that effort breeds success and pre- 
school work is frequently judged by the effort which has gone into producing it 
rather than by its quality. 
Having been revealed as such an influential variable to young children, O'Sullivan 
(1993) investigated the nature of children's beliefs about effort in the context of 
metamemory. She showed 25 subjects (mean age of 54 months) drawings of 
children performing a recall task. These children were portrayed as trying either a 
little or a lot, or, with facial expressions omitted (to remove effort cues), as 
working towards either a low or a high incentive prize. The subjects believed that 
higher incentive and effort expenditure would result in greater recall and that a 
higher incentive would produce greater effort input. O'Sullivan (1993) then 
examined whether these beliefs would be reflected in actual behaviour. 34 subjects 
(mean age of 53.6 months) performed a recall task and were offered either a low 
or a high incentive prize for successful task completion. More attentional 
behaviour was observed in the high incentive condition confirming the children's 
belief that a greater incentive would result in increased effort expenditure. 
However, their belief that greater effort input would facilitate superior recall did 
not correspond to actual performance scores on the task. These results 
demonstrate the young child's firm beliefs about effort, which, due to their 
naivet6, may not represent reality (O'Sullivan, 1993). 
The importance of effort to the developing child has been made apparent by 
Erikson in stage four of his life-span theory. During this stage, children experience 
a conflict between industry and inferiority. They begin to learn the skills which 
their culture values and develop a desire to gain competence in these skills. At the 
same time, the child discovers that they can derive pleasure from being industrious 
and working hard towards gaining these competencies. This enjoyment takes the 
form of satisfaction in the learning of a new skill and the approval and recognition 
received from significant others. If a sense of industry and competence is not the 
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result of these efforts, the child is, however, likely to develop a feeling of 
inferiority and inadequacy. 
The emphasis which young children place on effort provides them with a means of 
protecting levels of perceived competence, a phenomenon succinctly described by 
Heckhausen (1984, p. 16) as the: 
effort-dependent elasticity of perceived competence. 
It is also likely that young children's exaggerated competence perceptions (for 
example, Harter & Pike, 1984) are maintained by their belief that present effort 
expenditure can always be increased (O'Sullivan & Joy, 1990). 
Following this euphoric period of optimism, children's competence perceptions 
tend towards a general decline. A logical, though yet to be established, 
relationship is apparent between developmental changes in perceptions of 
competence, self evaluation and concepts of effort and ability. Previous research 
has revealed conflicting results concerning the developmental changes exhibited in 
children's self-evaluations of their academic competence. Butler (1989); Dweck & 
Elliott (198' )); Frey & Ruble (1987) & Ruble, Boggiano, Flett & Frey (1983) have 
suggested that this number of self-evaluations made increases with age, as does 
their positive content (Frey & Ruble, 1987). Moreover, parallels have been 
proposed between the increase in self evaluative instances and the demonstrated 
decrease in children's positive self regard (Dweck & Elliott, 1983 )). In contrast, a 
developmental decrease in the amount of self evaluations children make has been 
revealed, as demonstrated by older children's increasing reluctance to engage in 
verbalised self evaluation (Asher & Renshaw, 1981; Frey & Ruble, 1985). Darley 
& Goethals (1980) attribute this to feelings of anxiety which emanate from self 
evaluation as it becomes a more sensitive topic with increasing age. 
As the individual's conceptions of effort and ability develop, the individual 
gradually increases their understanding that ability limits the effects of effort on 
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the success of performance outcomes. Unlike in previous levels, when level four 
reasoning is achieved, individual differences in perceived competence are now 
likely to affect performance levels. Impaired performance is anticipated when 
perceived competence is low and the concept of ability as a capacity is understood 
(Nicholls & Nfiller, 1984). When this concept is ftilly understood, enhanced 
competence perceptions result from favourable comparisons with others. For 
example, by expending comparatively less effort than others yet achieving the 
same or greater levels of success. However, in appropriate contexts, for example, 
task involving environments (where the aim is to achieve personal mastery rather 
than demonstrate superior competence over others), individuals are still able to 
apply the less differentiated concept of ability (Nicholls, 1984). Although Nicholls 
(1984) discusses the adult's use of the "less differentiated" concept of ability, no 
evidence exists to suggest that individuals regress to previous levels of 
understanding. The Piagetian approach to developmental change proposes that 
individuals do not regress to previously experienced stages. Nicholls (1978) 
appears to adopt this approach in his apparent belief that the development of 
effort and ability understanding ceases once the notion of ability as a current 
capacity is understood during early adolescence. However, life-span theorists such 
as Baltes (1987) would propose that development occurs long after the 
chronological age boundaries which are suggested by many child 
developmentalists. It is therefore possible that the adult's ability to apply the more 
or less differentiated concept of ability, depending on the context in which this 
concept is applied, is a manifestation of a further stage of reasoning about ability 
and effort concepts, rather than a regression to previously experienced 
developmental stages. Further investigation is therefore required to ascertain 
whether the individual's understanding of effort and ability concepts develops 
beyond the four levels which Nicholls (1978) proposes. 
Empirical verification of the adult's use of the less differentiated concept of ability 
was provided by Jagacinski & Nicholls (1984). They asked undergraduate 
students to recall situations in which they employed either high or low effort 
under either task or ego involving conditions. (Task involving conditions 
emphasise personal mastery and improving on one's previous performance 
whereas ego involving environments emphasise demonstrating superior 
performance to others in a relevant normative comparison group. ) In task 
involving conditions, the students judged their competence to be higher and 
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experienced greater positive affect when success was gained through the 
application of high rather than low effort. However, under ego involving 
conditions, the students judged their competence to be higher and experienced 
more positive affect when they perceived that they had succeeded through the 
input of little effort. Jagacinski & Nicholls (1984) concluded that, because these 
adults derived more positive affect and felt their competence was higher when 
more effort was expended in task involving conditions than in ego involving ones, 
they had employed the less differentiated concept of ability. It must be noted that 
under task involving conditions the subjects were not provided with information 
which allowed them to make comparisons of their own performance with those of 
others'. Additionally, the efficacy of studies which employ retrospective measures 
must be questioned as the degree of subjectivity which such studies rely on may 
be too great to result in conclusive findings. 
Although they perceive ability as a capacity and understand that it limits the 
effects of effort on performance outcomes, adults as well as children attach great 
importance to effort, as demonstrated by Jagacinski & Nicholls (1990). Whereas 
children maximise effort input to maintain perceived competence, it was originally 
believed that adults maintain their perceived competence levels by reducing effort 
expenditure (e. g. Covington, 1984). Such effort reduction, when faced with 
failure, would then allow the individual to attribute poor outcomes to low effort 
rather than low ability. A lack of empirical support for the effort reduction 
paradigm led Jagacinski & Nicholls (1990) to conduct a series of experiments 
designed to determine the existence of such a phenomenon. Initial doubts 
concerning its existence were raised by a preliminary experiment in which adults 
were asked to imagine they were sitting an IQ test which became progressively 
more difficult. They were told that previous experience on the test meant they 
knew at which point they were unable to answer any more questions. Subjects 
were then asked if they would stop trying at this point in order to avoid appearing 
unintelligent to others. Even when appearing intelligent was stressed to the 
subjects, none reported that they would reduce their effort and were astounded at 
such suggestions made after the experiment. 
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In subsequent experiments subjects were asked to imagine either themselves or 
another sitting the test. In this hypothesised context, the individual was observed 
by either an instructor or peers. Alternatively, the hypothesised individual did or 
did not receive negative social comparison information (defined as knowledge that 
own performance will be worse than that of the normative peer group). These 
studies demonstrated an overwhelming lack of support for the effort reduction 
paradigm concerning the self, but some support where others are concerned. 
Subjects indicated that demonstrating effort was more important in the presence 
of an instructor, suggesting that effort employment is a means of obtaining social 
approval. However, social comparison did not affect the results and students' 
unwillingness to reduce effort was evidently not an attempt to appear hard 
working to others. Therefore no support was provided for this hypothesis. 
A new hypothetical scenario was employed to assess whether subjects did not 
appreciate the implications associated with reducing effort. The advantages of 
effort reduction were stressed to the subjects: not appearing incompetent to 
others; being able to focus attention on a more achievable task instead; being able 
to attribute a poor outcome to low effort rather than low ability. Nevertheless, 
subjects still only saw effort reduction as a viable option for others and not for 
themselves. 
Perceiving ability as a capacity, these subjects should realise the futility of 
continued effort if demonstrated ability level is low (see previous discussion of 
reasoning at level four of Nicholls' (1978) continuum). In spite of this, they chose 
to maintain effort, and did not demonstrate the behaviour expected from 
individuals at such a level of conceptual understanding 0* 
A rudimentary flaw exists within the effort reduction paradigm as reducing effort 
requires the individual to acknowledge a lack of personal competence (Jagacinski 
& Nicholls, 1990). Protecting competence perceptions is one of the primary 
objectives of effort reduction. The need to recognise personal incompetence when 
deciding to reduce effort therefore effectively defeats the purpose of this process. 
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Jagacinski & Nicholls (1990) do suggest however, that effort is unlikely to be 
maintained when the individual has withdrawn their commitment to demonstrating 
competence at the task and when the withdrawal of effort is unconscious (Berglas 
& Jones, 1978). Support for the effort reduction paradigm would perhaps be 
revealed in two further contexts. If the investigation were conducted in a real life 
situation, compared with Jagacinski & Nicholls' (1990) hypothetical scenarios, 
subjects would have to face the consequences of their actions. The advantages of 
reducing effort may become more apparent and the subjects' willingness to do so 
would perhaps demonstrate an increase. In a physical or motor setting, effort and 
its impact on outcome are more immediately visible to others than in an academic 
context (See Duda, 1987). Hence, continuing effort when failure is experienced is 
more likely to result in damaged self-efficacy. It appears quite probable that in a 
physically oriented context, individuals will withdraw effort in response to failure 
as an attempt to protect self-efficacy levels. Whether or not children would 
subscribe to the effort reduction paradigm is still open to investigation as 
Jagacinski & Nicholls (1990) examined this phenomenon with adult subjects. 
1.3.1. The multidimensionality of development and the concept of domain 
specificity 
To date, empirical evidence which pertains to the individual's developing 
conceptualisation of effort and ability has focused on children's reasoning about 
academic tasks. The present research is concerned with children's ability to apply 
this conceptual development within the physical domain. We cannot presume that 
reasoning about effort and ability concepts in this domain directly parallels that 
already revealed in academic contexts. Theoretical proposals concerning 
achievement motivation in these two domains may not demonstrate congruence 
when the observed differences in the nature of academic and sporting contexts are 
considered (for example, Duda & Nicholls, 1992). Possible developmental 
differences between the academic and physical domains need acknowledgement in 
order to provide individuals with beneficial learning environments. 
Duda (1987, p. 136) warns against generalising across the physical and academic 
domains without sufficient empirical support: 
15 
... it would be limiting simply to extrapolate from the academic domain when 
attempting to understand how children engaged in sports tasks process their 
competence. 
The following quotation from O'Sullivan (1993, p. 396) demonstrates the present 
specificity of Nicholls' (1978) continuum to the academic domain: 
... young children do not differentiate between effort and hitellectual ability 
in 
the same way that adults and older children do (my italics). 
In fact, Nicholls (1978, p. 808) suggests that, 
... it remains conceivable that a different set of levels might be found 
if 
different stimuli were used to elicit reasoning. 
The rationale behind independent consideration of competency domains is 
demonstrated in the following discussion of the concepts of multidimensionality in 
development and domain specificity. 
1.3.2. Multidimensionality 
Central to a number of theoretical perspectives (e. g. Baltes, 1987) is the 
multidimensional nature of development. Multidimensionality is one of the family 
of perspectives which Baltes (1987) describes as characteristic of his life-span 
approach to development. It refers to the variation in developmental trajectories 
which is evident in different domains of competence (Hetherington & Baltes, 
1988). The concept of multidimensionality is reflected in Piaget's notion of 
horizontal d6calage which proposes that highly and less highly developed 
structures exist simultaneously, and Erikson's claim that individuals can 
experience two of his eight life-cycle stages at any one time. Piaget's and Erikson's 
ideas on the course and mechanisms of development are examined in greater 
detail in Chapter Three. 
Neo-Piagetians such as Flavell (1963), although maintaining Piaget's idea of the 
existence of general cognitive stages, have adapted some of his proposals so that 
this theoretical perspective can accommodate both general cognitive 
developmental stages and individual and domain specific differences. For instance, 
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Flavell (1963) suggests that general logical structures can be replaced by 
independently assembled domain specific structures. As a result, developmental 
changes may be acquired at different chronological ages in different domains, a 
situation which reflects Piaget's original proposal of horizontal d6calage. Lewis 
(1994) also discusses proposals made by Case (1992), in which Case (1992) 
claims to reconcile the generality of stages with domain and task specificity. Case 
(1992) suggests that this issue can be resolved by the existence of individual 
structures which are designed to solve particular problems and are linked by 
central conceptual structures. These central control structures are assembled 
individually within each domain and are constrained only by maturational forces. 
They represent solutions to loosely related tasks, such as telling the time and 
reading music in six year old children, and share the same general content of 
semantics. Case (1992) believes that central conceptual structures are a common 
unit of analysis for knowledge domains and developmental stages and therefore 
offer a method of reconciling the notions of generality and specificity. Lewis 
(1994) however, contends that Case's (1992) proposals do not provide a solution 
to these issues but offer merely a compromise between two differing perspectives. 
Experiential, cultural and task factors all contribute towards the individual 
differences which can be observed in the construction of cognitive structures 
(Lewis, 1994). Carey (1985) believes that domain specific knowledge is based on 
the child's experiences with problems in the domain under consideration. As 
children's constructs of the world are guided by experience, content and goals, 
these constructs demonstrate considerable diversity. Regardless of this diversity 
however, the structures which underpin the conceptual content of different 
domains is universal across these domains (Case, 1992). 
That developmental courses vary between domains of competence has already 
been mentioned, yet variation is also evident within competency domains. Even 
within developmental trajectories, individual differences are demonstrated. For 
instance, one experience may produce different outcomes for different individuals 
and alternatively, individuals may derive the same outcome through a number of 
different experiences. Hence, the concept of multidimensionality demonstrates the 
plurality of developmental change (Baltes, 1987). This proposal is mirrored in 
Kelly's (1955) "Individuality" corollary which also describes the individuality and 
plurality of developmental pathways. One person's perception of an event differs 
from other peoples' perceptions of the same event, therefore no two individuals 
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can ever experience exactly the same event. Consequently, an individual follows 
their own developmental course during which a unique personality is fostered. 
Evidence of organismic contextualism is apparent in Kelly's (1955) proposals. 
Kelly (1955) sees development as a process which involves active experiences 
with the environment and interpretation of this environment by the individual. The 
individual's present and previous environments shape their interpretation of their 
experiences and subsequently shape their individual course of development. 
Developmental changes also affect the way in which individuals interpret events. 
Therefore the same event may be interpreted differently by two individuals as a 
direct result of their developmental stage and the environmental influences they 
are exposed to by socialisation processes evident at this developmental stage. For 
example, high effort expenditure can be seen as a positive attribute by younger 
children but not by older ones, as a consequence of their beliefs about effort and 
ability and the emphasis which their current context places on these concepts. 
Baltes (1987) cites the system of intellectual abilities found in adulthood as an 
example of multidimensionality. Intellect does not comprise only one structure but 
a whole subsystem of different structures. Of these, fluid and crystallised 
knowledge are the most important. 
A multidimensional approach to motor and cognitive development is supported by 
Zelazo (1983). Traditionally, changes in cognitive and motor skills have been 
thought to occur simultaneously and few examples have been produced to suggest cc 
their independent development though Zelazo (1983) argues that cognitive and 
motor development may be asynchronous in some cases. Fagan (1977) for 
example has revealed that in some instances, infants may not have to rely on gross 
and fine motor skills to process visual and auditory information. A common 
approach to measuring the child's cognitive ability is by assessing their level of 
motor ability. Zelazo (1983) suggests that this may not be applicable in all cases 
and that in some, cognitive development may influence subsequent motor 
development. For instance, walking may be stimulated by the child's interest in a 
distance object. To satisfy their curiosity children must develop a means by which 
to gain access to this object, which may stimulate the development of unaided 
walking. During the preliminary developmental stages, motor development occurs 
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rapidly and independently of any cognitive change, providing further evidence for 
independent development between different competency domains. 
1.3.3. Self esteem and domain specificity 
The constructs of self esteem and achievement motivation provide examples of 
the multidimensionality and domain specificity of development. 
Multidimensionality is a common feature of self esteem theories (Weiss, 1987). 
Self esteem can only be understood if an individual's self evaluations within all 
domains of competence are considered (Fox: hierarchical model, 1988; Harter: 
multidimensional model, 1985a). These perceptions of competence vary from one 
domain to another (Harter, 1985a). For instance, an individual can judge their 
competence in the classroom to be high yet feel incompetent in sporting and social 
contexts. 
This domain specificity allows researchers to employ distinct subscales to measure 
competence perceptions in different domains (Harter, 1985a), and individuals in 
general to personalise their self esteem. This personalisation is achieved through 
either self-serving or discounting. If in a given domain, an individual's perceived 
competence is high, they can self-serve by attaching greater importance to this 
domain than others in which their competence is low. Discounting is the converse 
of self-serving, helping to ameliorate the effects of low perceived competence on 
self esteem level. To discount, individuals reduce the importance of those domains 
in which their perceived competence is low. Subsequently, the demonstration of 
competence in domains which have been discounted is no longer of importance. 
As self esteem level is only influenced by domains which are important to the 
individual (Harter, 1985a), self-serving and discounting are effective ways of 
customising and maintaining self esteem. 
However, the multidimensionality of self esteem extends beyond the observed 
domain specificity of competence perceptions. Multidimensionality is also 
apparent within domains of competence, exemplified in the physical domain by 
Fox (1988). Figure 1.1 (modified from Fox, 1988) demonstrates his hierarchical 
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arrangement of dimensions within the physical domain. Physical self esteem 
initially derives from an individual's self evaluations of sports competence and 
physical appearance. Self evaluative judgements become even more refined within 
each of these facets of physical self esteem. For instance, feelings of general 
sporting competence are built up by assessing competence in different sporting 
pursuits and the particular skills which they involve. Located at the base of the 
hierarchy are specific, state feelings of self-efficacy such as, "My backstroke 
technique was good today". If sufficiently reinforced, these perceptions can 
permeate up through the hierarchy to influence more stable feelings of physical 
and global self esteem. 
I 
GLOBAL SfLF ESTEEM 
Physical (elf esteem 
I 
Sports competence Physical appearance 
(facet) 
I 
Swimming ability 
(sub t cet) 
Backstroke ability 
(specific 
I aspect) 
This morning's backstroke 
technique 
(self-efficacy) 
Figure 1.1: A hierarchical arrangement of physical self esteem components IM 25 
(Fox, 1988) 
1.3.4. Multidimensionality and achievement motivation 
When achievement motivation theories are proposed, they are generally 
concerned with specific domains of competence and are believed to possess 
limýited generality to other domains (for example, Weiner, 1990). Duda & Nicholls 
(1992) investigated the extent to which achievement motivation variables can be 
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generalised across the sporting and academic domains and demonstrated that 
multidimensionality is a feature of achievement motivation. They obtained 
measures in both domains of goal orientations; beliefs about the causes of 
success; intrinsic satisfaction/enjoyment, and perceived ability, from 207 
adolescents (mean age of 15.1 years). Whereas goal orientations and beliefs about 
the causes of success were found to generalise across the two domains, perceived 
ability demonstrated a greater association with intrinsic satisfaction/enjoyment and 
boredom in the sporting than the academic domain. Similarly, different predictors 
of satisfaction/enjoyment and boredom were revealed in the two domains. These 
were respectively task orientation and perceived ability in the sporting and the 
academic domains. Duda & Nicholls (1992) attribute these differences to the 
competitive and tangible nature of sport which makes sporting competence more 
visible to others than academic competence. Hence, we can see evidence of the 
domain specificity of achievement motivation variables. The degree of the 
generality across domains of competence depends on which variables are under 
consideration (Duda & Nicholls, 1992). 
As mentioned previously, the present research is concerned with effort and ability 
understanding and its developmental trajectory in the physical domain. 
Multidimensionality and domain specificity prompt an exploration of similarities 
between this research focus and effort and ability development in the academic 
domain. In an examination of this issue, two factors require attention - the nature 
of this conceptual development and its temporal sequence. The developing 
concepts of effort and ability revealed by Nicholls (1978) reflect the different 
types of reasoning which Piaget describes in his general cognitive developmental 
stages (see section 1.2.1 for a full discussion). Reasoning changes from that 
characterised by preoperational thought to concrete then formal operational 
thought with movement through the continuum. This is exhibited by the child's 
initial focus on concrete entities such as effort and his/her increasing capacity to 
reason about abstract entities such as ability. 
Considering the parallels between developing conceptualisations in the academic 
domain and general cognitive development, it is reasonable to hypothesise that a 
similar developmental trajectory will be exhibited in the physical domain. The 
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developmental advances in the reasoning displayed throughout the continuum 
require movement through general cognitive developmental stages. As the nature 
of effort and ability conceptual development displays characteristics of general 
cognitive developmental advances, it is unlikely to differ in the academic and 
physical domains. 
Similarly, the developmental trajectories of effort and ability understanding in the 
academic domain and of general cognitive developmental stages appear to be 
temporally synchronous. At the onset of developments in this conceptual 
understanding, parallel advances in general cognitive capacity are exhibited. These 
changes in general reasoning capacity, from preoperational to formal operational 
thought, are manifest in the developing conceptualisations of effort and ability 
revealed in the academic domain. It seems safe to assume that effort and ability 
understanding in the physical domain will follow the same temporal pattern as 
general cognitive developmental stages and subsequently, as effort and ability 
understanding in the academic domain. Therefore we would expect temporal unity 
of the developmental trajectories of effort and ability understanding in the 
academic and physical domains. This proposal is supported by Lewis (1994) who 
claims that global reorganisation in one or more domains should stimulate 
reorganisation in other competency domains through coupling with and 
amplifying perturbations experienced in these domains. The notion of amplified 
perturbations in normal parameter values is described in more detail in Chapter 
Three. 
Initially, Nicholls (1978) proposed that, if different stimuli were employed to elicit 
reasoning about effort and ability concepts, different levels of understanding could 
conceivably be revealed. By 1992, (p. 35) he claims that, 
... there 
is no reason to expect any significant differences in the nature of the 
conception of ability-as-current-capacity or its development for the field of 
sport and games, 
and that (p. 34): 
... there 
is every reason to suppose that use of physical tasks would show 
comparable trends in conceptions... 
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Irrespective of Nicholls' (1992) comments and the expectations of the present 
research, that similar developmental trajectories of effort and ability understanding 
will be displayed in the academic and physical domains, multidimensionality and 
domain specificity necessitate empirical verification of these claims. Although 
Nicholls' (1978) findings have been applied to the physical domain, no empirical 
support has yet been provided for this application. Therefore Chapter Two 
describes an experiment which investigates whether effort and ability 
understanding is applied to physical tasks in a similar manner to which it is applied 
to academic tasks. Comments made by Duda (1987) (and by Nicholls, 1992, see 
reference note 1) support the need for such a study. She states that investigations 
should examine how physical ability is construed by children at different ages and 
that the information obtained will increase our understanding of children's 
sporting performance levels and persistence and aid attempts to maximise 
children's levels of sporting participation. 
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CHAPTER TWO. 
AN INVESTIGA TION INTO EFFOR T AND 
ABILITY UNDERSTANDING 
CONCERNING PHYSICALLY ORIENTED 
CONTEXTS. 
2.1.1. Introduction 
Chapter One presented previous research which has revealed the developmental 
changes involved in children's understanding of effort and ability concepts. This 
research has focused mainly on the child's application of their knowledge to 
academic tasks, although these findings have been widely employed to explain this 
conceptual development with respect to physical tasks. The domain specificity and 
multidimensionality of development indicate that existing knowledge about this 
conceptual development should not necessarily be applied across different 
competency domains. For instance, domain theory (Fischer & Canfield, 1986) 
suggests that knowledge acquisition does not occur simultaneously in different 
domains. Consequently, it appears that the individual's capacity to apply this 
acquired knowledge to different domains may not be comparable between 
domains. The multidimensional and domain specific nature of development 
therefore does not allow direct extrapolation of Nicholls' (1978) findings to the 
physical domain. These issues necessitate an empirical assessment of children's 
capacity to apply their knowledge of effort and ability concepts to physical tasks. 
As a result of this, Chapter Two describes an investigation which was carried out 
to compare developing conceptualisations of effort and ability in the academic and 
physical domains and across a range of chronological ages. 
2.1.2. Subjects 
The subjects were taken from five primary schools in Gwynedd and Clwyd and a 
secondary school on Merseyside. Participants, who were predominantly 
Caucasian, were chosen at random by class teachers to represent a range of 
academic ability levels. Of the total sample of 137 subjects, 70 were boys and 67 
were girls, aged between 4 and 13 years. 
An explanation is offered to define randomisation in the current context when 
referred to in this and subsequent studies which are described in this thesis. This 
randomisation refers to the selection of schools, classes within these schools, 
children within these classes and the allocation of these children to different 
experimental groups. Local schools were approached and asked 
if they would 
participate in this research. As a result, these schools were not selected in a truly 
random manner, it was those who met the criteria (for instance, sufficient numbers 
24 
of children at the required age or developmental level) and who were willing to 
take part, from which subject samples were obtained. Children were then selected 
to participate if they met the requirements of the study under consideration, and, 
where appropriate, allocated as randomly as was feasible to different experimental 
groups. 
Although this procedure results in a degree of randomisation in that the schools 
selected could have been any from a number in North Wales and the children who 
took part did so through this arbitrary selection procedure, the limitations of this 
randomisation are acknowledged. Although it would have been desirable to have 
employed truly random samples in this and subsequent experiments, the practical 
limitations incurred in this research placed limitations on the extent of 
randomisation which could be achieved. For instance: schools had to be within 
daily travelling distance of the University of Wales, Bangor; the children had to be 
able to speak English (a number of young children in rural schools in North Wales 
only speak Welsh); the schools and children had to be willing to take part in the 
research, and, only schools which accommodated children at the required ages or 
levels of conceptual development could be included in studies described in this 
thesis. 
A comment is also warranted concerning the small samples employed in the 
current research as it must be acknowledged that small numbers increase the 
probability of incorporating deviant samples (Kerlinger, 1986). Practical 
considerations, some of which were listed previously, all contributed to the 
resultant small sample sizes used in this research. These include: the nature of the 
empirical investigations, that is, independent testing sessions for each individual; 
the time scale allowed to carry out doctorate research; the sizes of the schools in 
the locality; the limitations of bilinguilism, and, the necessity to impose as little as 
possible on schools'time. 
Although these are real and unavoidable concerns, it is necessary to highlight that 
the use of small samples can limit the efficacy of certain statistical analyses and, 
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coupled with the problems of achieving completely random samples, the extent to 
which findings using these samples can be generalised to their immediate 
population and to other populations. The caution required when using small 0 
samples and parametric statistics is considered further on in this thesis (see page 
109), whilst the issue of generalisability is considered below. 
When small samples are employed from a limited population, as was the case in 
the present research, this limits the extent to which findings can be generalised to 
wider populations. Consider, for instance, Kerlinger's (1986) suggestion, 
discussed previously, that small samples are more likely than larger ones to 
include deviant samples, that is, those which may not be representative of the 
whole population from which they are taken. It was hoped that the subjects who 
participated in the investigations carried out in this research were representative 
of all the children at the level of conceptual development which they themselves 
have achieved. However, the cautionary nature of such inferences must be 
acknowledged. The generalisability of the present findings extends only to the 
immediate population from which the subjects were taken and cannot be said with 
any certainty to extend beyond this population, that is, predominantly Caucasian, 
English speaking children from rural North Wales. 
When the limitations imposed by small samples sizes on both randomisation and 
generalisability are considered, it seems that when drawing conclusions from 
current findings, some reservation is required. It is evident that future research is 
required which replicates the current investigations with larger sample sizes and 
with different samples to overcome the problems incurred here. 
2.2.1. Experimental procedure 
The following experimental procedure was based on Nicholls' (1978) protocol, as 
described in Chapter One, page 1, and modified to incorporate a physically 
oriented setting. Normative conceptions of ability are concerned with 
performance in a given situation rather than skill development over relatively long 
periods of time (Nicholls, Pataschnick & Mettetal, 1986). Knowledge of ability as 
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a capacity requires the understanding that this present capacity determines the 
degree to which expended effort can influence performance outcomes (Nicholls, 
1989). Subsequently, methodologies which assess children's understanding of 
effort and ability concepts must examine this in one-off performance situations 
and not in long term learning ones, as Nicholls (1989) advises. The present 
experiment therefore employs a performance situation involving physical tasks 
rather than one which implies long term physical skill development. 
2.2.2. The films 
All subjects watched a sequence of three different films showing two children 
performing physical tasks. The order of presentation of these films did not vary 
between subjects. Two sets of films were used, one depicting boys and one 
depicting girls to remove the possibility of gender bias. 
Each of the three films showed two children working side by side on a physical 
task which enabled the subjects to make direct comparisons between the models' 
behaviour. In each of the three films, one of the children applied continuous effort 
whilst the other child, although not displaying disruptive behaviour, worked 
intermittently at the task. When not engaged in on-task behaviour, this child 
displayed off-task behaviours such as sitting down, playing with the throwing 
equipment and fiddling with shoelaces. The proportion of total time which this 
child spent engaged in on- and off-task behaviours did not vary between the three 
films. The actors changed their roles from one film to the next so that subjects' 
responses would not be affected by what they had seen previously. Both children 
were shown to score 10 points in the first film and 2 points in the second. 
However, in the third film, the child working intermittently scored 24 points 
whilst the child working continuously scored only 6. 
Nicholls (1978) has demonstrated that the above format is an effective method of 
examining reasoning about effort and ability. We can determine children's 
understanding of these concepts by assessing their explanations 
for equal 
outcomes gained from unequal effort or for a higher score achieved by a child 
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who applies relatively less effort to the task than does another child. 
Developmental changes in conceptualisations of effort and ability can be identified 
if a cross section of age groups is included. Moreover, adapting Nicholls' (1978) 
protocol to a physically oriented context allows direct comparison with the 
development of effort and ability understanding demonstrated in the academic 
domain. 
All three of the films comprised a sequence of three different episodes. Episode 
one demonstrated the requirements of the task which the children in the film were 
to perform. The two children were seen standing behind a line marked on the 
floor and facing two targets equidistant from this line. In between them was a pile 
of beanbags (see figure 2.1). Each child had their own target which was a hoop in 
film one and a bucket in film two. They scored one point for every beanbag which 
landed in the target. In film three, the children faced a flat, circular target which 
was divided into three rings. On the innermost ring was the number 3, on the 
middle one, the number 2, and on the outermost, the number 1. These numbers 
indicated the points which would be scored if a beanbag landed in these areas. In 
episode two, the children were shown playing the game which included the off- 
task behaviour of the child whose role was to work intermittently. Throughout 
this episode, the subjects could not see the children's targets, only the children 
themselves (see figure 2.1). Episode three depicted the children's scores at the end 
of the game. Subjects saw both of the targets including the beanbags which were 
said to have landed inside the target and those which were said to have landed 
outside. Cards indicating the children's scores were placed next to their targets 
(see figure 2.1). Finally, the two children were seen holding similar cards which 
displayed their respective scores (see figure 2.1). 
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Episode One 
Episode Two 
Figure 2.1: Still versions of episodes one and two of the films which were shown Z5 
to children 
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Figure 2.1: Still versions of episodes three and four 
of the films which Nvere shown to the children 
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2.2.3. Procedure 
The same procedure was employed for all of the films, and the script used is 
shown in Appendix One. Subjects were informed that they were about to see 
short films of two children playing throwing games and would be asked to talk 
about what they had seen in each film. They then watched episode one, during 
which the requirements of the task were explained by the experimenter. A number 
of facts were emphasised in this explanation: the children had to throw across 
equal distances and had to remain behind the marked line; there were sufficient 
numbers of beanbags available for each child to throw as many as they wanted; 
and, each child had to aim for their own target. The subjects were then told how 
much both children had scored on the game and cards depicting these scores were 
placed on the table in front of the appropriate actor. Next, subjects were asked to 
watch the children playing the game (episode two) and to think about how hard 
they were both trying and how good they were at the game whilst they watched. 
Immediately afterwards, subjects watched episode three during which the number 
of beanbags in each target were counted and each child's score reiterated. After 
each of the three films, the subjects were asked the following questions (based on 
Nicholls (1978)): 
(1) Did one boy/girl work harder than the other or did they work as hard as each 
other? 
(2) Is one girl/boy better at this game or are they as good as each other? 
(3) How can you tell? 
(4) How come they got the same when one tried harder than the other? [For film 
three: How come one scored more than the other but didn't work as hard as 
him/her? ] 
(5) If they tried the same, would they score the same or different points? 
Although standardised questions were used, the children's responses necessitated 
some re-structuring of the questions at times. These interviews were recorded, 
transcribed at a later date and assessed in relation to Nicholls' (1978) levels. 
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2.3.1. Results 
Interrater correlation: 
Two independent raters assessed the transcripts of children% interview responses 
to determine each child's level of effort and ability understanding. The two raters 
agreed on the classification of all but four of the 137 subjects. Using Pearson's 
Product Moment measure of correlation to calculate the level of interrater 
agreement revealed a correlation coefficient of 0.9865 (2-tailed probability level 
0.01), which indicates that the subjectslevels of effort and ability understanding 
were accurately assessed. 
After rating the interview transcripts independently, the two raters discussed the 
four transcripts which they had allocated to different levels of effort and ability 
understanding. For two of these they reached a general consensus on the child's 
level of conceptual development. However, they were unable to agree on the level 
demonstrated by the remaining two subjects. These subjects were therefore 
excluded from subsequent frequency distributions describing conceptual 
development in relation to age and gender. 
2.3.2. Nature of effort and ability understanding 
The present results indicated that the pattern of stages in the development of 
effort and ability understanding is not domain specific (Hudson, Fazey & Fazey, 
unpublished). The developmental trajectory demonstrated in the physical domain 
exhibits similarities to that previously revealed in the academic domain. This 
finding supports the claims of Flanagan (1984). He discusses five criteria of stages 
and their patterns in relation to Piaget's stages of cognitive development. One of 
these criteria is relevant to the present discussion. Flanagan (1984) states that, 
regardless of the dilemma with which they are presented, individuals reason at the 
same developmental level. He cites moral reasoning as an example but it is 
apparent from the present findings that this criterion also applies to children's 
reasoning about effort and ability concepts. However, this argument does 
contradict the proposals of Piaget and Baltes (1987) concerning issues of 
development such as horizontal d6calage and multidimensionality. 
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Four levels of effort and ability understanding were defined when interview 0 
transcripts were examined. Although each level displays qualitative differences 
from the next, some individuals did exhibit reasoning which was characteristic of 
two adjacent levels. This suggests that, rather than experiencing discrete 
transitions from one level to the next, the individual progresses gradually towards 
higher levels of understanding. When reasoning reflected characteristics of two 
adjacent levels, considerable difficulties were involved in determining the 
individual's level of conceptual development. However, a decision was made 
possible as one of these levels commonly dominated the child's schema. 
Individuals could then be classified according to this dominant level of 
understanding, as defined by their verbal responses. The different levels of 
reasoning about effort and ability demonstrated in a physically oriented context 
are presented below. 
Level 1: 
When scores are equal but effort is not children at this level state that the model 
who tried the hardest is the best because of their greater effort input. Therefore 
these children demonstrate the belief that effort is an indication of ability. This 
reasoning is exhibited by some, but not all, children when they observe someone 
gaining a higher score whilst expending less effort than a comparison other. For 
instance, regardless of the fact that the hardest working child achieved the lowest 
level of success, some children at this level claim that this child is the best at the 
game. Again, the inference of higher ability is justified by the fact that the model 
expended greater effort. However, other children will state that the model who 
scored the most was the best, demonstrating their perception that outcome is an 
indication of ability. Some children further state that this model did try harder 
even though they were not observed to. They appear to display the belief that 
effort, ability and outcome are inextricably linked. Whether the child focuses on 
effort or outcome as an indicator of ability appears to depend on whether the 
situation presents the outcomes of performance attempts as equal or unequal. 
Therefore children at level one appear to believe that regardless of the respective 
success levels of two individuals, the one who tries the hardest is perceived as the 
more able of the two. If an individual is seen to achieve a higher level of success 
with little effort, these children will nevertheless claim that effort expenditure was 
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high. When children do acknowledge lesser effort input by the highest achieving 
individual, they do not attribute this high success level directly to ability but to 
factors such as size, desire to win, resting to save energy, concentration, speed, 
and, throwing technique. It may appear at first that these last two factors are 
ability-related. However, these factors are more likely to reflect the female 
models' behaviour in the present methodology rather than the child's belief that 
they are ability-related factors which contribute towards the outcome of a 
performance attempt. Although consistency between the two models' behaviour 
was desired, obviously, individual differences between the two resulted in 
differences in their exhibited behaviour. For example, one of the girls adopted a 
more "hurried" throwing style than the other girl who tended to throw in a more 
studied manner. These differences in task performance may have prompted the 
children to cite speed and throwing technique as factors to explain higher levels of 
achievement in the absence of a high degree of effort input. This interpretation 
appears to be satisfactory as the same children would cite throwing too quickly as 
a reason for a higher level of success when previously they had cited throwing 
slowly when asked for a similar explanation. Therefore speed or throwing 
technique are not factors which play a logical role in the child's beliefs about 
effort, ability and outcome. 
It is important to note however, that the use of the word, "ability" here may be 
somewhat misleading. Employing this term does not imply that these children 
perceive ability as a capacity in the same way that adults do. Nicholls (1978) 
suggested that, when asked to apply their reasoning to academic tasks, very 
young children believe that effort or outcome are synonymous with ability. 
Although this was apparently the case in the present experiment when children 
were asked to apply this reasoning to physical tasks, certain factors indicated that 
this finding may not accurately reflect young children's beliefs about effort and 
ability. Instead, it may reflect developmental differences in construct interpretation 
or the nature of the cues which children are presented with during the present 
methodology. In Chapter One, research was cited which indicated that young 
children receive praise and reinforcement from significant others 
for, for example, 
trying hard and following given instructions. As children get older however, 
feedback from significant others increasingly emphasises ability and normative 
evaluation. It is likely that young children will perceive that 
being good at 
something is indicated by the degree of effort expended 
in an attempt to achieve 
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success. To adults, being good at something indicates that the individual 
possesses ability in the sense of a present capacity. It is therefore conceivable that 
when discussing who the most able of the two models is, the child subject and the 
adult experimenter possess varying definitions of what ability is. Moreover, it 
possible that these children demonstrate the tendency to equate effort and ability 
because the methodology employed to assess this understanding presents the 
children with concrete and tangible effort cues. As a result, these young children 
may base their responses to interview questions on the concrete cues with which 
they are presented. These issues are discussed in greater detail further on in 
Chapter Two and an experiment is described which attempts to address whether 
young children do believe effort and ability to be synonymous or whether this 
finding is attributable to the above factors. 
Level 2: 
Individuals now focus on the relationship between effort and outcome. Unlike 
level one reasoning, perceived effort is seen as the determinant of outcomes. 
Subsequently, if two individuals exert equivalent amounts of effort, resultin. 1.1, 
success levels are expected to be the same. This belief in effort as an outcome 
determinant is demonstrated by explanations for higher scores achieved with 
relatively less effort than someone else. They will claim that the individual who 
tried the least but scored the most points must have gained the advantage by 
resting, aiming better, or having the sense to sit down. Conversely, the child who 
tried the most but achieved the lowest score, must have aimed for the wrong 
target or knocked the other child's beanbags into their hoop for them. 
Explanations for superior performances such as, the child aimed better, may be 
defined as ability-related. Children's use of ability-related factors at this level 
could provide an indication of their initial recognition that ability is a separate 
entity from effort and outcome. Moreover, that, although these children do not 
perceive ability as a current capacity in the way that older individuals do, they 
acknowledge individual differences in ability which affect the outcome of a 
performance attempt. Even when effort employment is observed to 
be unequal, 
when similar levels of success are achieved, children will assert that effort 
expenditure was the same. 
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Level 3: 
Children are beginning to recognise that ability mediates the effects of effort on 
performance outcomes. This is apparent in the child's understanding that if a high 
level of success is achieved without trying hard, then ability must be high. 
However, such principles are not consistently employed. For example, when 
scores are equal, children correctly state that the individual who did not have to 
try as hard is the most able but they do not necessarily attribute this to ability. 
Instead, they attribute this success to, taking more care, reducing effort to distract 
the other child, trying really hard when effort was exerted (on the part of the child 
who worked intermittently), and, luck. Furthermore, children at this level often 
maintain that effort is a determinant of outcomes. 
Level 4: 
Individuals understand that ability is a capacity which interacts with effort to 
determine level of success. Similar to level three reasoning, these children realise 
that to score the same as someone else without trying as hard requires greater 
ability. However, unlike children at level three, they apply this reasoning 
systematically over a variety of contexts. Moreover, children can appreciate that, 
depending on ability level, the same task can be difficult or easy for two different 
individuals. 
2.3.3. Temporal sequence of effort and ability understanding 
The pattern of the frequencies of children of different ages at each of the four 
levels is expected to demonstrate that higher levels of conceptual development are 
manifest in older children and lower levels in younger ones. Table 2.1 and figure 
2.2 demonstrate this pattern. Level one reasoning is exhibited mainly up to 6 years 
of age, decreasing gradually until 11 years of age when no more children reasoned 
at this level. By 8 years of age, most children had achieved level two which 
predominated between the ages of 8 and II years. Again, the numbers of children 
who exhibit level two reasoning decreased following this period. 
Emerging 
initially at 7 years of age, level three reasoning was exhibited mainly 
by children 
aged between 10 and 12 years. Finally, level four reasoning was not manifest until 
10 years of age and then proceeded to dominate over the previous 
three levels 
although more than half of the twelve year olds tested 
had not achieved level four. 
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AGE 
10 11 12 13 
LEVEL 
15 17 95542000 47 
20323 11 10 10 851 53 
30001214430 15 
40000006671 20 
N5 20 11 9 18 15 22 18 15 2 135 
Table 2.1: Frequencies of children at each level of understanding across ep 
the ages 4-13 years. 
Figure 2.2: Frequencies of children at each 
level of understanding across the ages 4-13 
years. 
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AGE (YEARS) 
4-7 8-9 10 11+ N 
LEVELS I&2 44 30 12 14 100 
LEVELS 3&413 10 21 35 
N 45 33 22 
35 135 
Table 2.2: Frequencies of children in different age groups representing 
the lower and upper ends of the continuum of effort/ability understanding 
When a chi-squared analysis was conducted on the data shown in table 2.1 this 
was rendered invalid as too many of the cells had expected frequencies less than 
five. Although this does not present too much of a problem when the frequency 
table is large, it is recommended that in such situations the data is grouped into far 
less categories (Hinkle, Wiersma & Jurs, 1988). It was felt that too many of the 
cells did not meet the required expected frequency count in this analysis. 
For the purpose of statistical analysis, children's initial classifications were 
therefore collapsed into two categories. These categories were: levels one and 
two, and levels three and four. Chi-squared analysis conducted on the data in table 
2.2 indicated that significant differences did exist, X2 (3) = 43.565, p<0.001. One 
sample follow-up tests were subsequently carried out to ascertain where these 
differences could be found. The results of these follow-up tests (which are 
displayed in table 2.3) demonstrate that, as expected, significantly more children 
between the ages of 4 and 9 years reasoned at levels one and two than at levels 
three and four. However, no differences existed between the numbers of 10 year 
old children reasoning at levels 1 and 2 and levels 3 and 4. Similarly, although 
more children who were 11 years and over did reason at levels three and 
four than 
at levels one and two, this difference did not reach traditional significance 
levels. 
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AGE GROUP CHI-SQUARED (1) PROB. 
4-7 YEARS 82.178 <0.001 
8-9 YEARS 44.182 <0.001 
10 YEARS 0.364 >0.05 
11+ YEARS 2.80 >0.05 
Table 2.3: Results of one-sample follow-up tests 
It is evident that the temporal sequences of effort and ability understanding in the 
academic and physical domains demonstrate similarities when the age boundaries 
which are cited here are compared with those previously revealed by Nicholls 
(1978) in Chapter One. The small differences which are revealed in the 
chronological age boundaries between domains are most likely to be attributable 
to individual differences between subjects. Table 2.1 shows that within the same 
chronological age group, different children have achieved different levels of 
understanding. For instance, if we examine the frequency distribution of 10 year 
olds, who are expected to have reached level three, not all children conform to 
this predicted norm. Although some of the children have achieved level three most 
of them still demonstrate reasoning characteristic of levels one and two and a 
number of subjects have already reached level four reasoning. 
These individual differences indicate that chronological age is not necessarily a 
good predictor of level of conceptual development and necessitate empirical 
assessment if children's effort and ability understanding is to be fully understood. 
2.3.4. Gender differences 
Gender differences were not expected but were examined within the four age 
groups and two level divisions cited above in table 2.2. These 
data are shown in 
table 2.4. 
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AGE (YEARS) 
4-7 8-9 10 11+ 
fmfmfmfm 
LEVELS 1&2 20 24 16 13 75 10 5 100 
LEVELS 3&40112388 12 35 
20 25 17 15 10 13 18 17 135 
Table 2.4: Frequencies of children, divided by age and gender, at each of the 
specified age groups (f = female; m= male) 
Again, the expected frequency counts of too many of the cells were less than the 
required minimum of five, rendering any analysis invalid. However, an initial 
examination of the frequencies in table 2.4 indicates that gender differences are 
unlikely to exist. 
2.3.5. The mental and physical connotations of effort 
By level two, children begin to understand that effort has both physical and mental 
connotations even though the present context is physically oriented. Consider this 
quotation from a girl who is at level two and who is discussing the film in which 
both children scored the same but the actor in yellow tried harder than the one in 
pink. 
One girl tried harder. 
"ich one? 
One in yellow. 
Was one girl better or ivere they as good as each other? 
One of the girls was better. 
nich one? 
One in yellow. 
Hoiv come they got the same ivhen one girl tried harder than the other? 
She was thinking. 
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nich one? 
The one in pink. 
Was one girl better? 
No. 
Did the try the same? y 
Yes. 
Initially, this girl states that the actor in yellow, who exerted more physical effort, 
did try the hardest. However, when asked how identical outcomes were obtained 
by unequal effort input, she cannot accommodate this information into her schema 
as she believes that effort is the cause of outcomes. She then states that the actor 
in pink was thinking about the task when she was not seen to be exerting physical 
effort. Therefore she appears to conclude that both actors were trying hard but in 
different ways: one mentally, and one physically. Now perceiving effort to be 
equal, this girl is able to assimilate this information into her present schema of 
effort and ability understanding. 
Recognition that mental effort is important when engaged in physical tasks is I> demonstrated by the following quotation from a boy at level 2 who is discussing 
the film in which the boy in yellow scores more than the boy in black but does not 
try as hard as him. 
Did one try harder or did they Ity the same? 
I noticed the one in yellow was sitting down, I think lie was trying to 
concentrate on a battle plan. 
What was he planning? 
Try and get a better target to beat his opponent. 
Did the boy in black try harder? 
I noticed lie had quite a good aim, lie was going a bit too quickly and he 
never did a battle plan. 
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2.3.6. Outcome as an indicator of effort and ability 
Before the subjects saw each film they were told the actors' scores and asked to 
think about their ability levels and their effort employment. Subjects at the lowest 
levels of the continuum often answered these questions prior to seeing the films. 
When they were told that the children scored equally, subjects stated that both 
effort expenditure and ability level would be equal. Similarly, when one child was 
said to score higher than the other, subjects judged that this child would try the 
hardest and was the most able of the two. It appears then, that without any other 
information available, young children feel sufficiently equipped to make ability and 
effort judgements based only on an individual's level of success. Unfortunately the 
numbers of children at different levels of effort and ability understanding who 
made such a priori judgements were not recorded. Therefore this finding can only 
be presented as anecdotal evidence. 
2.3.7. Level one reasoning 
Reasoning at level one was associated with the equation of effort and ability both 
in the present and Nicholls' (1978) study. However, based on characteristics of 
the methodology and subject and experimenter interpretations of interview 
questions, the present study offers an alternative explanation. It is proposed that 
the finding that effort is ability does not necessarily reflect young children's 
cognitions. Subsequently, it is hypothesised in the following discussion that these 
children do not have the capacity to conceptualise the existence of ability. Such 
speculation can only be made about children's reasoning in the physical domain at 
present. Empirical investigations which follow attempt to assess the validity of 
these claims in both the physical and academic domains. 
An individual's interpretation of events and related constructs changes with 
increasing experience (Kelly, 1955). According to Korthals (1994), developmental 
theories are reconstructions of the constructs which individuals employ when 
interpreting their own behaviour. However, the theoretical proposals which are 
made are constructed from the perspective of the developmental theorists 
themselves. Therefore this construction reflects the developmental level which 
they have currently achieved. This level may not reflect the level of development 
reached by the individuals to whom these theoretical proposals are applied. 
42 
Therefore the same constructs may be differentially interpreted by two individuals 
at different developmental levels. For instance, Harter (1983) claims that 
kindergarteners and first graders perceive that smartness is indicated by a level of 
skill which is dependent on practice. This definition appears to indicate that, 
unlike the adults' beliefs that ability is an innate capacity, these children believe 
that smartness can be acquired by any individual if sufficient efforts are made 
towards its acquisition. Stipek, Roberts & Sanborn (1984) have discussed that to 
young children, smartness is internally determined. Presumably, they do not imply 
that these children perceive smartness to be an innate capacity but they believe it 
to be an ability which can be determined by the individual. Perhaps the 
individual's internal determination of whether or not they are smart is based on 
their desire or expectation to be smart as Stipek et al (1984) have demonstrated 
that children's desires influence their expectations and self-evaluations. Due to 
experiential and developmental differences, it is likely that the subject and the 
experimenter do not always interpret questions such as, "Who is the best? " and 
"Are both boys good at this game? " in the same way. This issue was initially 
addressed in a previous section of this chapter, see page 34. The experimenter is 
referring to ability in the sense of a relatively fixed innate capacity whereas the 
child is likely to interpret these questions in terms of behavioural conduct, and 
task involvement and interest. This interpretation is supported by research 
findings presented in Chapter One. For example, Stipek & MacIver (1989) 
demonstrated that pre-school children's work is often deemed acceptable if 
sufficient time and effort has been invested in it. It seems therefore that children 
learn from teachers that their work is good and that they have achieved if they 
fulfil these criteria. A logical extension of this argument is that children will then 
assign the labels "smart", "clever" or "good" to themselves as a result of this 
information. Evidence of these interpretational differences is demonstrated by 
children's responses to interview questions. The following quotation is from a boy 
at level one who is discussing the film in which the actor in black works 
continuously and scores six points, yet the actor in yellow works intermittently 
and scores twenty four points. 
Did the boy in black try harder? 
Yes. 
Mas he better or were they as good as each other? 
The boy in yellow wasn't good but he still won. 
Why wasn't he as good? 
Because he stopped throwing. 
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no was the best? 
The boy in black. 
From the boy's claim that the actor in black was the best it could be inferred that 
he equates effort with ability. However, consideration of his additional statements 
implies a different explanation for his reasoning. Although he states that the boy in 
yellow "won" the game and therefore indicates recognition of a superior 
performance, he nonetheless concludes that this boy "wasn't good". A possible 
explanation for this is that he interprets "being good" in terms of demonstrated 
task-related behaviour. He is not proposing that the boy in black is good in the 
sense of being able (demonstrated for example by achievement level) but by being 
well-behaved and involved in the task, unlike the boy in yellow. This reasoning 
does not clearly demonstrate a belief that effort and ability are synonymous, and 
may suggest that the subject bases judgements of whether someone is "good" on 
exhibited task involvement and effort investment. 
This interpretation is demonstrated further in the quotations cited below, the first 
from a boy at level one and the second from a girl at level two. (By including this 
last example I do not imply that children at level two would be expected to equate 
effort with ability. Nonetheless this excerpt serves to illustrate the differences in 
two individual's interpretations of the same construct). 
Did one boy try harder here? 
Not exactly, the only thing that I think, he was better than him because 
he never kept on sitting down and didn't stop throwing the beanbags, he to 
kept on throwing them. 
ny ivas he better? 
Because he tried harder it makes him better, because the other one was 
just being silly like he was before, but it doesn't mean that he would win. 
The statement, "Because he tried harder it makes him better,..., but it doesn't 
mean that he would win. " implies that this boy also interprets "being better" in 
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terms of being better behaved and that he does not equate effort with ability. He 
perceives the actor's maintained effort expenditure as an indication of good 
behavioural conduct not as ability as the adult experimenter expects. 
Was one trying harder or were they trying the same? 
They tried the same. 
How couldyou tell? 
Because they had ten. 
Were they as good as each other or was one girl better? 
One of the girls was better. 
nich one? 
The one in yellow because she [the girl in pink] sat down and she [the girl 
in yellow] didn't. 
Because outcomes are equal, this girl states that effort employment was also equal 
(as we would expect from a child who has achieved level two reasoning). 
However, she further claims that the girl who did not sit down was better. Her 
interpretation of "better" therefore appears to be based on exhibited behavioural 
conduct. The subject believes that this girl was better not because she was more 
able, but because she was well-behaved and demonstrated the task involvement 
which was expected of her. 
Nicholls (1992) refers to this issue in relation to research which has investigated 
the child's developing conceptualisations of effort and ability. He presents a 
variety of sources of misinterpretation and confusion which can arise based on his 
own investigations. For instance, Nicholls (1992) describes the issue of whether 
children perceive the harder worker as smarter as one possible source of 
confusion of interpretations. This issue can be viewed as one which addresses 
whether or not children believe that ability and diligence are attributes which 
commonly accompany each other, that is, if children believe that people who work 
hard are generally smart (Nicholls, 1992). However, this question is not of 
particular interest when assessing how children construe the concept of ability in 
relation to effort (Nicholls, 1992). The question which is of interest is how 
children at different developmental levels construe the meaning of ability and the 
45 
relative contributions of effort and ability towards the final outcome of a 
performance attempt. Nicholls (1992, p. 58) goes on to state that, 
... children's 
judgements indicating that effort and ability are positively 
correlated are ambiguous. Such judgements do not tell us whether or not 
children understand that smarter people are those who are able to do as well 
as others without trying as hard. 
A second issue which Nicholls considers and which has been discussed previously 
in the present thesis relates to the several meanings which the word "smart" can 
demonstrate. This claim supports the previously cited work of, for example, Kelly 
(1955) and Korthals (1994) and claims made within the present research. In the 
following quotation, Nicholls (1992, p. 44) demonstrates that his beliefs reflect 
those of the aforementioned authors, 
When studying achievement-related concepts, we must try to ensure that 
everyone answers the same question. It quickly becomes apparent that when 
interviewing children ... that what appear to be simple and unambiguous 
questions are often subject to diverse and unexpected interpretations. In 
effect, when you ask them one question, different people answer different 
questions. 
Nicholls (1992) also states that children often recognise that the word "smart" can 
embody different meanings. He cites, for example, a child who states that the 
harder worker is smarter as she does the work whereas the other child, who tries 
the least, is also smart as she knows the work better. Young children will often 
initially select the harder worker as the smarter of the two as they believe that it is 
not "smart" to be lazy. According to Nicholls (1992) questioning children as to 
how equal outcomes can be obtained from unequal effort expenditure shifts the 
focus of the question from diligence to ability and that this line of questioning 
does not rely on the child's interpretation of the word "smart". It seems however, 
that this is not altogether a foolproof argument. Although such questioning 
does 
not explicitly refer to "ability" or "smartness", the child's interpretation of these 
constructs seems to be unavoidable. It is possible that young children will 
interpret the situation in accordance with the constructs evident in their schema 
and how they perceive the different meanings of these constructs, and that the 
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child's verbalisations will reflect their own interpretation of the constructs 
involved. In summary, Nicholls (1992) believes that there is greater potential for 
individuals to display different interpretations of the concepts under consideration 
when these concepts are effort and ability than when they are luck and skill. He 
also believes that by simply asking children to assess others' ability based on 
observed differences in their effort expenditure and performance outcomes, this 
method will not adequately control for variations in different individuals' 
interpretation of the word "ability". This statement provides further support for 
proposals which are made below and experiments which are carried out on the 
basis of these proposals, that the removal of effort cues from situations which 
display differences in achieved levels of success will partially control for 
developmental differences in construct interpretation. These proposals are 
discussed in more detail further on in this chapter and the one which follows. 
It is apparent from the previous discussion that significant others around children 
who have achieved level one of effort and ability understanding emphasise the role 
of effort in achievement situations. These children, with their inability to 
conceptualise abstract entities, will likely focus on concrete entities, of which 
demonstrated effort expenditure is an example. The methodology employed to 
assess effort and ability understanding presents the child with very tangible effort 
cues, particularly in a physically oriented environment. The more overt nature of 
effort and ability in physical settings compared with academic ones (Roberts & 
Pascuzzi, 1979) is discussed in Duda (1987). Consequently, the child is likely to 
be drawn towards these concrete effort cues to provide a basis for their reasoning. 
If such cues were not made available to the child their focus on effort may be 
removed and the belief that effort and ability are synonymous may not be 
demonstrated. This proposal is supported by comments made by both Johnson- 
Laird (1983) and Neisser (1987). Johnson-Laird (1983) suggests that the 
relationships which children perceive between concepts influences the mental 
models or theories which they subsequently construct about these concepts. These 
models or theories may then determine how concepts are organised by 
constraining which features the child focuses on in a given context and the 
meanings they derive from this construct (Keil, 199 1). Neisser (1987) presents a 
similar perspective. He proposes that the degree to which a context highlights an 
event determines how it will be construed by the individual. As a result, different 
"highlights" may induce different conceptual models. 
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It was suggested previously that young children cannot conceptualise that such an 
entity as ability exists. To provide a preliminary assessment of this hypothesis 
children's explanations for equal outcomes derived from unequal effort were 
examined. Table 2.5 (see page 50) displays these explanations from which it is 
apparent that at all levels of effort and ability understanding, with the exception of 
level one, children employ ability as a referent. The fact that children at level one 
employ factors other than ability, such as effort, as a referent could be a 
consequence of their belief that effort is synonymous with ability, as Nicholls 
(1978) suggests. An alternative explanation is that they do not use ability as a 
referent because they are unable to conceptualise its existence. 
If we consider the general cognitive development of very young children it 
becomes increasingly likely that they are unable to conceptualise ability. Innate 
ability is an abstract concept and they have not yet reached the stage where they 
are able to reason on a hypothetical and abstract level. If this is demonstrated in 
subsequent experiments it is conceivable that in the physical domain, and possibly 
the academic domain, effort and ability do not become more differentiated from 
each other at level two. It remains possible that young children only appear to 
equate effort with ability as a result of their interpretation of these constructs and 
cues with which they are presented, as discussed earlier. Moreover, if this is the 
case it is equally likely that young children do not conceptualise the existence of 
ability. 
The validity of this hypothesis could be examined by assessing young children's 
explanations for unequal outcomes in a situation in which no effort cues are 
presented. This seems a reasonable approach to adopt as Nicholls (1992) claims 
that questioning children as to how unequal outcomes are obtained from unequal 
effort expenditure shifts the focus from diligence to ability and eradicates the 
confusion which can arise from children's general association of diligence and 
ability. A logical extension of this argument is that if children are questioned about 
performance differences when effort cues are removed, then the 
focus on 
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diligence is completely removed and the focus on ability is paramount. Employing 
effort as an explanation for a higher score would indicate that this result is an 
accurate reflection of the child's reasoning and is not prompted by explicit effort 
cues incorporated in the methodology, therefore supporting Nicholls' (1978) 
suggestion that young children do equate effort with ability. However, if the 
children do not employ effort as a referent in the absence of tangible effort cues 
then support is lent to the present hypothesis that young children do not equate 
effort with ability. Moreover, ability-related explanations can provide an 
indication of the child's capacity to conceptualise ability. If children rely on factors 
other than ability, such as luck, to explain relatively superior performances, this 
would then demonstrate that young children cannot conceptualise ability. An 
investigation which explores this issue in the physical domain is described in 
experiment two. 
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Level 1 Explanations: 
don't know; luck; he enjoyed doing the task more; he kept throwing again; he threw more 
beanbags; he was a slow coach; one boy did more, then he sat down, then the other boy started 
then the other one started again; he had one or none first then he got another one and they 
ended up with the same score; because he sat down; he wanted to win; he was the biggest; one 
girl was faster; she was trying harder and getting lots in because she was trying hard and she 
-%vas getting most of them in and the other girl was just throwing and getting some of them in 
and most of them out; because they did it at the same time; because the one in red threw two in 
at the same time; because the boys have different clothes on; because the one in red tried to work 
hard but she had to sit down; because he never sat down for a long time, he got up quick; 
because she sat down ... and then she caught up. Level 2 Explanations: 
she was thinking; that girl grabbed about three; because the girl in pink kept sitting down, 
waiting for the yellow one to throw; she was keep on missing it; because she was throwing, she 
got up straight after she sat down; because she was taking her time; she got two lucky shots; I 
think the one in yellow was trying to help the black one as well; the rests I suppose; because 
they both aimedproperly; he was quite confident; it looked like he was aiming; I noticed he had 
quite a good aim; because the one in yellow was throwing quite quick although he had to stop to 
tie his shoelaces; can't explain it; maybe the one in yellow ifhe didn't stop he might have got 
more points; he wasn't concentrating; by throwing more beanbags; the boy in black probably 
knocked some into the other boy's hoop; because that one stopped for a bit ... so the other one could catch up with her; because the one in red was a bit better than the other one; because the 
one in yellow might have been better and the pink girl might have tried harder because she 
knew the other girl was better; maybe she was trying too hard; because when the one in yellow 
got up she went really fast. 
Lcvel 3 Explanations: 
don't know; luck sometimes; because the other girl was better at the game-, because the girl in 
pink kept sitting down; because the girl in pink was trying but she wasn't gettingvery far 
because the other girl was going faster than her, and getting more, well the same amount in, but 
she was going faster; ifhe didn't keep on stopping he would have got more; the bov in black was 
a better shot; they might have been told to try and get the same amount; he might hmefound it 
easier to do than the other one; he was more into sports and that. 
Level 4 Explanations: 
because the boy in black missed; when hewas tying his shoelaces, the other boy was rushing; 
maybe he was the best but he wasjust like showing off; a good ainter; he would have got them in 
quicker ifyou wouldn't have counted him sitting down; well, he was ttying harder hut he wasn't 
a goodshot; by chance; because the one that didnt try as hard was the best: the one in pink was 
more accurate; because he stopped and had a break and started a gain. 
Table 2.5: Children's explanations for equal outcomes from unequal effort 
expenditure (cited verbatim with ability-related explanations shown in 
italics) 
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2.4.1. Experiment two 
Introduction 
In a physically oriented environment which involved no effort cues, and where 
one individual scored more than another on a given task, adults' and 4-5 year old 
children's explanations for this higher score were expected to differ. Because 
adults are able to conceptualise ability and no information is provided to suggest 
that the superior score is not ability-related, they were expected to attribute this 
outcome to greater ability level. However, it was hypothesised that young 
children are unable to conceptualise ability and do not equate effort with ability. 
Therefore they were expected. to cite any number of factors, other than effort or 
ability, as reasons why one individual gains a higher score than another. This 
experiment was designed to investigate two issues- whether young children's 
verbalisations demonstrate that they equate effort with ability and whether they 
are able to conceptualise the existence of ability in relation to physical tasks. 
2.4.2. Subjects 
Group one comprised 21 adults between 18 and 46 years of age, 18 of which 
were female and three of which were male. This group served as a control to 
demonstrate that when an individual has the capacity to conceptualise ability, 
observed differences in performance outcomes in the present methodology will be 
attributed to individual differences in ability level. Group two consisted of 19 
children between the ages of 4 and 5 years, 8 of which were male and 11 of which 
were female. All subjects were randomly selected to participate in the experiment, 
were Caucasian in origin and spanned a range of abilities. 
2.5.1. Experimental procedure 
Subjects were shown a picture of two children holding a beanbag and standing 
behind a line marked on the floor. Each child faced a hoop which lay on the floor 
at equal distances from the line (see figure 2.3, page 54). Throughout the 
experiment, pictures involving girls and boys were shown to female and male 
subjects respectively. Subjects were told that the children were about to play a 
game in which they were required to stand behind the line, and, within a minute, 
throw as many beanbags into their own hoop as they could. Subjects were then 
3 page 54) shown a picture of the two children in a throwing stance 
(see figure 2.3, 
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and told that this would enable them to see how they played the game. After 
viewing this picture, subjects were asked to predict whether the two children 
would score the same or differently or asked to make any other comments they 
felt were appropriate. If they responded that the children would achieve different 
outcomes they were asked to state which child they thought would score the 
most, and why. Finally, subjects saw a picture of the two children standing beside 
their hoops which contained the number of beanbags they were said to have 
thrown in (see figure 2.3, page 54). One child's hoop contained a great deal more 
beanbags than the other's and subjects were asked to explain why this child had 
scored more than the other. If subjects claimed that external factors had caused 
the difference in outcomes, for example, that this child had practised more or had 
more bean bags, they were told that this was not possible as neither child had ever 
played the game before, or that both had the same number of beanbags available. 
Questioning continued until subjects either cited ability as an explanation or could 
offer no more explanations of any nature. Subjects' responses were recorded and 
analysed at a later date. 
2.6.1. Results 
Outcome predictions- Adults 
Based on the fact that no information was presented to indicate that the two 
children would score differently, adults were expected to predict that outcomes 
would be the same. Alternatively, they were expected to state that no such 
prediction could be made as insufficient information about the two individuals was 
provided. 
Of the 21 adults questioned, the majority (18) responded as predicted. Usingo a 
chi-squared analysis to compare the number of subjects who responded as 
predicted with the number who did not, revealed that significantly more subjects 
fell into the former than the latter category, X2 (1)=10.714, p<0.01.15 subjects in 
this category said that outcomes would be the same or similar, one that the 
outcomes depended on how good the children were at throwing and the 
remaining two subjects said that not enough information was provided on which 
to base a prediction. Of the three subjects who predicted that outcomes would 
differ, two claimed that the outcomes depended on: whether the children were left 
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or right handed, and probability, whereas the final explanation employed was that 
the two girls used different throwing styles. 
0 
53 
Fi. g, ure 2.3: Pictures shown to both adults and children who were asked to discuss 
performance outcomes, in the absence of effort cues, on physical tasks 
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Outcome predictions- Children 
As a result of their egocentricity, children's own beliefs and desires are expected 
to influence their outcome predictions, and their explanations for these are likely 
to be illogical. It was hypothesised that no differences would exist between the 
frequencies of children who predict unequal and equal outcomes. Of the 19 
children interviewed, 7 predicted that outcomes would be equal, whilst the 
remaining 12 predicted that outcomes would differ. As expected, the frequencies 
of children in these two response categories were not significantly different, 
X2 (1)=1.315, p>0.05. Also as hypothesised, there was no apparent logical basis 
for explanations which were provided to support predictions that outcomes would 
differ. These explanations were modified to suit the current context and the 
child's assumed developmental level, and were as follows: I want him to win; 
Don't know, she just will win; I know that one can throw higher; I know that one 
always scores higher; He's higher up in the picture. 1. 
2.6.2. Reasons for different outcomes- Adults 
Adults were expected to cite greater ability as an explanation for one individual 
scoring more highly than another. Accordingly, 14 subjects' initial responses were 
ability-related, as were those of a further 5 subjects when other possibilities had 
been eliminated. Only 2 subjects did not offer ability-related explanations when 
their initial suggestions were exhausted. A chi-squared analysis demonstrated that 
the difference between the number of subjects who gave ability-related 
explanations and the number who did not, was significant, X2 (1) =24.3810, 
p<0.01. Both the subjects' ability- and non-ability-related statements are shown in 
table 2.6. These subjects have therefore demonstrated their suitability as a control 
group. With the exception of 2 subjects, when the situation does not indicate that 
other factors such as luck or effort are involved, superior performance outcomes 
were attributed to greater ability. 
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Non abilitv-related explanations: 
she had more beanbags; she's colour blind, she can't see the hoop; her bags are heavier; just 
chance; short sighted; one of them's blind; plays more sport, greater involvement; a bigger 
hoop; she's nearer, I don't know. 
Abilitv-related explanatiOns: 
the way she throws them, the other one's not particularly co-ordinated; she's got better hand-eye 
co-ordination as to where it's going, she judged it better than the other one; her aim's more 
accurate and she's got better hand-eye co-ordination; she's better at judging distances, her skill 
level's higher; she was more accurate; he's a better shot; that one's better at throwing than that 
one; that one's better at throwing it into the hoop than she is; better aim; one is a worse aim 
than the other one. 
Table 2.6: Adults' explanations for differences in performance outcomes 
(cited verbatim) 
2.6.3. Reasons for different outcomes- Children 
As table 2.7 depicts, no effort- or ability-related attributions were made by the 
children, even when all previous suggestions were eliminated as possible 
explanations for observed differences in outcomes. Those explanations which are 
marked with an asterisk may be related to the young child's understanding of 
ability. Perhaps they perceive this as a construct which is related to age and size, 
as they generally see that older, bigger individuals are able to achieve greater 
success than them on more difficult tasks. However, interpreted from an adult 
conception of ability, these statements are not ability-related. 
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Reasons cited for perrormance differences: 
he had more beanbags; he was scoring more ... because he had loads of 
beanbags; he had a bigger 
hoop; don't know; she's got more... because she threw some in; she did a little throw; she was 
young*; she's got a blue hoop; she's got three and she's got twelve; she took them out of the 
other girl's; she wanted to get more; she's a daddy and she's a lady; because she had, her 
mother didn't have any more; because they're both sisters; he's big*; he got them quickly; he 
could carry them all and he couldn't carry them to the hoop; the teacher gave them more; she 
got tired. 
Table 2.7: Children's explanations for differences in performance 
outcomes (cited verbatim) 
Overall, this study has revealed that young children do not employ effort or ability 
in their verbal explanations for performance outcomes. This finding reflects either 
their reasoning about these concepts or their ability to verbalise (Hudson, in press) 
suggesting that they may not equate effort with ability nor do they appear able to 
conceptualise the existence of ability when asked to reason about physical tasks. 
However, the multidimensional nature of development does not allow Nicholls' 
(1978) findings in the academic domain to be dismissed. It is possible that 
Nicholls' explanation describes reasoning in the academic domain whereas the 
present explanation is more appropriate when judging a very visible performance 
in the physical domain. Experiment three attempts to resolve this issue by 
replicating the above experiment in an academically oriented context. 
2.7.1. Experiment three 
Introduction 
By removing effort cues from the presented situation, the previous experiment 
revealed that young children, when asked to reason about outcomes on physical 
tasks, do not use effort or ability, or ability-related factors. This result provides an 
initial indication that, when asked to reason about physical tasks, these children do 
not conceptualise the existence of ability or are unable to verbalise this concept 
and may not use effort and ability interchangeably. In Chapter One, the 
multidimensional and domain specific nature of development was discussed. 
These features of development do not allow the present findings to be directly 
applied to children's reasoning about these concepts in relation to academic tasks. 
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Empirical investigation is required to assess whether similar results will be 
revealed when children are presented with situations which portray academic 
tasks. The study which follows investigated whether children equate effort with 
ability and are able to conceptualise and verbalise ability when they are asked to 
apply their understanding to academic tasks. 
2.7.2. Subjects 
Two groups of subjects were employed, Group One consisted of 2' ) adults, 14 of 
which were male and 9 of which were female. Group One represented a control 
group for the experiment, the purpose of which is explained more fully in 
experiment two (see page 5 1). The second group (Group Two) comprised 16 4-5 Z 
year old children, 7 of which were female and 9 of which were male. 
2.8.1. Experimental proýedure 
Adults- The adult subjects were shown a picture of two children sitting at 
adjacent desks and each writing in a book which lay on the desk in front of them 
(see figure 2.4, page 60). They were told that the children were taking a test in 
school and asked to predict whether the children would score the same or 
differently on the test. If their prediction was that outcomes would differ they 
were asked to provide an explanation for their answer. Next the subjects saw a 
picture of the two children's workbooks. One child's book showed that they got 
all 10 answers correct (indicated by a tick next to each one of their answers) and 
the other's that they only got 2 answers correct (indicated by ticks next to two of 
their answers and crosses next to the remaining eight). Underneath each book was 
a number corresponding to the number of questions which each child was said to 
have answered correctly (see figure 2.4, page 60). Subjects were then asked to Z 
explain why one child had scored more than the other on the test. If their 
explanations suggested for example, that one child had done more revision for the 
test or that factors such as help from others were responsible for the outcome, 
they were told that this was an impromptu test and supervised to prevent 
collaboration between students. Questioning continued until subjects cited ability 
as an explanation or until they had exhausted all alternative explanations. 
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Children- Pilot interviews conducted with 4 year old pre-school children 
indicated that although these pictures were suitable for use with adults, they could 
not be used with young children. These children could not relate to the situation 
as easily as adults could, as children and adults define cognitive tasks in different 
ways and have different experiences. It was decided therefore to interview 4-5 
year old children who had already entered school and to use a different task. The 
task selected was taken from Harter & Pike's Pictorial Scale of Perceived 
Competence and Acceptance for Young Children (pre-school and kindergarten, 
1980). This task involves completing a jigsaw puzzle and is one of a number of 
tasks which are used by Harter & Pike to measure children's perceived cognitive 
competence. 
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Figure 2.4: Pictures shown to adults who were asked to discuss performance 
outcomes, in the absence of effort cues, on academic tasks 
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Subjects were shown a picture of two children working side by side at this task. 
One child's puzzle was almost finished, only a few pieces lay outside the puzzle 
and the child was shown placing a piece in the jigsaw. The other child's puzzle 
contained only a few pieces and the majority of the pieces still lay outside the 
jigsaw (see figure 2.5). The subjects were told that both children were trying to 
complete the same jigsaw puzzle and were asked to explain what the children had 
to do and which child had inserted the most pieces in their jigsaw. These 
questions were used to check that the subjects understood the task requirements 
and the children's outcomes on the task. Following this, subjects were asked to 
explain why one child's jigsaw was more complete than the other's. Again, any 
initial explanations relating to previous experience or to factors which could not 
be controlled by the child were counterbalanced by the experimenter. Throughout 
the experiment, all subjects were shown pictures of same-sex children to eradicate 
gender bias from their responses. 
2.9.1. Results 
Adults' Outcome Predictions- As demonstrated in a physically oriented context, 
the majority of adults were expected to predict that outcomes would be the same 
or similar or that insufficient information was provided to enable such a prediction 
to be made. Of the total 2-33 subjects, 14 stated that the two children would obtain 
the same score whilst 9 stated that they would score differently. The reasons for 
these predicted outcome differences did not provide any insight into the subjects' 
reasoning, but appeared only to reflect their idiosyncrasies. For example, they 
related to variables such as, hair colour, colour of clothes, conforming to "clever" 
or "conservative " stereotypes and purely for argument's sake. 
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Figure 2.5: Pictures shown to children who were asked to discuss, in tile absence 
of effort cues, performance outcomes on academic tasks 
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Adults' Explanations for Different Outcomes- Adults were expected to cite 
ability as an explanation for one individual gaining a relatively higher level of 
success than another. Such explanations were anticipated either in initial 
responses or in responses which followed the dismissal of all other factors which 
could contribute towards a performance outcome. The adults' explanations for 
different outcomes are shown below in table 2.8. Although some non-ability- 
related explanations were given, a chi-squared analysis indicated that the number 
of adults which gave ability-related explanations was significantly greater than the 
number who did not, X2 (1)= 22.2609, p<0.01. 
Non abilitv-related explanations: 
the exam suited the other girl better, better exam technique; he's more consen, ative; parental 
input: he's wcaring a v-neck, his parents arc more old fashioned; she appealed to me; she's 
wearing green, a happy and relaxed colour, red indicated the other girl is tense and worried. 
Abilitv-related explanations: 
she's cleverer; she conforms to society's expectations of what a clever girl should look like, she 
just knew her stuff better, it must have been a subject she was better at; she's more intelligent; 
perhaps he's intelligent and the other one's stupid; he knows the answcrs, better memory 
retention or he's able to work things out better; she's brighter. 
Table 2.8: Adults' ability and non-ability related explanations 
for differences in performance outcomes on academic tasks 
(cited verbatim) 
2.9.2. Children's Explanations for Different Outcomes- The children were not 
expected to refer to either effort or ability as an explanation for unequal outcomes 
in the absence of effort cues. Although subjects did not provide any effort-related 
explanations, it is evident from table 2.9 that a number of children (6) did give 
ability-related explanations for observed differences in outcomes. 
The number of 
children who gave ability-related explanations did not differ significantly 
from the 
number who did not, 7,2 (1)=0.375, p>0.05. 
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Non abilift-related explanations: 
she was older**; she's tired; doing different puzzles; don't know; he must have a map; didn't 
know he had a map; he went faster**; he doesn't want to; he likes doing jigsaws; it's in a 
picture; he's got his hand out but he's not picking none up*; she's happy; she's getting on with 
it*; that one's the biggest and that one's the smallest **(children, notjigsaws); he's a little girl 
and he's a big boy**; she's looking at the top of the jigsaw-, he's not putting the pieces in*; he 
wants to take his time; his hands are going fast*; his hands are slow, he's looking for the side 
pieces. 
Abilitv-related explanations: 
put the wrong pieces in the wrong place; he fit more pieces in; he's not very clever; she doesn't 
know what to do; he doesn't know where the pieces go; she put them right, but the other one 
doesn't know which is which; he knows how to do his jigsaw and he doesn't; the other one was 
thinking where the pieces go; she was good at doingjigsaws when she was a little girl, she 
turned them all over and she looked at the pieces; she wasn't good at doing jigsaws because she 
didn't turn them all over; he started off with the edge pieces; every time he puts one in, it fits. 
Table 2.9: Children's explanations for different outcomes on 
academic tasks (cited verbatim). *= possibly effort-related 
**= possibly ability-related 
Some of the children's explanations again raise the issue of differences in 
interpretation. The statements labelled with an asterisk may be interpreted by 
some individuals as effort-related. However, such an interpretation does not 
appear appropriate in the present context as the children's statements can be 
directly related to the behaviour of the models in the pictures. For instance, one 
child stated about the model who had completed less of the jigsaw, that, "He's not 
putting the pieces in. ". This could be construed to mean that the model is not 
performing the task as required and not trying to put any pieces in. However, 
examination of figure 2.5, which shows the pictures which were used, indicates 
that this child is referring only to the behaviour which he sees exhibited in the 
picture. In the picture, this model is not putting any pieces in at that time. It 
appears that, as many children do, this boy is simply describing what he sees, 
rather than providing a causal explanation for this. As was evident when children 
were asked to discuss physical tasks, some explanations were provided which may 
represent the child's concept of ability if it differs from the adult's. For instance, 
they may believe that ability is related to gender, size or age, if the explanations 
cited above are considered. These explanations could be interpreted as ability- 
related by the young child, but not by the adult experimenter and are marked with 
a double asterisk in table 2.9. 
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2.10.1. General Discussion 
Young children's equation of effort and ability 
The present study demonstrated that, regardless of whether children are asked to 
reason about academic or physical tasks, they do not use effort and ability 
concepts interchangeably (Hudson, in press). When asked to explain one 
individual's relatively superior performance to another's in the absence of effort 
cues, no effort-related explanations were provided. It appears therefore that when 
very young children appear to equate effort with ability their reasoning is based on 
the effort-related information with which they are presented and not on their 
internal system of beliefs. They provide what, to them, is the most obvious 
explanation for performance outcome. 
An examination of the present results together with those discovered by Stipek & 
Tannatt (1984) and Blumenfeld, Pintrich, Meece & Wessels (1981) provides 
further support for the current proposal that young children's concepts of effort 
and ability cannot be described as existing within a single schema. Stipek & 
Tannatt (1984) asked children from pre-school through to the third grade to rate 
themselves and their classmates on their smartness levels and to rate which 
children in the class were the best and worst thinkers and the best and worst at 
two specific tasks. The children's explanations for their ratings provided 
information about their use of effort and ability and what these concepts mean to 
them. Subjects often employed work habits to justify the levels of smartness 
which they attributed to their classmates, suggesting that they equate effort and 
ability. However, contrary to their predictions, Stipek & Tannatt (1984) 
discovered that work habits were cited by pre-school children no more frequently 
than those in the later grades. Even the second and third graders, according to 
Stipek & Tannatt (1984), did not clearly distinguish between work-related 
behaviours and ability in the explanations which they provided for their 
classmates' smartness levels and their ratings of the best and worst thinkers in the 
class. 
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Stipek & Tannatt (1984) suggest that their results support claims made by 
Blumenfeld et al (198 1) that elementary school children believe that trying and 
good conduct are synonymous with each other. In addition, they suggest that their 
findings lend further support to previous research which has indicated that young 
children believe that effort and ability are synonymous with each other. However, 
it seems that both Stipek & Tannatt's (1984) results and arguments presented by 
Blumenfeld et al (198 1) can alternatively be employed to support current 
proposals about these issues. According to Stipek & Tannatt (1984), Blumenfeld 
et al (1981) state that young children base their effort judgements on observed 
behavioural conduct and that effort expenditure provides the basis for their 
judgements about levels of ability. Stipek & Tannatt (1984) claim that the results 
of their 1984 study support this argument as young children justified their low 
smartness ratings by stating that children to whom such ratings were given fooled 
around instead of getting on with their work. Contrary to Stipek & Tannatt's 
(1984) suggestion that Blumenfeld et al's (1981) argument favours the young 
child's equation of effort with ability, closer inspection of this argument appears to 
indicate quite the opposite. If, as Blumenfeld et al (1981) suo, est, young children 
base their effort judgements on behavioural conduct and their ability judgements 
on effort expenditure, then their ability judgements seem indirectly to be based on 
behavioural conduct. Figure 2.6 demonstrates this relationship which has been 
proposed by Blumenfeld et al (198 1) and includes the indirect relationship 
between ability and behavioural conduct which is proposed by the present author. 
It seems that young children do base their ability judgements on effort but only 
because these effort judgements are based on behavioural conduct. This may also 
indicate an early understanding that success can be acquired through effortful 
practice, something which is assumed only to occur with the developmental 
advances associated with later child or adulthood. It is not surprising that young 
children do not differentiate between effort and behavioural conduct ývhen both 
are constantly reinforced by significant others (see for example, the quotation 
from Stipek & Tannatt, 1984, on page 67). This may result in the proposed 
relationship between success, or ability, and behavioural conduct, and may 
indicate that young children believe that ability may be something which can be 
gained through effortful practice and following procedural instructions, and that 
ability is under the control of the individual. If this is the case, this perceived 
controllability reflects the young child's egocentrism, which leads them to believe 
that their experiences are to some extent, personally controllable and modifiable. 
The only aspect of behavioural conduct which is available for reference to the 
young child when their understanding about effort and ability 
is assessed is effort 
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expenditure, hence, they may then appear to base their ability judgements on 
effort when in fact effort is merely a manifestation of behavioural conduct. The 
confusion of behavioural conduct, effort and ability, as proposed by Blumenfeld et 
al (198 1), also reflects the differences in interpretation which exist between the 
adult's and child's interpretations of ability 
Effort judgements 
Ability judgements > Behavioural conduct 
indirectly 
based on 
Figure 2.6: Relationship between effort, ability and behavioural 
conduct proposed by Blumenfeld et al (1981) with additional relationshi 
suggested by the present findings between ability and behavioural 
conduct 
related interview questions. If young children base their ability-related judgements 
indirectly on behavioural conduct as is suggested by the present results, then it 
seems that this would lead, through differences in construct interpretation, to the 
child's apparent belief that effort and ability are synonymous. As suggested 
previously, it seems that young children may base their ideas about effort on 
behavioural conduct as this is the only behaviour related variable with which 
methods assessing their effort and ability understanding presents them. This 
hypothesis also supports present proposals that young children interpret ability- 
related questions, for example, "Are both girls good at this game? " in terms of 
behavioural conduct instead of ability. As Stipek & Tannatt (1984, p. 82) state, 
Considering the degree to which procedural issues and conduct are stressed in 
early elementary school classrooms (Blumenfeld, Hamilton, Wessels & 
Falkner, 1979), it is perhaps not surprising that children's concepts of ability, 
effort and conduct are confounded. 
Although the present findings demonstrate some support for this confusion of 
these concepts, whereas Stipek & Tannatt (1984) believe the source of this 
confusion derives from the child's confounding of effort and ability, 
findings from 
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the present thesis indicate that this confusion is more likely to derive from the 
child's confounding of ability and behavioural conduct. Although it does seem 
that, if young children see ability and success as under their personal control, as 
was suggested previously, it may not be necessary for them to differentiate 
between ability and behavioural conduct. If confounding of these factors results in 
the belief that success can always be achieved then the young child will remain 
optimistic about their own ability and levels of future success. Further support for 
the present argument is provided by Stipek & Tannatt (1984). They revealed that 
to some extent, pre-school children used "smart" and "likeable" interchangeably 
when discussing reasons for the ability-related evaluations which they were asked 
to make. They suggest that the interchangeable use of these concepts could arise 
as a result of the emphasis which pre-school teachers place on exhibiting socially 
acceptable behaviour. Subsequently, young children may then base their ability 
related judgements on behavioural conduct, as proposed previously in the present 
research. It seems that two interrelated issues are evident here: differences in the 
way in which individuals at different developmental levels interpret the same 
constructs, and the tangible effort cues which children are normally presented with 
when their understanding of effort and ability is assessed. Stipek & Tannatt (1984, 
p. 83) reiterate statements made previously which have highlighted the importance 
of allowing for developmental differences in construct interpretation when 
assessing young children's conceptual development, 
... 
in studies of children's self-concept of ability, it is important to consider 
the child's definition of the terms being used. 
They cite as an example that young children may be referring to the fact that they 
like this individual or that this individual exhibits socially acceptable behaviour 
when they state that this child is smart. As a result, Stipek & Tannatt (1984, p. 
83) claim that, 
... we cannot assume that evaluative terms 
in measure of self-concept have the 
same meaning for all children, 
or, it seems for all adults. 
2.10.2. Young children's conceptualisation of ability 
The present study hypothesised that very young children cannot conceptualise the 
existence of ability as a factor involved in task outcome. 
Unless ability is explicitly 
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referred to, these children will not employ this concept as an explanation for one 
individual's greater level of success than another's. Alternatively, if the child does 
have an "ability" schema, even when ability is not explicitly referred to by the 
experimenter as a possible cause of outcome, he/she will provide ability-related 
explanations. 
There appears to be some domain specificity involved in this issue and only 
inconclusive support was revealed for the original hypothesis in this study. As 
expected, when children were asked to reason about physical tasks, no ability- 
related explanations were offered. However, when they were asked to reason 
about academic tasks, some children did provide ability-related explanations 
(Hudson, in press). These domain specific differences cannot be explained by the 
current data and should be addressed by future research but, this finding does 
emphasise the need to be aware of the possible domain specific nature of 
developing beliefs about effort, ability and the assessment of competence. It also 
suggests that 4-6 year old children are able to recognise the mediating effect of 
ability on the task performance of others in an academic context. The finding that 
children who were asked to discuss performance outcomes on academic tasks 
employed ability related explanations whilst those who were asked to discuss 
physical tasks did not is surprising. Duda (1987) cites work by Roberts & 
Pascuzzi (1979) which demonstrated that effort and ability can be more easily 
determined in physical than in academic contexts. Also, Duda & Nicholls (1992) 
stated that sporting competence is more visible to others than is academic 
competence. This is obviously an area for future research to address. The flaw in 
the research design which meant that no direct comparison could be made 
between the academic and physical domains within one group of children renders 
it impossible to state that it is domain rather than subject differences which 
revealed these results. 
When asked to reason about academic tasks, children's responses indicated that, 
contrary to predictions, they are capable of conceptualising the existence of I 
ability. This was demonstrated by responses such as the highest achieving child, 
"knew what to do", or, "knew where to put the pieces in the puzzle". With the 
exception of two children who substantiated their explanations by saying that this 
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child was "clever" or "good at puzzles when she was younger", the remaining 
subjects could not explain their reasoning in terms of ability. It therefore appears 
that although young children can conceptualise the existence of ability, they are 
sometimes unable to verbalise their reasoning. This explanation is supported by 
Harter's (1986) claim that before eight years of age, children do possess a feeling 
of general self-worth but cannot verbalise theirjudgements about this global 
concept. Young children's statements made here appear to indicate that they 
recognise positive affect in others and that others can derive positive affect from 
performing tasks which they enjoy. For example, they cited explanations for 
superior performance levels such as, "Because he likes doing jigsaws" and, 
"Because she wants to do it". These responses also indicate that young children 
appear to associate success with affective reasons for performing a task. Their 
responses do not clarify whether they believe that positive affect mediates success 
on a task or whether success derives from positive affect and the desire to 
perform the task. The direction of this relationship presents a possible question for 
future research to pursue. 
It is possible that possessing knowledge about a concept and employing this 
concept in verbal statements presents two differing perspectives to the current 
findings. The present data can be interpreted in one of two ways. First, young 
children could be capable of conceptualising the existence of ability but do not use 
it, perhaps because they are unable to, in their verbal explanations for 
performance outcomes. Alternatively, young children may not employ ability in 
their verbalisations because they cannot conceptualise the existence of this 
concept. The present findings indicate initial support for the former explanation. 
That children who discussed performance outcomes on academic tasks provided 
ability-related explanations seems to suggest that young children can 
conceptualise the existence of ability but have difficulty verbalising their beliefs 
about this construct. 
Current findings also support those of Stipek & Tannatt (1984) whose study 
investigated young children's ability-related jud gements of their own and their 12 
peer's academic ability, as cited previously. Stipek & Tannatt (1984) examined the 
factors which the children used to substantiate their ratings and revealed that 
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young children, when discussing academic competence, can employ ability-related 
factors, as did the present research. The children's responses were grouped into 
categories which included, for example, "work habits", "tautological responses" 
and "mastery". Examples of mastery related explanations which Stipek & Tannatt 
(1984, p. 78) cite are, 
He colors inside the lines. [and] She can count to 100. 
It appears that such explanations can also be interpreted as ability-related, when 
the examples which Stipek & Tannatt (1984) have provided are considered. Their 
results revealed that even very young children could employ such criteria and only 
on ratings of "worst thinker" did significant differences exist between the numbers 
of children at different grade levels who employed these mastery-related 
explanations. First and second graders were more likely to employ mastery-related 
criteria as explanations for their ratings of who was the worst thinker than 
children in the other grades. Consider table 2.10, which is taken from the data 
provided by Stipek & Tannatt (1984) and which shows the frequencies of children 
in each age group who provided mastery-related explanations for their ratings of 
the listed variables. These data indicate that even at pre-school age, the frequency 
of mastery-related explanations was comparable to those provided by children 
from the two older age groups. Results of the present research mirror these 
findings which also appear to indicate that young children can verbalise their ideas 
about academic ability. Also in line with current proposals, these results suggest 
that young children may see ability as a concept which is distinct from effort, 
evidenced by their ability-related explanations for performance levels. 
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Pre-school Kindergarten & 1st grade 2nd & 3rd grade 
Best at task 17 10 7 
Worst at task 1773 
Best at task 2998 
Worst at task 2461 
Best thinker 595 
Worst thinker 1 10 5 
Classmates' 576 
smartness 
Table 2.10: Frequencies of children of all ages who cited mastery-related 
explanations for their ratings of the variables listed, taken from 
Stipek & Tannatt (1934) 
Findings from the present study provide direct evidence concerning the effort and 
ability-related content of young children's verbal explanations for observed 
differences in performance outcomes. Although no similar direct evidence can be 
presented which demonstrates how the young child construes the meaning of 
ability, the author believes that findings from this study can be used to make 
strong suggestions, or inferences, about how the child construes the meaning of 
this concept. There are various reasons why this position is adopted, which are 
discussed below. 
In her consideration of developmental approaches to children's achievement 
motivation, Duda (1987) discusses Nicholls' work which has investigated the 
child's developing conceptions of effort and ability. This research required 
children to provide verbal explanations, in relation to ability level and effort 
expenditure, for performance outcomes, as demonstrated previously in Chapter 
One. Duda (1987, p. 132) states that, 
Nicholls' theory considers the meaning of ability or how abilitj, is constnied in 
respect to performance and persistence in achievement settings, 
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and, the assumption is, 
that the concept of ability has different meanings to individuals at different 
stages of development. 
The important phrases to consider from these quotations are, "the meaning of 
ability" and, "how ability is construed". It is apparent that Duda (1987) is 
suggesting that young children's explanations for performance outcomes can 
provide information about how they construe the meaning of ability. Similar 
evidence that Nicholls makes such inferences is demonstrated in Nicholls (1992). 
He firstly discusses the roles which the concepts of luck, effort, task difficulty and 
ability play in the individual's interpretation of their immediate performance 
outcomes. He then proceeds to propose that developmental changes are involved 
in the child's conceptualisations until the complete differentiation of ability from 
effort, luck and task difficulty results in the understanding that ability is a current 
capacity. Following this, Nicholls (1992, p. 34) states that the issue under 
consideration is, 
what children think ability is- the meaning of ability. 
Prior to this, when discussing the developmental continuum of effort and ability 
which he has determined, Nicholls (1989) again refers to these findings as a 
possible source of information about how the child construes the meaning of 
ability, referring to the different levels as, 
different levels of meaning (p. 5 1) 
and the reasoning which is revealed as reflecting, 
the meanings of ability and effort (p. 52). 
It appears that both Nicholls (1989; 1992) and Duda 
(1987) have suggested that 
young children's explanations for performance outcomes and the 
developmental 
changes involved in these explanations can be employed to make 
inferences about 
the meaning of ability to children at different levels of this understanding. 
For 
instance, Nicholls (1978; 1989) states that to very young children who have only 
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achieved the initial level of this understanding, the meaning of ability is effort 
expenditure or level of outcome. 
A reasonable assumption which can be made, based on the writings of both Duda 
(1987) and Nicholls (1989; 1992), is that although findings from the present study 
can provide only direct evidence about children's use of effort and ability in their 
verbal explanations for outcomes, these explanations can be employed to infer 
how these young children construe the meaning of ability. 
2.10.3. Criticisms 
One major criticism must be aimed at experiments two and three. This relates to 
the criteria which were employed to assess whether or not young children's 
statements were ability-related. The children's statements were evaluated from an 
adult perspective. For instance, if a child stated that one child managed to achieve 
a higher level of success than another because they were older or bigger then this 
was not labelled as an ability-related explanation. It remains conceivable that size 
or age represent the meaning of ability for the young child, but assessed from an 
adult perspective, these factors are not ability-related. This issue does seem to be 
somewhat unavoidable and allows us only to conclude from these experiments 
that young children cannot easily verbalise their ideas about ability in a way which 
can be interpreted from an adult's perspective of this concept but, contrary to 
previous research findings, do not appear to employ effort as a referent for ability 
when effort cues are removed. 
A more effective method of assessing young children's conceptions of ability 
should, if possible, be determined, although when one considers the following 
statement from Nicholls (1992, p. 3 4) this does not present an easy challenge: 
Children's conceptions are often difficult for adults to understand (Nicholls, 
1989) ... It 
is hard not to project our own conceptions on children when they 
lack understandings that are, for us, axiomatic. 
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CHAPTER THREE. 
THEORIES OF 
DEVELOPMENTAL 
CHANGE. 
3.1.1. Introduction 
Previous chapters have discussed research which has investigated the 
development of children's understanding of effort and ability concepts when they 
are asked to reason about academic tasks. Subsequently, experiments have been 
described which examined children's ability to apply their knowledge of these 
concepts to physical tasks. This empirical investigation established that where 
both domains are concerned, similar developmental trajectories of effort and 
ability understanding are exhibited. A relevant issue to pursue at present is the 
pattern of developmental change which is demonstrated by this conceptual 
understanding. In this chapter a number of developmental theories are considered 
which present a common perspective on the nature of developmental change. 
Although the theories discussed demonstrate dissimilar aetiologies, associations 
between the approaches which they propose are apparent. These approaches share 
common elements which effectively link them together. The principles which 
provide this link between these different approaches are as follows, the developing 
system, or organism: is dynamically stable; has the capacity to self-regulate; 
demonstrates a tendency to reduce dissonance; requires disequilibriurn or 
instability to effect developmental change, and, experiences developmental 
periods which exhibit differential degrees of stability. 
The first section of this chapter introduces the main features of the four different 
theories which contribute towards the approach adopted in this thesis. Parallels 
will then be drawn between the common elements of these and other 
developmental theories which demonstrate similar perspectives. Implicit within 
some of these theories is the suggestion that the stability of different 
developmental periods can be examined by observing exhibited behaviour 
throughout these different periods (for example, Fogel & Thelen, Gesell and 
Piaget). Empirical evidence is presented which supports this argument. A 
description follows of how the present research will attempt to employ this 
method of assessment to examine the applicability of these theoretical 
perspectives to the development of effort and ability conceptualisations with 
regard to the physical domain. 
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3.2.1. Self-organising Systems Theory (Fogel & Thelen, 1987) 
Fogel & Thelen (1987) have incorporated the perspectives of general systems 
theory (Sameroff, 1984), dynamic systems theory (Wolff, 1987), and domain 
theory (Fischer & Canfield, 1986) to generate their own proposal of a dynamic, 
self-organising system. Essentially, self-organising systems theory accounts for 
developmental change in the absence of inherent instructions (for example, 
genetics). This approach proposes that intrinsic instructions which direct 
development are not required as the interactions between the components of the 
system, or organism, result in developmental change. Order is derived from the 
process of developmental change itself and not from a set of procedural 
instructions (Thelen, 1989). For instance, Thelen (1989) cites as an example, the 
series of reactions which take place when bromate ions which are contained in a 
highly acidic environment are placed in a glass dish. In the presence of these 
elements a pattern of reactions is produced which results in the formation of 
concentric, circular rings and spirals. The production of this series of reactions is 
not generated by any set of instructions. This order derives simply from the initial 
configuration of conditions evident at the outset, that is, the combination of these 
chemicals at a particular room temperature within a confined space. Scientists 
have further demonstrated this self-determined generation of order (Thelen, 
1989). Without providing procedural instructions in the form of a computer 
programme, they have succeeded in reproducing this series of reactions in 
computer simulations. The only variables which are entered are the initial 
conditions from which the computer carries out the same reactions which are 
observed when the actual chemical constituents are assembled in this 
configuration. Therefore, in the absence of explicit procedural instructions, these 
elements demonstrate a tendency to self-organise into a series of ordered patterns. 
Thelen (1989) proposes that this tendency is a feature of other developing 
systems, such as the human organism. Subsequently, developmental change 
occurs not as a result of instructions informing the system how and when to 
change, but as a consequence of the system's tendency to self-organise as a means 
of creating order. This process creates the information necessary for development 
to occur and for individual differences to be manifest within a species. 
Consequently, self-organising systems possess the properties necessary to 
describe the genesis of both individual differences and species similarities 
(for 
example, Fogel & Thelen, 1987). Essentially, 
Order emerges as a dynamic rather than as a prescriptive phenomenon. (Fogel 
& Thelen, 1987, p. 749). 
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As a result of constant energy exchange with its surroundings, the organism, 
whilst demonstrating dynamic properties, manages to maintain stability. Each 0 
component of the organism has a functional purpose which may not be manifest 
until some time in the future. This purpose depends on the child's developmental 
status, previous experiences, and the activity in which they are currently engaged. 
A number of concepts and terminologies which are central to self-organising 
system theory's proposals require definition to facilitate understanding of their 
roles in developmental change, as discussed in the following section. These 
features include: critical parameter values; phase shifts; attractor states; 
disequilibrium, or instability; amplification of natural fluctuations; noise, and, 
control parameters. Throughout all developmental states, the system displays a 
preferred range of behavioural outputs which result in greatest system comfort. 
The most preferred of these is known as the attractor state. When the system 
experiences disruptions, it self-regulates to settle at this attractor state and regain 
the comfort, or stability, experienced prior to this disruption. Relocation to the 
attractor state following system disruption is more easily achieved when the 
system is presently experiencing a stable developmental phase than when an 
unstable phase is encountered. Thelen (1989) uses fluctuations in heart rate and 
body temperature to illustrate this concept. When the system experiences 
disruptions of these factors, they are effectively dislodged from their normal 
values, or the system's attractor state. This can occur, for example, during 
exercise when heart rate and body temperature are increased and the output of the 
system extends beyond the normal range of behavioural output which is exhibited 
when the individual is at rest. Although the dynamic stability of the system allows 
its continued functioning within this normal range of behavioural outputs, to 
maintain system stability, the system wants to return to its attractor state. 
Consequently, following the system disruption caused by engaging in exercise, the 
individual is able to reduce both their heart rate and body temperature to relocate 
at the attractor state. This example also demonstrates the dynamic stability of the 
system. Although a preferred attractor state exists, the system is not only 
restricted to the behavioural outputs exhibited at the attractor state. An acceptable 
range of behavioural outputs exists between which the system can fluctuate and 
still maintain some degree of system stability. in the present example, the 
individual has a preferred heart rate and body temperature. However, the system 
can be maintained when changes in these values are within certain limits, for 
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instance, as a result of exercise. The stability of the attractor state, hence of the 
system as a whole, varies according to the individual's current developmental 
phase. 
Thelen (1989) suggests that development involves alternate periods of system 
stability and instability. Moreover, that movement from one stable behavioural 
mode to another involves the experience of an intermediate unstable mode. She 
refers to this as a phase transition, or phase shift, which she views as an essential 
requirement for change and to effect the production of novel behavioural outputs. 
Various factors are involved in effecting movement into a transition phase. The 
first of these relates to what Thelen (1989) describes as a control parameter. The 
components of a system do not all change at the same rate, the slowest 
developing component is known as the control parameter. Changes in the control 
parameter therefore drive the system into a phase transition which effectively 
results in movement to new phases of development. Thelen (1989) does 
emphasise however that control parameters do not prescribe change by instructing 
the system how and when to change. It is alterations of the control parameter 
which result in wider system reorganisation and novel behavioural outputs. There 
are two ways in which control parameters are capable of triggering developmental 
change. As mentioned previously, the system can maintain stability within a range 
of behavioural outputs, the limits of which are known as critical parameter values. 
Changes in one or more system components may move the system beyond the 
normally accepted range of parameter values and beyond these critical parameter 
values. Hence, when behavioural outputs are no longer within the accepted range, 
the system cannot easily relocate to its attractor state and movement into a phase 
shift is effected. Essentially therefore, control parameters effect developmental 
change, as initiated by movement into a transition phase, by amplifying, natural 
fluctuations in parameter values to the extent that critical parameter values are 
exceeded and new behavioural modes are exhibited. Fluctuations in parameter 
values are constantly produced by naturally occurring noise, or disruption to the 
system. (Noise can be broadly defined as general perturbation of the system 
experienced as a consequence of dynanlic interaction between system components 
and between the system and its environment. ) The system 
is able to tolerate these 
natural fluctuations in parameter values and subsequently maintain an overall 
system stability. However, when this noise reaches a magnitude which can no 
longer be tolerated by the system, a phase shift occurs and new behavioural 
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outputs are observed. Thelen (1989) cites research by Kelso, Scholz & Sch6ner 
(1986) which exemplifies the role of the control parameter in effecting a 
nonequilibriurn phase shift. Kelso et al (1986) asked subjects to extend the index 
finger of one hand whilst simultaneously flexing the same finger on the other hand 
in time to a metronome which initially dictated a slow pace. As the pace was 
increased, the subjects involuntarily shifted from this out of phase movement to 
flexing and extending their fingers at the same time, therefore demonstrating an in 
phase movement pattern. They concluded that at a critical speed, the system 
shifted from exhibiting out of phase movements to exhibiting in phase movements. 
The system was not provided with any instructions which told it to make this 
shift- the new behaviour resulted merely from the task demands and the 
thermodynamics of the elements which combined to produce this movement. 
Therefore Thelen (1989) claims that the energy sent to the system to effect an 
increase in movement speed represented the single control parameter which 
produced the phase shift manifest by the change from out of phase to in phase 
movements. The second source of change related to control parameters lies within 
the control parameters themselves, or changes from one control parameter to 
another. These changes are a consequence of movement between different 
contexts which individuals experience throughout different periods of 
development, for example, their physical or social environments. 
Being independent of a particular time scale, a dynamic systems approach is 
applicable to both short term changes, such as the phase shift involved in the 
transition from walking to running and long term changes, and such as skill 
acquisition over a period of months (Fogel & Thelen, 1987). To date however, 
this approach has mainly been employed to explain the development of early 
motor skills (Thelen, 1989) but can potentially describe development in a number 
of competency domains (Fogel & Thelen, 1987). The most relevant aspect of this 
theory with respect to the present research is the proposal that throughout 
development, the system experiences periods of differential stability. Thelen 
(1989) suggests that in order to move from one stable behavioural mode to 
another, more advanced state, the system must experience an unstable mode 
which she refers to as a phase shift, or phase transition. Before 
developmental 
change can occur, the system must encounter this period of 
instability. Essentially 
therefore, Thelen (1989) proposes that the system experiences alternate periods of 
stability and instability, with each successive state of stability 
demonstrating 
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greater stability than those which preceded it. She further suggests* that the 
stability of the system during different developmental periods can be measured by 
observing the variability of the behaviour exhibited by the system throughout this 
period. During stable developmental periods exhibited behaviour demonstrates 
less variability than that exhibited during unstable developmental phases. These 
principles are adopted by the present research and consequently form the 
fundamental basis of the theoretical perspective employed. As such, later sections 
discuss these principles in greater detail. 
3.2.2. Piaget's Equilibration Model (see Boden, 1979) 
Piaget proposes that four factors are involved in developmental change: 
maturation; experiences with the physical environment; experiences with the 
social environment, and, equilibration. Equilibration co-ordinates the interactions 
of the first three factors enabling changes in the child's understanding of, and 
adaptation to, the world. Piaget (1985) defined equilibration as a process which 
leads the individual from a state of incomplete equilibrium to a state of equilibrium 
which is qualitatively different from the previous one. This movement results from 
multiple states of disequilibrium and reequilibration. According to Miller (1993), 
Piaget suggests, as do Fogel & Thelen (1987), that the system prefers to locate 
itself at a stable state of equilibrium. The developing child therefore wants to 
achieve an equilibrium between existing information in their internal schemata and 
information which they receive from external sources. It is the need to restore 
equilibrium, produced as a consequence of disequilibrium, or, discrepancies 
between external and internal information, which effects developmental change. 
This belief reflects Fogel & Thelen's (1987) proposal that the mediator of 
developmental change is the instability which the system experiences during 
transition phases. Also as Thelen (1989) suggests, Piaget claims that although we 
are able to cope with discrepant information up to a certain magnitude, a point is 
reached at which the individual is no longer able to cope with the experienced 
discrepancies. Discrepancies between the individual's environment and their 
internal cognitive structures, and between these structures, therefore create 
disequilibrium which subsequently produces developmental change and 
equilibrium in the form of novel and more advanced cognitive structures. This 
restoration of system equilibrium is facilitated by the process of equilibration. 
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Disequilibrium can result from changes in either the organism or its environment. 
When modifications within the organism are not matched by equivalent alterations 
within the organism's environment, and vice versa, disequilibrium occurs. As 
discussed previously, this disequilibrium must be stabilised, the achievement of 
which effects movement into a more advanced state of development. The 
individual stabilises experienced disequilibrium by carrying out either of the 
processes of accommodation or assimilation. The process of assimilation involves 
fitting reality into currently existing cognitive structures. Externally received 
information is adapted to enable the individual to incorporate it into their present 
knowledge. Accommodation however, involves modifying internal schemata to 
result in internal knowledge which matches this externally received information. 
When these capacities are exceeded and the modifications of either the individual's 
internal cognitive structures or externally received information become too great 
for the system to effect in its present state of development, disequilibrium results. 
The internal or external information cannot be adapted to explain the individual's 
experiences. From this resulting disequilibrium, developmental change occurs 
which produces new and more advanced cognitive structures. Again, these 
proposals are similar to those made by Thelen (1989) concerning the amplification 
of accepted parameters to a limit beyond which the system can cope. The entire 
course of cognitive development can be viewed as a process of equilibration as 
the child continually experiences disequilibrium which effects movement through 
stages of increasing equilibrium. As does Thelen (1989), Piaget proposes that a 
period of disequilibrium must be experienced for developmental change to take 
place. Similar to Thelen's (1989) suggestion that a range of parameter values 
exists within which the system can successfully cope with natural fluctuations, 
Piaget proposes that the system is able to deal with discrepancies within a certain 
range of acceptability and magnitude. Self-regulatory cognitive structures undergo 
continual development as a result of the organism's interaction with their 
environment. However, these system components are not merely passive 
recipients of environmental information as the relationships which are established 
between them define sources of action and produce developmental change. 
According to Piaget, the dynamic nature of the system is exhibited by constant 
transformation and conservation. Transformation ensures that individuals do not 
exist in a rigid and unchanging environment whereas conservation prevents 
individuals from experiencing constant flux. Thus whilst there is a mechanism for 
change in response to situational factors there is also a 
boundary which creates 
stability. 
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As was evident in the proposals of Self-organising systems Theory, the most 
important feature of the Equilibration Model in terms of this thesis, is Piaget's 
suggestion that development involves alternate periods of equilibrium and 
disequilibrium. Similarly, with progressive states of equilibrium, greater system 
stability is exhibited and the system's present state of equilibrium or disequilibriurn 
can be assessed by observing the variability of behavioural output exhibited 
throughout these developmental periods. 
3.2.3. Erikson's Psychosocial Theory (see Stevens, 1983) 
The basis for Erikson's theory was that of Freud's Psychosexual Theory of 
Development. Erikson acknowledges Freud's psychosexual stages, his description 
of the subconscious, and the existence of three aspects of the mind (the id, ego 
and superego). However, he expanded on Psychosexual Theory by exploring, 
amongst other things: the socialisation of the child, placing special emphasis on 
the role of play in introducing the child to the particular rituals involved in their 
culture; the development of a healthy personality, and the post-adolescent period. 
He also defined eight lifecycle stages during which the individual experiences 
specific crises, drawing parallels between these stages and Freud's psychosexual 
stages. His central proposition is that throughout development each individual 
strives towards a balanced sense of self, or, ego identity. The importance of 
developmental change in response to unpredicted life events and social influence 
plus the constraining nature of previous experience and environmental demands is 
a feature of Erikson's theory. 
According to Newman & Newman (1991), a central tenet of Psychosocial Theory 
is the tension which exists between the individual and their environment. During 
each life crisis stage, the resolution of conflict results in increased strengths which 
subsequently produces a balanced state. Erikson's Psychosocial Theory of 
development presents a perspective towards developmental change which is 
similar to that of Self-organising Systems Theory and the 
Equilibration Model. He 
proposes that before a conflict between two polar constructs, 
for instance, trust 
and mistrust, is encountered, the individual experiences equilibrium. 
However, the 
tensions which are created by these two opposing constructs results 
in conflict, or 
disequilibrium. The disequilibriurn which arises from this conflict initiates its 
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resolution which subsequently results in greater equilibrium. Therefore Erikson's 
Psychosocial Theory of development also describes developmental change as 
involving periods which display differential levels of stability. 
3.2.4. Gesell's Maturational Theory of development 
Thomas (1979) writes that although Gesell mainly examined developmental 
growth from birth to adolescence he was interested in pre-natal development but 
to a lesser extent. Gesell firmly believed that developmental change is governed by 
internal, maturational forces. He saw the genetic code as the primary determinant 
of both developmental schedules and the developmental changes which unfold as 
a result of these schedules. Therefore, his belief was that development always 
follows fixed sequences, which are initiated at the pre-natal stage. For instance, 
the individual's genetic blueprint always ensures that the heart is the first organ to 
both develop and function. Mthough he claimed that development progresses 
through a fixed series of internally governed sequences, he did acknowledge that 
the rate of change may differ from one individual to another. Gesell did briefly 
discuss the influence of the child's environment but he afforded it little status as an 
influencor on their development. His belief in the supremacy of maturational 
factors led him to develop gradients of growth which describe developmental 
norms for different chronological age groups. Although these norms were 0 
concerned with infant neuro motor development, he did devise one of the first 
tests of infant intelligence (Gesell & Amatruda, 1941). Not only did Gesell believe 
that maturational factors directly govern physical and motor development, he also 
believed that they influence the nature of the developing child's personality. He 
suggested that an individual's somatotype (that is, the physical appearance of the 
person, for example, muscular or thin and angular) partially determines the nature 
of their personality. He believed that the source of individual differences lay in the 
individual's somatotype. Although his child-centred approach to child rearing and 
education emphasised the individuality of every child (Crain, 1992) Gesell did not 
afford individual differences in development much consideration (Thomas, 1979). 
It is apparent therefore that Gesell believed that genetic factors are the most 
influential determinants of developmental change. His proposals differ greatly 
from those of other developmental theorists such as Piaget, Thelen and Erikson. 
Unlike Gesell, these theorists propose that the environment does not merely 
support the production of internal patterns (Crain, 1992) but through dynamic 
interaction with the individual, it actively participates in their development. 
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Although Gesell views the impetus of developmental change very differently from 
these other theorists, he makes proposals about development which mirror theirs. 
Gesell's proposals concerning the self-regulatory capacity of the organism and its 
fluctuation through periods of stability and instability are similar to those of the 
aforementioned theorists. Gesell suggested that self-regulation was, amongst 
other factors, a principle of growth (Crain, 1992). He believed that the organism's 
internal mechanisms are so powerful that to a certain extent the organism is 
capable of regulating their own development. For instance, if babies are allowed 
to, they will learn to regulate their own sleeping, waking and feeding patterns. 
However, in the attainment of a stable pattern, fluctuations frequently occur. As a 
result, the individual experiences periods of stability followed by periods of 
instability. However, even when instability is experienced, the individual's self- 
regulatory capacities ensure that they never stray too far from a balanced state. In 
so doing, they manage to maintain an overall integration and equilibrium. Gesell 
expands on his proposal that development fluctuates between periods of stability 
and instability in his description of the cycles of good and bad years through 
which individuals progress (Thomas, 1979). He referred to better and worse 
years, in relation to children's behaviour (Thomas, 1979), which accompany the 
child's transitions from introverted to extroverted phases (Crain, 1992). 
According to Thomas (1979), during better years the child is well adjusted and in 
balance both within themself and with their interactions with others. During worse 
years however, the child is confused within themself and is not in balance with 
their physical and social environments. These cycles are essentially invariant for all 
children and recur at different chronological ages (Thomas, 1979). The first cycle 
extends from two to five years, the second from 5 to 10 years and the third from 
10 to 16 years (Thomas, 1979). Thomas (1979) describes the first cycle of worse 
and better years, which is shown below in table 3.1. 
AGE BEHAVIOUR EXHIBITED AGE BEHAVIOUR EXHIBITE 
2 Better 
2.5 Worse 
3 Better 
3.5 Worse 
4 Better 
4.5 Worse 
5 Better 
Table 3.1: Gesell's first cycle of worse and better years (taken from Thomas, 1979) 
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Whether a year is described as better or worse is determined by maturational 
factors (Thomas, 1979). It is apparent therefore that Gesell's position on certain 
features of development is similar to those of the developmental theorists 
previously discussed. His suggestion that the individual possesses self-regulatory 
capacities and experiences fluctuations between stability and instability match their 
proposals on these issues. This latter feature represents the most important 
contribution of Gesell's developmental theory to the present thesis. 
The above discussion demonstrated that common elements are shared by the 
theories presented. The section which follows expands on this discussion to 
present the perspectives of these and other theories on a number of aspects of 
developmental change. This discussion will demonstrate that such theories share a 
cornmon approach to these issues, regardless of their widely differing origins and 
initial emphases. The features of developmental change which are similarly 
approached by these theories are as follows, the system: is dynamically stable; has 
the capacity to self-regulate; displays a natural tendency to reduce dissonance; 
requires a period of disequilibriurn to effect developmental change, and, displays 
alternate periods of stability and instability. These features of development 
provide the basis for the approach which is adopted in this thesis to address the 
issue of developmental changes in effort and ability understanding. 
3.3.1. System stability 
Stability and instability can be loosely defined as situations in which internal and 
external conditions are congruent and incongruent, respectively. Dynamic stability 
of the system is a feature of Self-organising Systems Theory (Fogel & Thelen, 
1987), Piaget's Equilibration Model, Kelly's Personal Construct Theory (1955) 
and Gesell's maturational approach to development (see Crain, 1992). The 
dynamic stability of the system allows the organism to maintain overall stability 
even when instability is experienced during periods of developmental change. It is 
also reasonable to argue that Erikson's description of conflict between two 
opposing constructs at each stage is an indication of the dynamic stability of the 
system. The conflict which the individual experiences results in disequilibrium, or 
instability., However, even when such instability is encountered, an overall, general 
balance or equilibrium is maintained by the system. Similarly, when constantly 
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faced with unpredictable life experiences and social forces, the individual is able to 
deal with the inconsistent and unexpected to preserve this overall balance. 
According to Self-organising Systems Theory, the organism's continual exchange 
of energy with its surroundings facilitates the organisation and maintenance of 
stability. The organism has a range of states in which it functions most 
comfortably, the most preferred of these being the attractor state. The organism 
remains stable within a range of parameter values but greatest stability is 
demonstrated when the system is located at its present attractor state. Theleds 
(1989) example of heart rate and body temperature which was cited earlier can 
serve as a reminder of how the attractor state functions. Individuals function best 
and feel most comfortable at optimum values of heart rate and body temperature. 
Representing the most stable levels of these factors, this optimum level is called 
the attractor state. Under some circumstances, for example, during exercise or 
illness, changes in heart rate and body temperature are exhibited and the system 
deviates from its attractor state. The system is still able to function within a range 
of parameter values, and will return to the attractor state once the disruption, that 
is, exercise session or illness, is over, if stability of the present state allows. 
Therefore the system is able to cope with changes within the critical limits of these 
parameter values and effect relocation to the attractor state. However, when these 
factors (heart rate and body temperature) change to such an extent that critical 
levels are surpassed beyond which the system cannot maintain overall stability in 
its present developmental state, the system shifts to a new behavioural mode. 
In terms of Piaget's Equilibration Model, system regulation results in instability 
yet also demands that some degree of stability is maintained. Hence, dynamic 
stability of the system is required to produce simultaneous stability and instability. 
Miller (1993) provides an example which Piaget uses to demonstrate the dynamic 
stability of the system. Most of the individual's encounters with their environment 
are novel in some way. For instance, previously experienced events may be 
interpreted in new ways by the individual in their current presentation and the 
context in which an event is experienced may differ across time. Therefore minor 
cognitive adjustments, or accommodations, accompany these novel experiences to 
enable the individual to cope with them. These adjustments constantly decrease 
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the discrepancy between reality and internal cognitive structures. However, as 
discussed earlier, boundaries exist within which experienced discrepancies are 
deemed acceptable. Consequently, if discrepancies are located within these 
boundaries, elaborate cognitive restructuring is not necessary. These boundaries 
therefore help the system to maintain overall stability even in the face of constant 
discrepancy between internal and external information, caused by these "new" 
experiences. Although discrepancies between these two types of information exist, 
the individual does not undergo constant cognitive restructuring when the 
discrepancies lie within the boundaries of acceptability. 
Similar views are expressed by both Kelly and Gesell. Kelly's belief is that 
individuals are constantly engaged in interpreting themselves and their 
environment, which effects developmental change. However, amidst this internal 
and external flux, the organism is still able to maintain a general stability. 
According to Personal Construct Theory (PCT) (Kelly, 1955), the individual's 
primary concern is with anticipating future events. Through their behaviour, 
individuals experiment and question their experiences to gain a better 
understanding of their world (Kelly, 1970). They constantly interpret and 
reinterpret both themselves and their experiences, a process which shapes their 
psychological characteristics. As a result of this, in PCT terms, development is a 
continual process involving no discernible end product (Bannister & Fransella, 
1989). The individual is constantly responding to experiences within a framework 
of past events. Gesell states that throughout the disequilibriurn which is 
encountered during growth, the organism nevertheless has the capacity to carry 
out integration processes and maintain an overall equilibrium. This overall 
equilibrium is achieved through the individual's capacity to self-regulate. Self- 
regulation ensures that throughout all developmental periods, the individual never 
deviates too greatly from a state of balance or equilibrium. For instance, when 
children experience the unknown for the first time, they also encounter an 
accompanying tension. However, even in the midst of this experienced tension, 
self-regulatory processes enable the child to remain in a general state of balance or 
equilibrium. 
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3.3.2. Self-regulation 
Although approached from differing perspectives, many developmental theorists 
propose that developmental change is intrinsically governed. Gesell, and Fogel & 
Thelen (1987) adopt divergent positions on this issue but do agree that the system 
is capable of self-regulation. Gesell believes that internal mechanisms are solely 
responsible for controlling and producing developmental patterns, to such a 
degree in fact, that the organism is capable of regulating its own development. He 
cites, as discussed previously, that when infants are left to their own devices, they 
are able to regulate their own sleeping, waking and feeding patterns. Montessori 
(see Crain, 1992) also appears to see maturational forces as the source of self- 
regulation. She claims that children are capable of developing skills and 
competencies independently of external input. She believes that the information 
they require for learning to occur is internally generated. 
In contrast, Fogel & Thelen (1987) reject the notion of genetically pre-determined 
instructions and claim that development occurs in the absence of such 
instructional information. Developmental pattern and order are obtained as a 
result of the interactions which occur between system components. Prior to this 
assembly of order, no prescriptive instructions are provided, the order derives 
directly from the relationships between the elements of the system. Genetic 
information defines only the initial conditions of the system but not the 
developmental changes which subsequently occur. Hence, no instructions are 
provided which inform the organism that it must return to a stable attractor state, 
and the mechanisms by which this can be achieved. The organism automatically 
regulates itself to settle at this attractor state because this state represents greatest 
comfort and stability of the system. When located at this state, behavioural 
outputs are at their most stable and the system can easily accommodate 
experienced system disruptions. Although Fogel & Thelen (198 7) do not deny the 
existence of a genetic code, they are not of the opinion that developmental plans 
and instructions are contained in the genes. They do not ignore maturational or 
environmental factors, perceiving the demands of the task and the individual's 
environment as equally important as internal information in the production of 
novel behavioural forms. Maturational factors include, for example, increases or 
decreases in neural elements and changes in the child's cognitive and motor 
abilities (Fogel & Thelen, 1987). The physical and social contexts of the organism 
are essential components of the system, and variations within these contexts may 
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represent control parameters of developmental change (Thelen, 1988). For 
instance, parents provide their children with a means of access to objects within 
the child's environment which they would not normally have gained through the 
course of development governed by maturational forces. System elements are 
assembled in a task-specific manner, the order of which is influenced by 
maturational factors, the current context of the behaviour, and, the child's current 
and previous experiences. Fogel & Thelen (1987) afford all these developmental 
forces equal status, and claim that the behavioural output of the system is a result 
of the organisation of all of these factors. 
Piaget sees the mind as a system of self-regulating cognitive structures, and this 
active construction by the individual as the basis of developmental change. To a 
lesser extent, Erikson, Kelly and Social Learning Theory (see Crain, 1992) 
describe a system which is self-regulating. From Erikson's perspective, 
development depends on the individual's resolution of conflicts, a process which 
takes place internally, but. within a social setting. Internal regulation, manifest in 
the individual's interpretation of events and constructs, is the determinant of 
unique personality characteristics (Kelly, 1955). Hence, personality development 
derives from the individual's own interpretations of events they experience in 
different contexts. Furthermore, social learning theorists suggest that with 
increasing development and socialisation, the individual's use of external rewards 
and punishments to determine individual standards is ameliorated. Standards of 
success in various competency domains are increasingly self-regulated and based 
on internally produced criteria rather than externally established ones. 
3.3.3. The system's tendency to reduce dissonance 
Self-regulation can be seen as a manifestation of the system's desire to dissipate 
experienced inconsistencies. Van Geert (1986) has claimed that the organism aims 
to acquire an internal, stable state of equilibrium with constant attempts 
being 
made to reduce dissonance, or incongruence 
between external and internal 
conditions. 
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When experiencing disruptions, the self-organising system will automatically self- 
regulate to return to its attractor state and reduce instability of its behavioural 
outputs (Fogel & Thelen, 1987). A general tendency towards ever greater stability 
is demonstrated by the increased stability which is experienced by the system with 
successive developmental states. The greater equilibrium exhibited by advanced 
developmental states again exemplifies the system's constant attempts to reach 
greater levels of equilibrium. Gesell sees the individual's self-regulatory 
mechanisms as instrumental in maintaining equilibrium as they ensure that the 
individual never moves too far away from equilibrium, and therefore never has to 
experience a high degree of inconsistency between internal expectancies and 
external experiences. From a Psychosocial Theory perspective, the individual's 
constant attempts to resolve experienced conflicts and to develop a coherent 
sense of ego identity demonstrate their natural inclination towards internal 
stability and comfort. This inclination is apparent in Personal Construct Theory's 
proposition that individuals aim to anticipate events they may encounter in the 
future. The constant reinterpretation which individuals engage in is an active 
attempt to reduce incongruencies between internal and external experiences, in 
order to further their understanding of themselves and their environment. 
The organism's tendency to reduce dissonance is also a feature of the 
Equilibration Model. Piaget's beliefs on this issue appear to be based on his early 
doctoral study. This study examined the ability of simple organisms to maintain 
their internal fluid balance whilst experiencing different environmental conditions. 
Essentially, his research exemplified the homeostatic principle at work, whereby 
the individual has a basic need to maintain internal coherence and congruence 
between internal and external conditions. At a cellular level, this involves 
maintaining the correct balance between different internal fluids and between the 
concentration of these fluids and those in the organism's external environment. To 
remain in a homeostatic state, the organism must continually reduce discrepancies 
between internal and external fluid concentrations to ensure its survival. Having 
established his knowledge of the homeostatic principle at a cellular level, Piaget 
then sought to examine its applicability to cognitive development. He proposed 
that the homeostatic principle can be employed as an explanation for cognitive 
development. Just as the simple organism needs to maintain a balance between 
internal and external body fluid concentrations to enable its survival, the 
developing child must maintain an equilibrium between internal cognitive 
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structures and externally received information. Homeostasis is disrupted when 
internal and external fluid concentrations of the simple organism are incongruent. 
Similarly, dissonance between internal information and information received from 
external sources disrupts the child's cognitive. equilibrium. Comparative to the 
simple organism's need to reduce inconsistencies which threaten homeostasis, the 
child needs to reduce dissonance which threatens their cognitive equilibrium. 
Based on the principles of homeostasis, Piaget claims that the developing child 
demonstrates a tendency to reduce dissonance and maintain equilibrium within 
cognitive structures and between these structures and their external environment. 
This tendency to reduce dissonance is evident in Erikson's Psychosocial Theory. 
Psychosocial Theory emphasises the existing tension between the individual and 
their environment (Newman & Newman, 1991) which can arise from the conflict 
which the individual experiences during each lifecycle stage. Throughout 
development, the individual strives to maintain balance by resolving these conflicts 
and ameliorating the tensions created by the dissonance which may exist between 
internal and external conditions. 
3.3.4. Mechanisms of developmental change 
A period of disequilibrium, or instability, must be successfully dealt with before 
the individual moves into a more stable state and for developmental change to 
occur. Self-organising Systems Theory refers to this period of instability as an 
unstable transition phase during which the present attractor state destabilises to 
allow novel states to emerge (Thelen, 1989). Fogel & Thelen (1987) describe two 
sources of developmental change, the first of which involves scalar changes in 
one, or a number of, system components and existing relationships between these 
components. As previously mentioned, the organism is capable of functioning 
within a range of parameter values. Within this range, a preferred set of values 
exists which represents the system's attractor state (Thelen, 1989). The system is 
able to tolerate natural fluctuations or noise which cause deviation from its 
attractor state, providing these fluctuations are within a range of acceptability, or 
within critical parameter values. When fluctuations are amplified to such an extent 
that they exceed these critical parameter values, in order to accommodate these 
fluctuations, the system moves into a new state which results in novel behavioural 
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modes (Kelso, Scholz, & Sch6ner, 1986). The instability produced by the 
amplification of these natural fluctuations effects a phase shift where the system 
reorganises to eventually exhibit a new level of stability and new behavioural 
modes which accompany this advanced state of development (Thelen, 1989). At 
critical developmental points only slight disruptions, or small changes in the 
system components (Gleick, 1987), will initiate a phase shift and the subsequent 
manifestation of novel behavioural forms. With progression through successive 
phase shifts, the system exhibits increasing levels of complexity. Fogel & Thelen 
(1987) suggest that the second source of developmental change emanates from 
changes within the control parameter or the replacement of an existing control 
parameter with a new one. The control parameter, which is either internally or 
externally determined, is generally the slowest system component to develop. 
Control parameters therefore catalyse movement through phase shifts but do not 
encode or prescribe developmental change. Changes in the control parameter can 
essentially be viewed as the final system modification which subsequently leads to 
developmental change. The nature of the control parameter can change from 
context to context and between different developmental periods. It is these 
changes, according to Wolff (1987), which result in ontogenetic change, and not a 
genetic blueprint. As effectors of development, natural fluctuations which cause 
changes within or between control parameters result in the system's movement to 
an entirely new behavioural state. 
Piaget discusses this issue with respect to the internal conflicts which the 
individual experiences during periods of disequilibrium. These conflicts are 
necessary for the initiation of equilibration and subsequent transition to a state of 
further equilibrium. Two processes enable the individual to deal with 
disequilibrium: accommodation and assimilation. In much the same way that the 
amplification of natural fluctuations causes movement into a phase shift, when 
discrepancies between internal schemata and external information are so great that 
the individual's assin-fflatory and accommodatory capacities are exceeded, 
developmental change takes place. Thus, the individual's inability to cope with 
discrepant information, and incorporate it into an adapted schema, marks the 
transition into a new developmental stage. 
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Gesell shares this view to a certain extent. He believes that the tension created as 
a result of encountering new experiences initiates self-regulatory mechanisms to 
restore the individual to a state of equilibrium. Similarly, Erikson describes the 
individual's internal conflicts as the major impetus for developmental change. 
These conflicts must be resolved to decrease disequilibrium and return the 
individual to a stable state where no conflicts are experienced. The successful 
resolution of conflicts in later stages is dependent on the degree to which conflicts 
in previous stages were successfully resolved. However, in Erikson! s proposals, 
successful resolution of conflicts does not dictate movement between lifecycle 
stages. Movement occurs as a result of maturational and social forces, regardless 
of whether the present conflict has been successfully resolved. 
3.3.5. The differential stability of developmental periods 
It may be apparent from the previous discussion that development involves 
periods which display differential degrees of stability. With respect to the present 
research, this phenomenon, which is recognised in a variety of forms by several 
developmental theorists, is of great interest and is therefore discussed more fully 
in the following section. 
Patterns of development display behavioural stability, followed by an unstable 
phase from which the organism progresses to a more advanced developmental 
state demonstrating greater stability (Fogel & Thelen, 1987). This movement, 
from a stable to an unstable state and then a state of further stability, is referred to 
as a discontinuous phase shift. Thelen, Kelso & Fogel (1937) present the changes 
involved in quadrapedal locomotion speed as an example of a discontinuous phase 
shift. A horse's gait, for instance, differs according to the speed at which it is 
travelling. This is evidenced by differences in gait observed when walking, trotting 
and galloping. At low gait speeds, the horse's limbs move out of phase which 
produces an asymmetric gait. However, when speed of locomotion 
is increased, 
the horse's limbs move in phase, resulting in a symmetrical gait. As no stable 
intermediate gait is observed between walking and trotting, Thelen et al (1987) 
describe this shift as a discontinuous phase transition. Phase stability can be 
measured by assessing the proximity of the system to 
its present attractor state. 
Throughout stable phases, the stability of the attractor state allows it to relocate 
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easily when perturbations which move the system away from its attractor state are 
experienced. Subsequently, the behavioural outputs of the system are consistent 
and invariant. However, during transition phases, when the attractor state 
experiences a loss in stability, the system does not cope easily with disruptions 
and relocation to the attractor state is not so readily achieved. Behavioural 
outputs now display greater variability and are less predictable than those 
exhibited during stable developmental states. For instance, Thelen (1989) 
discusses research carried out by Shurnway-Cook & Woollacott (1985) which 
illustrates this phenomenon. This research will be considered in greater detail 
towards the end of this chapter. Shurnway-Cook & Woollacott (1985) examined 
the ability of children at different developmental stages to compensate for postural 
disturbances presented by a balance platform. One group of children represented a 
transition phase, characterised by changes in their body proportions which the 
children in the other groups were not currently experiencing. Children in this 
transition group exhibited greater variability of behaviour than those in the other 
groups, manifest by their longer latencies of response to the postural disturbances 
which were administered. Therefore because they were experiencing a transition 
phase, these children demonstrated greatest variability of behavioural output and 
least capacity to compensate for postural disruptions. 
Piaget also describes cognitive development as a sequence of alternating 
equilibrium and disequilibrium. The individual firstly experiences cognitive 
equilibrium at a fundamental level of development. Following this, conflicting 
beliefs result in a period of disequilibrium. On resolution of these conflicts, the 
individual enters a subsequent stage of reequilibrium, or cognitive equilibrium at a 
higher developmental level. For example, this process is a general feature of 
progression through different stages of development. Piaget's theory of 
developmental change emphasises the stage approach and alternating equilibrium 
and disequilibrium is apparent in each of the developmental stages he describes. 
Upon entry into a new developmental state, disequilibriurn is encountered as 
cognitive structures are unstable and loosely organised. At the point of 
completion of this stage, equilibrium is achieved as cognitive structures are now 
stable and rigidly organised. This equilibrium is maintained until disequilibrium is 
once more experienced which effects transition to a more advanced 
developmental state. Further equilibrium at the point of completion of this 
developmental stage is then attained through the process of cognitive 
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restructuring. Predictions made about the system's vulnerability to disruptions and 
resultant variability of behaviour reflect those of Self-organising Systems 
theorists. Piaget proposes that when a system is in a state of equilibrium it can 
more successfully compensate for perturbations than during a period of 
disequilibrium. For example, consider the progression which the child follows 
from a state of non conservation of liquids to one of complete conservation (see 
Crain, 1992). When the child is shown two tall glasses with equal amounts of 
water in them and the water from one glass is then poured into a shorter but wider 
glass, this presents the child with a perturbation. Their responses to what has 
happened depend on what stage of conservation they are currently experiencing. 
When children are in either of the complete conservation or non conservation 
stages, their current developmental stage is sufficiently stable to result in 
responses which demonstrate similar levels of stability. When asked which glass 
now contains the most liquid, the non conserving child will concentrate on only 
one characteristic, such as the height of the water, and subsequently state that 
there is more liquid in the taller glass than in the wider one. The conserving child 
however, will state that the two glasses contain the same amount of water by 
consistently applying one of three arguments (identity, compensation or 
inversion). The perturbation (pouring the liquid into a different shaped glass) has 
not caused these children confusion as their states of conservation or non 
conservation are sufficiently stable to allow them to cope with this perturbation as 
demonstrated by the consistency of their beliefs, demonstrated by the consistent 
responses which they provide. However, children who are experiencing the 
intermediate stage between non conservation and conservation are not as easily 
able to cope with the presented perturbation. These children are able to focus on 
both dimensions of the glass, that is, height and width, but not simultaneously. 
This results in confusion and inconsistency of both beliefs and responses. For 
instance, the child may at first state that the taller glass contains more liquid but 
then change their mind and state that the wider glass contains the most. The 
disequilibrium which the child is experiencing results in unstable responses to, and 
a lesser ability to cope with, the presented perturbation than is demonstrated when 
children are in a state of either complete non conservation or conservation. 
This pattern of differential phase stability is demonstrated by Erikson's lifecycle 
stages. Following equilibrium at the initiation of a lifecycle stage, the individual 
experiences conflicting beliefs between which they must develop a: 
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dynamic balance, or, a favourable ratio (Stevens, 1983, p. 56). 
The resolution of this conflict then restores the system to equilibrium. Some 
lifecycle stages demonstrate a general lack of stability, for example, the adolescent 
and two year old periods. Daily fluctuations can be observed in the adolescent's 
behaviours and beliefs and two year olds exhibit a constant conflict between the 
desire to assert their independence and their dependency on their caregiver. 
Furthermore, Gesell discusses this phenomenon in relation to personality 
development. Personality development, according to Gesell, displays periods of 
stability and instability which is manifest in the individual's changing level of 
introversion and extroversion. This issue was discussed in the introductory section 
of this chapter. To recall, Gesell proposed that development involves recurring 
cycles of better and worse years. Throughout better years, the individual 
experiences equilibrium, they are happy within themself and in their interactions 
with others. Conversely, during worse years, children are confused and are at 
odds with their environment. Therefore, until late adolescence, the individual 
fluctuates between stable and unstable developmental periods. 
It is evident therefore that regardless of their divergent aetiologies and emphases, 
the above theories share a common approach to developmental change. Their 
description of developmental change as a series of fluctuating periods of stability 
and instability is the most salient aspect on which they share a common 
perspective in terms of the present thesis. Furthermore, Piaget and Fogel & 
Thelen (1987) suggest that the behavioural output exhibited by the individual is 
dependent on the stability of the developmental stage they are currently 
experiencing. They propose that during stable developmental periods when the 
individual experiences unexpected disruptions, behavioural responses to these 
disruptions will be consistent and the individual will demonstrate an ability to cope 
with the disturbances. However, during unstable developmental periods, 
behavioural responses to such disruptions will be less consistent and the system 
will demonstrate a decreased capacity to cope with these disturbances. It appears 
that an inverse relationship exists between the present stability of the system and 
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the variability of exhibited behaviour in response to experienced system 
disruptions. As system stability increases, the variability of behavioural output 
correspondingly decreases. The following section presents empirical evidence 
which is offered by Thelen (1989) in support of this proposal, which is taken from 
research examining a wide range of developmental phenomena. 
3.4.1. Research demonstrating developmental phenomena which exhibit 
alternate periods of stability and instability 
Postural stability in children 
Postural compensations in response to displacements experienced whilst standing 
on a balance platform were measured in three groups of children and an adult 
group (Shumway-Cook & Woollacott, 1985). The children's ages ranged from 
15-31 months in the first group, 4-6 years in the second, and 7-10 years in the 
third. The group of 4-6 year olds represented a transition group experiencing 
rapid changes in body proportion. As Self-organising Systems Theory would 
predict, the subjects' behavioural response consistency was related to the stability 
of their developmental phase. The least overcompensation and response variability 
was demonstrated by the 7-10 year olds and adults, and, although the youngest 
children had a longer response latency period, their behavioural responses to the 
postural displacements were also consistent. However, significantly longer 
latency, and greater variability, of response was observed in the 4-6 year olds. 
Thelen (1989) concluded from the above that this more unstable response in the 
4-6 year olds than those younger and older resulted from changes in body 
proportion which the 4-6 year old children were currently experiencing but those 
in the other groups were not. Thus in comparison with these other groups, the 4-6 
year olds were in an unstable developmental phase created by these physical 
changes. As a result of this, their responses to the postural disturbances 
demonstrated the greatest variability of all the groups included in the study. This 
greater variability of behavioural output can be directly attributed to the 
instability 
of these children's current developmental state. 
3.4.2. Piagetian conservation and spontaneous gestures 
Church & Goldin-Meadow (1986) asked children between the ages of five and 
eight years to make conservation judgements and then to explain their reasoning 
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behind them. Whilst making these explanations the children made spontaneous 
gestures. Some children's gestures were congruent with their verbal statements 
whereas other children's were not. For example, when verbal statements and 
physical gestures were incongruent, information which could be inferred from 
children's gestures did not match their verbal explanations. Church & Goldin- 
Meadow (1986) then noted that when speech and gestures demonstrated 
incongruence, the child's reasoning was inconsistent. The dissonance between 
these children's behaviour and reasoning demonstrates the instability experienced 
in the transition phase between non conservation and conservation. As Thelen 
(1989) predicts, system instability was exhibited during this transition phase but 
not during the stable phases which precede and follow it. Church & Goldin- 
Meadow (1986) further presented support for Self-organising Systems Theory's 
prediction that the organism is more sensitive to disruption during unstable than 
during stable developmental phases. They provided the children with training in 
solving conservation problems, and, although children experiencing the unstable 
transition phase (indicated by their discordant speech and gestures) increased their 
knowledge of conservation principles, the other children did not respond to this 
training. 
3.4.3. Weaning in rat pups 
Rat pups demonstrate a pattern of feeding which progresses from an initial 
suckling phase to independent ingestion, normally achieved at around 28 days 
after birth. The shift from suckling to independent feeding generally occurs 
between 21 and 24 days after birth (Hall & Williams, 1983). This period therefore 
represents a transition phase between suckling and independent feeding states. 
Consequently, rat pups experiencing this transition phase are more likely to 
display greater variability of behaviour than those who are in stable phases of 
feeding at present, in accordance with Self-organising Systems Theory principles 
(Fogel & Thelen, 1987). Stoloff & Blass (1983) demonstrated this to be the case. 
Rat pups of varying age were provided with the opportunity to either suckle or 
eat independently. Whilst the youngest rats always suckled and the oldest always 
ate independently, those aged between 21 and 24 days displayed 
inconsistent 
feeding patterns, sometimes suckling and sometimes eating independently. 
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The research cited above demonstrates both patterns of development which 
involve alternate phases of stability and instability, and the increased consistency 
of behavioural output which accompanies increases in phase stability. 
The present chapter has discussed a number of theories which have explored the 
nature of developmental change. Although their proposals originate from different 
perspectives, these theories demonstrate a common approach to this issue. To 
differing degrees, they all advocate that development involves periods of stability 
and periods of instability. Throughout development, whilst maintaining an overall 
equilibrium, the individual fluctuates between stability and instability. Movement 
between these different phases produces novel behavioural modes and progression 
to more advanced developmental states than those previously experienced. The 
periods of instability experienced by the individual play an important role in their 
development. Their function is to effect developmental change. Progression to 
new and more advanced states of stability only occurs if a preceding period of 
instability has been encountered. Thelen (1989) proposes that system stability can 
be assessed by observing the behaviour which organisms exhibit at different stages 
of a developmental phenomenon. She has presented evidence from other authors 
in support of this proposal (see for instance, Shurnway-Cook & Woollacott 
(1985); Church & Goldin-Meadow (1986), and, Stoloff & Blass (1983)). As 
Thelen suggests (1989), the aforementioned research revealed that the different 
phenomena investigated progressed in each case from initial stability to a period 
of instability and on to further stability. The relative stability of each stage was 
indicated by the variability of the organism's behavioural responses to disruptions 
of the system whilst experiencing that stage. When behaviour was consistent and 
did not vary, the organisms were experiencing either of the outer states of 
stability. However, when behaviour varied either between individuals at the same 
developmental stage or in comparison with the behaviour exhibited by individuals 
experiencing stable states, the organisms studied were experiencing the unstable 
state in-between these two states of stability. Having established the 
developmental trajectory of effort and ability understanding when children are 
asked to apply their knowledge to physical tasks in experiment one, an interesting 
issue which will be addressed in the following study is whether or not this 
conceptual development displays periods of differential stability, mirrored in 
behaviour, as the theoretical approaches considered here would suggest. 0 
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Thelen (1989) discusses that the individual's behaviour can be examined to assess 
stage stability and the present research will employ this method. However, a 
priori hypotheses can be formed about the stability of different stages of effort 
and ability understanding based on the stability of the child's schema in relation to 
these concepts. During levels one and four, it seems that the child's conceptual 
schema has rigidly fixed boundaries. Their perceptions of the relationship between 
effort, ability and outcome are clearly defined. New information which they 
receive about these concepts does- not easily penetrate the boundaries of this 
schema to effect changes in their exhibited reasoning. The focus of their schema is 
therefore fixed and new information does not easily cause the individual to shift 
from this focus. For example, children at level one believe that effort, ability and 
outcome are consistently related but display illogical patterns of reasoning. At 
level four, systematic reasoning is displayed by the individual's belief that ability is 
a capacity which limits the effects of effort on the outcome of a performance 
attempt. 
This can be related to Thelen's (1989) beliefs about the stability of the attractor 
state throughout different developmental levels. The stability of the conceptual 
schema at levels one and four produces a state of developmental stability. During 
which, the attractor state is stable and fluctuations cannot easily shift the system 
away from its attractor state. When these fluctuations do cause the system to 
deviate from its attractor state, relocation to this state is easily effected by the 
system. In comparison, throughout levels two and three, the child's conceptual 
schema possesses relatively flexible and loose boundaries. The child's beliefs about 
the relationship between effort, ability and outcome are changing and their current 
verbal reasoning demonstrates inconsistencies. They no longer believe effort, 
ability and outcome to be linked by a consistent, non causal relationship as 
children at level one do, nor do they yet perceive ability as a capacity as do 
children at level four. Instead, children at levels two and three appear to be 
experiencing a transition between levels one and four of this continuum. Evidence 
of this transition is demonstrated by children's initial acknowledgement of ability 
as a separate entity at level two and by the child's partial differentiation of effort 
and ability concepts at level three. As a result, the boundaries and focus of the 
schema are not clearly defined. Therefore it is likely that new information can 
permeate through this boundary and alter the focus of the schema. In relation to 
Thelen's (1989) proposals about the attractor state, during levels two and three of 
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the continuum of effort and ability understanding, the attractor state is relatively 
unstable. New information can easily dislodge the system from this attractor state 
and relocation to this state is not easily accomplished. The child's developing 
understanding of the conservation of liquids can again provide an example to 
illustrate changes in the rigidity of schemata boundaries, according to the stability 
of the developmental stage experienced by the individual (see Crain, 1992). When 
children are experiencing the stages of either complete conservation or non 
conservation, their schemata are rigidly bound. Children who are unable to 
conserve will focus on only one dimension, either the width or height of the glass. 
The focus of their attention and their schema is fixed on only one dimension and 
they do not allow information about the other dimension to enter their schema and 
their reasoning. For example, these children demonstrate a real disbelief in what 
adults say about the matter when they attempt to teach them the principle of 
conservation (Crain, 1992). Such schema rigidity is also demonstrated by children 
who do understand the principle of conservation of liquids. They are able to apply 
one of three arguments, such as identity, where the child reasons along the lines 
of, "No water has been added or taken away when it was poured into a different 
container, therefore there must be the same amount of water in the two 
containers" (Crain, 1992). Having reached the stage of complete conservation, the 
boundaries of the child's schema are now rigidly fixed so as not to allow 
conflicting information to affect their beliefs. However, when children are 
experiencing the unstable, interim stage between non conservation and 
conservation, their schema about this concept is not so tightly bound. This is 
apparent in the shift of their attention from one dimension to another. The relative 
flexibility of their schema boundary allows new information into this schema 
which subsequently affects the child's beliefs and responses. It is this flexibility of 
schema boundaries and the permeation of new information into the child's schema 
which results in confusion, or disequilibrium, and eventual movement to the more 
advanced stage which involves mastery of the principle of conservation of liquids. 
Thelen (1989) offers various suggestions of how system stability can be assessed 
in general and it is this method which is to be employed in the present research to 
examine the stability of developing conceptualisations of effort and ability. 
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The first consideration concerns what Thelen (1989, p. 106) refers to as, 
variability in the age-dependent onset of new behaviours. 
When such variability is exhibited, individual developmental profiles should be 
employed to examine shifts from one mode to another. Once individual 
developmental profiles have been established, individuals at different 
developmental levels could be exposed to experimentally induced perturbations in 
order that their behavioural response to such disruptions can be observed. Thelen 
(1989) states that this disruption must be a context manipulation which is 
appropriate for the developmental phenomenon under investigation. Having 
defined and administered appropriate disruptions, behavioural responses to this 
disruption may be observed. The stability of the system at different stages of 
development can then be identified by examining behavioural variability during 
these stages. As previous research, cited above, has demonstrated, when the 
system is experiencing stable developmental states, exhibited behavioural 
responses to experimental disruptions do not vary between individuals and display 
predictable patterns. However, during transition phases, where stability is 
lessened, these behaviourýl responses vary in relation to the mean response 
exhibited during stable stages and are less predictable. As a result, displayed 
behaviour deviates from the mean performance demonstrated during the stable 
state which precedes this phase of instability and the new behavioural mode which 
follows it (Thelen, 1989). Experiment one revealed that variability is apparent in 
the onset of new modes of reasoning about effort and ability concepts, in other 
words, children of the same chronological age will not necessarily have achieved 
the same level of conceptual development. Therefore if the above procedure is 
employed to examine the stability of effort and ability understanding, individuals' 
achieved levels of this conceptual development can be assessed. Assessment will 
account for possible individual differences and ensure that subjects are correctly 
classified at their own developmental level. This assessment will be carried out by 
adrainistering the procedure described in experiment one which revealed that this 
method provides a reliable measure of effort and ability understanding in the 
physical domain. 
Following this empirical assessment of effort and ability understanding, individuals 
who have achieved different levels of conceptual development will be faced with 
an appropriate context manipulation, as advocated by Thelen (1989). This 
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experimental disruption will be presented in the form of manipulated information 
about individuals' own performance outcomes on a motor task which appears to 
be a relevant context for this question. An individuals' beliefs about how 
performance outcomes are determined has been demonstrated (see Chapter One) 
to be closely related to their conceptualisations of effort and ability. How an 
individual perceives the relationship between effort, ability and outcome depends 
on their achieved level of understanding. During levels one and four the 
relationship between effort, ability and outcome is clearly defined. At level one, 
children consistently demonstrate the belief that effort is the primary indicator of 
ability or outcome and are expected to be able to verbalise this belief Similarly, 
when level four reasoning is achieved, children will consistently apply their 
knowledge of how effort and ability interact to determine the outcome of 
performance attempts. However, whilst experiencing levels two and three, the 
relationship between these concepts is less clearly defined. On achieving level 
two, children believe that effort is the major cause of outcomes but are beginning 
to understand that ability is a separate construct. Although they are unlikely to 
refer explicitly to ability as a cause of performance outcomes, they do 
acknowledge its existence by correctly classifying individuals according to their 
effort expenditure and level of performance outcome. Children who have reached 
level three display reasoning which indicates that their beliefs about effort, ability 
and outcome are also not rigidly fixed. Although these children have developed a 
fundamental understanding that effort and ability interact to determine 
performance outcomes, they do not apply this reasoning systematically and 
consistently. These differences therefore allow the stability of effort and ability 
understanding to be examined by observing individuals' behavioural responses to 
experimentally manipulated information concerning their performance outcomes. 
Although the child's understanding of effort and ability concepts is assessed by 
asking them to reason about others, manipulating their own performance 
outcomes is still appropriate as Nicholls & Miller (1984) have demonstrated that 
concepts of effort and ability are consistent regardless of whether reasoning is 
applied to the self or to others. 
The motor task which the children performed required them to provide 
behavioural responses to presented experimental disruptions. The behaviour 
referred to in this context is the child's choice of task 
difficulty at various points 
throughout the procedure, which will be explained more fully in Chapter Four. It 
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is the variability and predictability of this behaviour which was used to assess 
system stability. It was anticipated that children at levels one and four are 
experiencing stable states of effort and ability understanding and would 
demonstrate predictable behaviour. However, it was suggested that children at 
levels two and three are experiencing unstable states of this conceptual 
development. They were therefore expected to exhibit behavioural variability and 
performances which deviated from the mean performance of those children 
experiencing levels one and four. The method discussed above was employed to 
conduct an investigation of the stability of different developmental stages of effort 
and ability understanding, which is described in Chapter Four. 
To maintain overall coherence throughout the thesis, the experiments described in 
Chapters Two and Four are not presented in the chronological order in which they 
were conducted. Experiment four was concluded before experiments two and 
three were carried out and thus the protocol used to investigate stability of 
conceptual understanding in experiment four was that established by Nicholls 
(1978). Had the sequence been as is described in the thesis, the categories into 
which children were placed in experiment four might have been different. 
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CHAPTER FOUR. 
AN EXAMINA TION OF 
BEHAVIOURAL VARIABILITY 
IN RELATION TO STABILITY 
OFEFFORTAND ABILITY 
UNDERSTANDING BASED ON 
PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK. 
4.1.1. Introduction 
Chapter One described an experiment which explored developing 
conceptualisations of effort and ability in the physical domain. In the previous 
chapter various developmental theories (for example, Self-organising Systems 
Theory, Fogel & Thelen (1987)) which describe a developmental pattern 
progressing through alternate periods of stability and instability of the organism's 
system, were discussed. The present chapter describes a study which investigated 
whether or not the developmental changes in understanding of the relative 
contributions of effort and ability to performance outcomes, as revealed in 
Chapter One, demonstrate this pattern in the physical domain. 
Research evidence has been discussed previously concerning a variety of 
developmental phenomena which have been shown to demonstrate a pattern of 
differential relative stability, for example, Shumway-Cook & Woollacott (1985). 
System stability was indicated by the variability of behaviour exhibited during 
different developmental periods when the system was presented with appropriate 
context manipulations. Behaviour varied less between subjects when they were 
experiencing stable developmental states than during unstable developmental 
states. The present study adopted this approach to examine system stability at 
different developmental phases of effort and ability understanding. 
Prior to this, a pilot study was carried out to determine the validity and reliability 
of the task intended for use as a context manipulation in this investigation. This 
pilot study is described before the main investigation is presented. 
In this main study, as Thelen (1989) suggests, individuals' levels of this 
conceptual development were assessed empirically. Having identified individuals 
who had achieved different levels of reasoning about effort and ability, they were 
presented with experimentally disrupted performance information. This 
experimental disruption offered an appropriate context manipulation in which 
children's behavioural responses were examined for indications of system stability 
or instability. 
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4.2.1. Pilot study 
Aims 
The aims of this pilot study were as follows, to examine whether: gender 
differences affect performance on the motor task employed; order of presentation 
of different levels of task difficulty affect performance; the task is appropriate 
across a variety of ages; the task provides a reliable performance measure 
between different testing sessions; and, it discriminates between performance on 
different levels of designated task difficulty. 
4.2.2. Subjects 
The subjects were 39 children aged between 4 and 8 years, 19 of which were male 
and 20 of which were female. They were classified according to their year at 
school, (one, two, or three) with 13,11, and 15 children respectively in the three 
year groups. 
4.3.1. Experimental procedure 
The game- The task was a hand-eye co-ordination game which is shown in figure 
4.1. The children were presented with a computer screen displaying a convoluted 
path which extended the entire width of the screen. In the path's uppermost left- 
hand corner a cursor was located. By correctly manipulating a joy-stick, the 
cursor could be moved a desired amount in a desired direction along the path. The 
aim of the game was to move the dot along the whole of the path's length in a 
limited time period. However, whilst moving the dot along the path, subjects had 
to prevent it from touching the path's sides. If this happened, a "beeping" noise 
sounded and an error was incurred by the subject. Before playing the game, 
subjects were questioned to ensure that they understood both of the game's 
requirements. All children's responses indicated this understanding. Various 
attributes of this particular task warranted its selection for use in the present 
investigation. First, it represented a task which was novel to the subjects which 
eliminated the possibility of prior task experience confounding the results. As 
required, this task incorporated different difficulty levels and could accommodate 
children of all different ages. Finally, being computer based, the game was mobile 
which was an essential requirement as subjects were taken 
from various schools in 
two different counties. 
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The game could be played at nine different levels, gradually increasing in 
difficulty. Increased difficulty was manipulated by decreasing the path width and 
simultaneously increasing the speed at which the dot responded to the subjects' 
movements of the joy-stick. It was felt that with such young subjects, repeated 
trials on all nine difficulty levels would not be possible. Therefore, although it was 
intended to employ nine levels in the main study, the children only played on three 
of the difficulty levels in the present study, which were, levels 3,5, and 7. 
Preliminary trials conducted with other children revealed that these levels 
appeared to represent appreciably different levels of difficulty. This pilot study 
examined children's performances only on levels 3,5, and 7. 
Three sets of the three levels of difficulty (that is, levels 3,5 and 7) were 
employed. One of these sets of three difficulty levels was used with each of the 
three year groups. As the child's age increased, so did the relative difficulty of the 
levels on which they played. Therefore, the level 3 which year one children played 
on was easier than the level 3 which the year two children played on, who 
correspondingly played on an easier level 3 than the year three children. This was 
also the case with levels 5 and 7. Year one subjects played on the easiest set of 
three difficulty levels in comparison with the sets on which children in the 
remaining two years played. This set had the thickest path widths, the slowest dot 
speeds and a trial length of 50 seconds. In comparison with the sets of difficulty 
levels which children in years one and two played, year three subjects played on 
the most difficult set with the narrowest paths, fastest dot speeds and a trial length 
of 30 seconds. Year two subjects played on a set of intermediate difficulty (easier 
than the set on which year three children played yet more difficult than that on 
which year one children played), again with a trial length of 30 seconds. As 
children scored effors, this was indicated by a beeping noise from the computer 
and a cumulative error score was constantly displayed in the right hand corner of 
the screen. 
4.3.2. Session 1- Children were familiarised with the game through verbal 
instruction from the experimenter and practice trials on level two. All subjects 
then performed three trials on each of levels 3,5, and 7. However, order of trial 
presentation was varied between three subject groups to allow any effects of this 
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variable to be assessed. A group of 15 subjects, including 4,4, and 7 children 
from years one, two, and three, respectively, were presented with a fixed random 
trial order sequence. This sequence was as follows: 3,7,5,5,3,7,5,3, and 7. A 
second group of 12 subjects, consisting of equal numbers of children from each 
age group, performed three trials on level 3, followed by three on level 5, and 
three on level 7. The third group of 12 subjects, again in which each year group 
was equally represented, performed one trial on level 3, one on level 5, then one 
on level 7. This sequence was performed three times. For each subject, an average 
error score on each level was calculated, resulting in three error scores for every 
individual. 
4.4.1. Results of session one 
Previous discussion (see page 26) considered the generalisation problems incurred 
when empirical investigations employ small sample sizes and also introduced 
concern surrounding the use of parametric statistical techniques with small sample 
sizes. As certain parametric statistics were used on the small samples employed in 
this thesis (for instance, Pearson's Product moment measure of correlation, 
analysis of variance and regression analysis), this section discusses the caution 
which must be adopted when using such analyses with small sample sizes. 
A number of assumptions about the samples employed must be met in order to 
carry out parametric statistics, for instance, normality of distribution, homogeneity 
of variance and adequate sample size. Kerlinger (1986) discusses the severity of 
violating these assumptions in relation to the validity of the results of parametric 
statistical techniques which are employed. He presents two opposing arguments 
from Bradley (1972), who asserts that when the assumptions of parametric 
statistical tests are violated then nonparametric methods should be employed, and 
Gardner (1975), who advocates the use of parametric methods even when faced 
with violated assumptions. Kerlinger (1986) is in favour of Gardner's position on 
this matter, as is the author, due to the robustness of such statistical techniques. 
However, Kerlinger (1986, p. 266) does issue an important caveat which should 
not be overlooked when considering the current findings: 
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If one uses reasonable care in sampling and analysis and circumspection in 
interpretation of statistical results, parametric methods are useful, valuable 
and irreplaceable. 
Sampling considerations and limitations of current samples have previously been 
discussed, however, a further consideration is highlighted by the above quotation. 
In this thesis, using small sample sizes and parametric statistics, of which some of 
the assumptions are violated, highlights the need for circumspection in 
interpreting the results of these analyses. Hence, circumspection is paramount 
when interpreting the results of parametric statistical analyses carried out in this 
thesis and the author strongly recommends that future research should explore 
these issues with greater sample sizes and more rigid adherence to the 
assumptions of parametric statistical techniques. 
The three year groups were treated independently from each other in all analyses. 
Gender differences: 
Three 20 (gender by difficulty level) ANOVAs were carried out, with average 
error score as the dependent variable and repeated measures on the second factor. 
As table 4.1 demonstrates, neither the main effect for gender nor gender by 
difficulty level interaction were significant in any of the three year groups. 
Significant main effects for difficulty level were observed, F(2,20)=30.45, 
p<0.00 1; F(2,20)=28.83, p<0.00 1, and F(2,24)=334.94, p<0.0 1, for years one, 
two, and three, respectively. These will be discussed when the data from sessions 
I and 2 are combined for analysis (see page 1133). 
4.4.2. Order of trial presentation 
Three 30 (trial order by difficulty level) ANOVAs were carried out, again with 
error score as the dependent variable and repeated measures on the second factor. 
No significant interaction or trial order main effects were revealed, as table 4.2 
demonstrates. Again, a significant difficulty level main effect was revealed, 
F(2,18)=39.76, p<0.001, F(2,18)=29.28, p<0.001, and F(2,24)=39.87, p<0.001, 
for years one, two and three, respectively. The significant difficulty 
level main 
effect will be discussed on page 113. 
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SS DF Als F SIG. OF F 
YEAR ONE: 
Within cells 428.03 10 42.80 
Gender 4.20 1 4.20 0.10 0.760 
Within cells 191.92 20 9.60 
Gender x Difficulty 10.48 2 5.24 0.55 0.588 
YEAR TNVO: 
Within cells 182.90 10 18.29 
Gender 0.04 1 0.04 0.00 0.964 
Within cells 108.01 20 5.40 
Gender x Difficulty 12.28 2 6.14 1.14 0.341 
YEAR THREE: 
Within Cells 343.88 12 28.66 
Gender 22.73 1 22.73 0.79 0.391 
Within cells 294.33 24 12.26 
Gender x Difficulty 32.46 2 16.23 1.32 0.285 
Table 4.1: Results of ANOVAs examining gender differences 
4.4.3. Discussion 1 
Analyses conducted on the data from session one indicated that neither gender nor 
order of trial presentation influenced performance on this task. Therefore it was 
not necessary to vary the order of trial presentation between subjects or to 
consider gender as a factor in subsequent analyses. It was decided that in session 
two all subjects would perform three consecutive trials on each difficulty level, 
that is, 3x level 3, then 3x level 5, then 3x level 7. This format would reduce the 
overall procedure time and ameliorate boredom and fatigue which young subjects 
may experience during long testing sessions. 
III 
SS DF ms F Sig of F 
YEAR ONE: 
Between subjects effects... 
Within cells 346.29 9 38.48 
Order 46.69 2 23.34 0.61 0.566 
Within subjects effects... 
Within cells 152.42 18 8.47 
Order x Difficulty 19.10 4 4.77 0.56 0.692 
YEAR TNVO: 
Between subjects effects... 
Within cells 178.85 9 19.87 
Order 4.09 2 2.05 0.10 0.903 
Within subjects effects... 
Within cells 95.72 18 5.32 
Order x Difficulty 24.58 4 6.14 1.16 0.363 
YEAR THREE: 
Between subjects effects... 
Within cells 332.66 12 27.72 
Order 56.46 2 28.23 1.02 0.390 
Within cells effects... 
Within cells 276.11 24 11.50 
Order x Difficulty 65.33 4 16.33 1.42 0.258 
Table 4.2: Results of ANOVAs examining trial order effects. 
4.5.1. Session 2 
Session two was completed between I and 21 days following session one 
depending on the time available within the different schools. Although the period 
between sessions one and two was somewhat longer for children from some 
schools than from others, this situation was unavoidable. However, any effects of 
this difference in time between testing sessions were counteracted by including 
children from all the different schools in each of the experimental groups which 
were employed. Moreover, when children were asked to recall what they were 
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required to do on the game, all children had remembered quite correctly. It is 
possible that the children who experienced a shorter period of time between 
sessions one and two had a slight performance advantage but allocating children 
from different schools to the same experimental group eradicated this problem. As 
the children had played the game previously in session one, they were asked to 
recall what they had to do and were given two practice trials on level 2. They then 
completed a total of nine trials, three on each of levels 3,5, and 7, presented in 
the order described above. Subjects' average error scores on each of the three 
levels were again calculated. 
4.5.2. Results 
Correlations between performance scores on sessions 1 and 2- Pearson's 
product moment correlation coefficients were calculated between scores on 
sessions one and two and are shown in table 4.3. Initial coefficients were 
calculated which included scores from all three difficulty levels. Separate 
coefficients were then calculated for each level of difficulty. With the exception of 
those coefficients marked with an asterisk, according to Munro & Page (1993), 
the remainder indicate high to very high correlations. 
4.5.3. Performance differences between the three levels of difficulty 
Using a within-subjects design, three one-way ANOVAs (score by difficulty level) 
were performed on error scores from sessions one and two. As table 4.4 
demonstrates, the difficulty level main effect was significant for all three year 
groups. 
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LEVEL YEAR 
3,5 & 7.1 0.923 
2 0.925 
3 0.903 
3 1 0.915 
2 0.904 
3 0.354* 
510.786 
2 0.806 
3 0.647* 
710.834 
2 0.845 
3 0.824 
Table 4.3: Correlation coefficients between 
error scores on sessions one and two 
Tukey's HSD test was then used to determine at which levels (alpha=0.05) mean 
error scores differed significantly from each other. For year one, error scores on 
level 7 were significantly greater than error scores on levels 3 and 5 and 
significantly more errors were made on level 5 than on level 3. In years two and 
three, significantly more errors were made on level 7 than on both levels 3 and 5. 
However, the difference between errors made on levels 3 and 5 was not 
significant. Although these differences were not statistically significant, the 
children did make more errors on level 5 than on level 3. Greater standard 
deviations (provided in parentheses in table 4.5) can be seen for all three year 
groups on level 7 than on levels 3 and 5. Such a finding is to be expected when 
we consider that level 7, being the most difficult level played on, is likely to result 
in widely differing performances by those subjects who are more and less 
competent at the game. 
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SS DF ms F SIG. OF F 
YEAR ONE 
Within subjects effects... 
Within cells 145.71 22 6.62 
Difficulty 764.03 2 382.02 57.68 0.0001 
YEARTWO 
Within subjects effects... 
Within cells 209.01 22 9.50 
Difficulty 838.43 2 419.22 44.13 0.0001 
YEAR THREE 
Within subjects effects... 
Within cells 442.70 28 15.81 
Difficulty 1814.35 2 907.17 57.38 0.0001 
Table 4.4: Results of ANOVAs examining performance differences between 
the three difficulty levels 
3 
LEVEL 
5 7 
YEAR 
2.13 4.80 12.96 
(1.95) (2.99) (5.21) 
2.10 3.20 9.82 
(1.91) (2.16) (4.49) 
3 0.91 3.27 11.39 
(0.71) (2.11) (5.72) 
Table 4.5: Mean error scores for all years on levels 
3,5 &7 with standard deviations in parentheses 
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Figure 4.2: Plot of mean error scores for all three 
groups on levels 3,5 and 7. 
14 -r 
12 4- 
10 
Error score 
4 
0 
2 a 
A 
A 
. 
a 
year I 
year 2 
A year 3 
023456 
Level of difficulty 
4.5.4. Discussion 2 
Discriminant validity-Results of the three one-way ANOVAs and follow-up 
tests indicated that, as required, subjects' performances varied in relation to the 
level of difficulty played on. Both table 4.5 and figure 4.2 demonstrate that error 
scores increased with increasing level of difficulty. Although the differences 
between mean scores did not all reach traditional levels of significance, they 
exhibited an increase in mean error scores from level 3 to level 7 which was both 
expected and required. The results indicated that higher levels of the game were, 
in general, significantly more difficult than lower levels for each age group. 
4.5.5. Test-retest reliability 
Correlation coefficients between scores on sessions one and two indicated that 
subjects' performances were consistent from one session to another. All but two 
of the r values are defined as high or very high when the criteria suggested by 
Munro & Page (1993) are employed. Therefore on separate testing occasions, the 
instrument provided a reliable measure of subjects' performances. 
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4.6.1. Conclusions from the pilot study 
The aims of the initial testing session were to determine whether or not gender 
and order of trial presentation affected performance on the task. Analyses which 
examined these variables indicated that they did not affect performance and these 
variables were not included in subsequent analyses. 
Two testing sessions were employed in order to examine if the task provided a 
reliable measure of performance over time. With the exception of two correlation 
coefficients, the remainder were classified as high to very high. This result 
indicated that the instrument under consideration did provide a reliable measure of 
performance across time. 
A further aim of this pilot study was to examine the discriminant validity of the 
instrument. Error scores on some but not all levels did differ significantly but on 
those on which error scores did not demonstrate significant differences, the 
differences between error scores were in the directions expected and required. 
That is, more errors were made on levels which were designated as more difficult 
than on those levels which were designated as relatively easier. Hence, the 
discriminant validity of this instrument was demonstrated. 
A learning effect was demonstrated in all three age groups on some of the levels 
tested. As table 4.6 indicates, this learning effect was evident in year one at all 
three levels of difficulty, in year three at levels 3 and 7, but only on level 3 in year 
two. This learning effect is demonstrated by smaller error scores produced in 
session two than those produced in session one. This indicates that the children 
improved their performance on the game with increased amounts of practice. The 
lesser learning effect for children in years two and three could perhaps be 
attributed to fatigue or boredom with the game. They may not have found the 
game as challenging in the second session as the children in year one evidently 
did. Equally likely is the fact that the children in years two and three may have 
more quickly reached their maximum level of performance than those in year one. 
Therefore whilst the younger children still had room for improvement after the 
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first session, the older ones may have improved as much as they possibly could 
during this session. 
As a result of this pilot study, certain adjustments and practices were adopted in 
the study which follows. First, the relatively large standard deviations of error 
scores around the mean indicates that the number of errors incurred varies quite 
widely between individuals. These individual differences in skill level must be 
taken into account. It was decided to employ a procedure to obtain individual 
baseline levels which would indicate each individual's own level of competence on 
the task. This procedure was as follows. Representing the intermediate level of 
difficulty, children performed three trials on level 5. Their average error score was 
calculated on these three trials and a threshold level of six errors was adopted. 
Given the length of the trial time and the difficulty of this level of the game it was 
felt that this threshold level was appropriate. If the children's average error score 
was six, then their baseline was designated as level 5, if this average error score 
was less than or greater than six, their baseline was designated as level 7 or 3, 
respectively. It was also decided to keep the different sets of levels for children at 
different chronological ages as error scores were approximately the same on the 
three levels for each of the three year groups, demonstrating their suitability for 
each age group. Similarly, it was decided that in the following study, all the 
children would perform trials in blocks of the same level of difficulty as order of 
trial presentation did not affect children's performance on the task. 
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LEVEL 
5 
YEAR ONE: 
7 
Session one 3.21 5.13 13.07 
Session two 1.30 4.71 12.89 
YEAR TWO: 
Session one 2.28 3.03 8.36 
Session two 1.91 3.38 10.78 
YEAR THREE: 
Session one 1.12 3.13 11.83 
Session two 0.84 3.63 11.73 
Table 4.6: Mean error scores on all levels for all years in sessions 
one and two 
One major change was made to the appearance of the game. In the pilot study, the 
screen displayed a blue path on a black background. However, in the study which 
follows these colours were changed throughout each of the three phases of the 
experimental procedure employed to make the game more attractive to the 
children. To remind the children of the difficulty of the current level on which they 
played, whilst the children were playing on each trial, a large number was 
displayed in the left hand corner of the screen . 
This instrument provides a ma or strength of the subsequently described main i 
experiment. The pilot study validated and demonstrated the reliability of a task, 
which, through alteration of the parameters of path width and dot speed, was 
appropriate for use across a spread of chronological ages. Being able to employ 
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the same task with children who represent different levels of conceptual 
development and motor control whilst assessing the same variable, adds validity 
to the main study described in the following section. The behaviour of children 
across a variety of developmental levels can then be directly compared in relation 
to the same task (or, an age appropriate version of the same task). Commonly, 
different measures are used to assess the same variables in children at different 
chronological ages and developmental levels, for example, Harter & Pike's (1984) 
Pictorial Scale of Perceived Competence and Acceptance for Young Children and 
Harter's (1985a) Perceived Competence Scale for Children are used respectively 
with younger and older children. Although a necessary step to take, use of 
different measures could reduce the direct comparability of the variables which 
they are designed to measure, as pointed out by Marsh, Barnes, Cairns & Tidman 
(1984). By using the same task with children of different chronological and 
developmental ages, the present study overcomes this problem. 
A final, general comment is warranted concerning the difficulty of selecting a task 
which would suitably fulfil the requirements of this study. A task was required 
which was relatively novel to all the subjects, which was sensitive to individual 
differences in ability level, which accommodated a range of age and skill levels 
and which would provide an opportunity to assess behaviour across a range of 
developmental levels. It is felt that this pilot study has demonstrated that the task 
intended for use in the following study has satisfactorily fulfilled these criteria and 
therefore demonstrated its suitability for this investigation. 
4.7.1. Experiment four: An investigation into the stability of effort and 
ability understanding 
Having established the validity and reliability of the task which will provide the 
necessary context manipulation in this study, the study itself is now described. 
During this study, children at different levels of effort and ability understanding, 
concerning performance outcomes on physical tasks, were presented with 
experimentally disrupted performance information. The variability of their 
behavioural responses to this information was examined to assess system stability 
at different developmental points throughout this conceptual development. It was 
expected that children at conceptual levels two and three would exhibit greater 
120 
variability of behaviour than children at levels one and four, therefore indicating 
periods of instability and stability of understanding at the different levels. 
4.7.2. Subjects 
The subjects were 51 children (age range 5 years &2 months to 13 years &3 
months) from primary schools in Gwynedd and Clwyd and a secondary school on 
Merseyside. They were randomly selected for participation, were mainly 
Caucasian in origin and represented a wide range of academic abilities. 
4.7.3. Experimental procedure 
Session l- Session one involved assessing subjects' individual levels of effort and 
ability understanding in the physical domain and establishing their baseline level on 
the computer game to be employed in the study. The level of effort and ability 
understanding of a number of children was assessed before groups were 
constructed. Group allocation took place following an assessment of the 
individual's level of effort and ability understanding. Originally, group size was 
anticipated to be 20, however, insufficient numbers of children who reasoned at 
the required level could be found to achieve this target. For example, although 20 
children could be found who reasoned at levels two and three, from the subject 
pool available, only 17 of the children had reached level four of this conceptual 
understanding. 
Conceptual understanding was assessed using the procedure described in 
experiment one (see page 3 1). Following this, subjects were allocated to one of 
three experimental groups. Group one (n = 17) comprised children who had 
reached level one of the continuum, II of whom were male and 6 of whom were 
female. They ranged in age from 5 years &2 months to S years &3 months, with 
a mean age of 6 years &I month. Group two (n = 17) was comprised of children 
who had reached either of levels two and three of the continuum, 7 of whom were 
female and 10 of whom were male. Their ages ranged between 5 years &2 
months and 12 years &5 months, with a mean age of 8 years 
&6 months. Group 
three (n = 17) was comprised of children who had reached level four of the 
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continuum, 12 of whom were male and 5 of whom were female. They were aged 
between 10 years &7 months and 13 years &3 months, with a mean age of II 
years &9 months. 
The aim of the game was explained to subjects and they performed two 
familiarisation trials on level 2 of their age appropriate set of levels. Level 2 was 
chosen to introduce the children to the game as it was felt that this level 
represented one which provided the children with an opportunity to become 
familiar with the game at a level which was achievable and not too challenging. A 
baseline level was then established for each subject to determine an appropriate 
difficulty level for that individual, therefore allowing for existing individual 
differences in ability level. The method of assessing individual baselines is 
described in the pilot study (see page 117). As with the pilot study, with 
increasing age, the subjects played on a set of nine levels of increasing difficulty. 
Although individual baseline levels were established, children nevertheless played 
on a set of nine levels which was designed for an age group into which they fell. 
This was necessary to allow for performance differences resulting from both age 
and skill level within this age group. As discussed previously in the pilot study 
(see page 108), three programmes were employed so that the more difficult levels 
on which the younger children played corresponded in difficulty level to the easier 
ones on which the next age group of children played. 
4.7.4. Session 2- This session was divided into three phases which were presented 
to the subjects in continuous succession. On selected manipulation trials during 
phases one and two, subjects received manipulated performance information on 
the game whereas information received throughout the whole of phase three was 
an accurate representation of their performance on the game. This last phase was 
incorporated into the design for ethical reasons to negate any effects of the 
previous two phases. 
On the manipulation trials in phase one children received performance information 
which was designed to suggest higher levels of success than they had previously 
122 
experienced. On similar manipulation trials in phase two, performance information 
was administered which was designed to suggest lower levels of success than 
previously experienced. Throughout all trials in the three phases, a large number 
was displayed on the screen which indicated the level the subject was currently 
attempting. This was to ensure that subjects were constantly aware of the 
difficulty level at which they were playing. 
4.7.5. Experimental format 
Figure 4.3 shows an abridged version of the experimental format employed. 
Phase one- Subjects first performed two trials on their individual baseline level. 
Throughout these trials they received performance information which was 
manipulated so as to suggest enhanced levels of success, relative to those 
previously achieved. Following this, they were asked to think about how far along 
the path they had moved the dot, how many beeps they had made, and to decide 
which level of difficulty they wanted to play on next. This level choice was 
labelled C I. At this, and each subsequent point at which they were required to 
make such a choice, subjects' understanding of the relative difficulty of the 
different levels was checked. The children were asked whether they wanted to 
play on a more difficult or an easier level than the present one, and to state on 
what level they wished to play. They then showed the experimenter their choice 
by moving an arrow along a scale which portrayed the nine levels, to their own 
level choice. Once a choice had been made and this check procedure had been 
carried out, they performed two trials on the level they had chosen. The 
performance information they received on these trials was not manipulated in any 
way. Following these two trials, they chose their next level of difficulty (C2) at 
which they performed two trials and on which they again received unmanipulated 
performance information. 
Phase two- Subjects then returned to their baseline and performed two trials at 
this level. During these trials they received performance information which was 
manipulated so as to suggest depressed success levels in comparison with those 
experienced previously. Following these manipulation trials, they chose their next 
playing level (0). They then performed two trials at this level whilst receiving 
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Figure 4.3: Experimental format. 
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unmanipulated performance information. After these trials, subjects again made a 
choice of difficulty level (C4) and performed a further two trials on this level, also 
during which performance information was not manipulated. 
Phase three- Subjects again returned to their baseline level for two trials during 
which performance information was not manipulated. Next they chose the level of 
difficulty on which they wished to play (C5) and performed two trials at this level 
whilst receiving unmanipulated performance information. Finally, subjects chose 
their last playing level (C6). They again performed two trials at this level during 
which performance information was not manipulated. 
4.8.1. Results 
it was anticipated that behavioural predictability would vary in relation to level of 
understanding about effort and ability concepts. Identified as possessing stable 
levels of this conceptual development, groups one and three were expected to 
demonstrate predictable responses to presented experimental disruptions. 
However, as group two was proposed to represent levels which are unstable, 
these subjects were not expected to exhibit such behavioural predictability. An 
examination of this issue first requires a definition of behavioural predictability in 
the present context. The following discussion describes the behaviour which only 
groups one and three were expected to exhibit and figure 4.3 will increase the 
clarity of this explanation. In the absence of other cues, it is reasonable to 
presume that we assess personal capability on the basis of performance outcomes. 
if we perceive ourselves to be capable of achieving a task we might either choose 
to continue at that task or increase the difficulty level of the task. Conversely, if 
we perceive ourselves as not capable of succeeding on a task, we might choose to 
decrease the level of task difficulty, or remain at this level to achieve success with 
subsequent performance attempts. Following information which indicates 
increased levels of success, at C I, subjects were expected to choose a level which 
was more difficult than their baseline. Subsequently, when performance 
information was not manipulated on trials performed at this chosen level, success 
levels were effectively lowered and subjects were expected to choose a lower 
level of difficulty at C2. A similar reduction of difficulty level, in relation to 
baseline, was expected at C3 when subjects had received performance information 
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which indicated decreased levels of success. However, in response to 
unmanipulated performance information received on trials at this chosen level, 
subjects were expected to elect to play at a more difficult level at C4. Because 
phase three did not present subjects with any experimental manipulations they 
were expected to demonstrate similar responses regardless of experimental group. 
Individual differences in actual and perceived competence levels could affect 
behavioural responses to performance information which accurately reflects 
performance. Therefore no apriori hypotheses were made about subjects! level 
choices at C5 and C6. What may be revealed is that no differences exist between 
the frequencies of subjects electing to increase and decrease the level of difficulty 
during this phase of the experiment, regardless of experimental group. 
If actual and predicted behaviour are congruent, significantly more subjects in 
groups one and three would elect to increase than to decrease the difficulty of 
their playing level at CI and C4. Alternatively, at C2 and C3, significantly more 
subjects in groups one and three would elect to decrease than to increase the 
difficulty of their playing level. However, such significant differences would not 
be evident in the choices of children in group two. Moreover, at CS and C6, the 
numbers of children electing to increase and decrease the level of difficulty would 
not differ significantly from each other in any of the three experimental groups. To 
examine the validity of these hypotheses, chi-squared analyses were used. 
The anticipated results related to whether the three groups demonstrated 
behaviour which could be predicted as a result of the performance information 
with which children were presented. Group behaviour following the receipt of 
performance information was then examined. The present study was interested in 
the direction of children's level choices rather than the mean level of difficulty 
chosen by each group as this latter method would not allow for individual 
differences in ability level. As a result, the most effective method of assessing the 
present hypotheses was to compare the frequencies of children who chose to 
move in either direction at each point when a level choice was required. Chi. 
squared analysis provides the most appropriate method of analysing differences 
between frequency data. 
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4.8.2. Chi-squared analyses 
At each point when subjects made a level choice (i. e. Cl-U), three options were 
available. They could either increase the difficulty level, decrease this level, or 
remain at their present level of difficulty. Therefore three response categories 
were formed, "Increase", "Decrease", or "Same". Table 4.7 shows the frequencies 
of children from all three groups who fell into each of these categories at all six 
response points during the experiment. 
GROUP 1 cl C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 N 
Increase 11 66757 42 
Decrease 5 10 11 8 12 7 53 
Same I102037 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 102 
GROUP 2 cl C2 C3* C4* C5 C6 
Increase 573 14 69 43 
Decrease 10 8 13 194 43 
Same 221224 13 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 102 
GROUP3 cl C2** C3** C4 C5 C6 N 
Increase 11 31 11 6 10 42 
Decrease 4 13 15 495 50 
Same 211222 10 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 102 
Table 4.7: Frequencies of children, classified by experimental group, who 
chose to increase, decrease or stay at the same level (Cl=following 
performance information designed to elicit relatively greater perceived 
success; C3=following performance infomation designed to elicit relatively 
depressed perceived success levels; C2, C4, C5 & C6=following 
unmanipulated performance information; *=significantly different; 
**=significantly different, as hypothesised) I. E. 
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Three initial within-group chi-squared analyses were carried out. However, these 
analyses were rendered invalid as more than 20% of the expected cell frequencies 
were less than five. It was the "Same" category which caused the violation of this 
chi-squared assumption. Therefore this category was excluded from subsequent 
chi-squared analyses which were performed on only the remaining "Increase" and 
"Decrease" categories. Three chi-squared analyses were carried out on these data, 
the results of which are shown in table 4.8. As this table demonstrates, within 
groups two and three, significant differences were revealed between the 
frequencies of children found in the two response categories. However, these 
frequency counts did not differ significantly in group one. One-sample chi-squared 
analyses were subsequently employed to determine the response points at which 
significant differences exist for each of groups two and three. The results of these 
analyses are displayed in table 4.9. 
GROUP DF CHI-SQUARED P 
156.52 >0.05 
25 20.812 <0.001 
35 26.77 <0.001 
Table 4.8: Results of initial chi-squired analyses 
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GROUP2 
Level choice point DF CHI-SQUARED P 
111.67 >0.05 
210.07 >0.05 
316.25 <0.05 
41 11.27 <0.001 
510.60 >0.05 
611.92 >0.05 
GROUP3 
Level choice point DF CHI-SQUARED P 
1 3.27 >0.05 
2 6.25 <0.05 
3 12.25 <0.001 
4 3.27 >0.05 
5 0.60 >0.05 
6 1.67 >0.05 
Table 4.9: Results of follow-up one-sample chi-squared analyses 
4.3.3. Group 2 
As expected, significant differences were not revealed between the frequencies of 
children in the two response categories at C 1, C2, C5 and C6. However, at C3, 
significantly more children elected to decrease the level of difficulty, and at C4, 
significantly more subjects elected to increase the level of difficulty. These 
differences were not expected. 
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4.8.4. Group 3 
As expected, at C2 and C3, significantly more subjects elected to decrease than to 
increase the level of difficulty. Also as expected, significant differences were not 
revealed between the frequencies of children in the two response categories at C5 
and C6. However, contrary to predictions, at CI and C4, no sianificant 
differences were found between the frequencies of children in the two categories. 
Figures 4.4-4.6 show the frequencies of children in both the "Increase" and 
"Decrease" categories at each response point and in each of the three groups. 
Figure 4A Frequencies of directional choices 
at C1-C6 in group 1. 
Response point 
0 Increase 
[: )De crease 
I --) () 
Figure 4.5: Frequencies of directional choices 
at Cl-C6 in group 2. 
Frequency 
cl C2 C4 
Response point 
C5 
Figure 4.6: Frequencies of directional choices 
at Cl-C6 in group 3. 
Frequency 
C, I (, 2 C3 
Response point 
C5 
0 Increase 
0 Decrease 
CG 
NI ncrea se 
0 Decrease 
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Considering the somewhat limited support which was provided flor predictions 
made in tile present study by the prccedin,, chi-squared analyses, a number of' 
additional statistical analyses were carried Out on the data to ftirther investlizate 
the proposed relationships between behavioural stability and conceptual 
understanding. 
4.8.5. Regression analyses 
Regression analyses were carried out to assess whether or not performance could 
be employed to predict the change in level choice which the child made following 
this performance score. Performance score was calculated as the mean number of 
errors scored on blocks of two consecutive trials. Level choice was calculated as 
the number and direction of levels which the child's level choice following a 
performance attempt deviated from the level on which they had played when this 
performance score was obtained. This value could be either negative or positive. 
This analysis therefore examined individual performance scores rather than 
performance scores which were expected as a result of the manipulations 
administered. These analyses revealed no further support for the present 
hypotheses. 
4.8.6. Correlation analyses 
These analyses were carried out to assess whether or not changes in performance 
and level choice were correlated. As with the above analyses, changes in the 
children's individual performance scores were used. The first analyses examined 
the correlation between change in level chosen, in relation to that played on 
previously, and performance changes between trial blocks. That is, whether, for 
example, if the child's performance improved between the second and third blocks 
of two trials, they correspondingly increased the difficulty level on which they 
played in block three in comparison to that played in block two. The second 
change in performance score which was examined was within trial blocks. That is, 
whether, for example, if the child's performance got worse from one trial to the 
next within the same block of two trials they correspondingly elected to play on a 
relatively lower level than the level on which they played during this previous 
performance attempt. Similar to the regression analyses carried out previously, 
these correlational analyses provided no further support for the predictions made 
in this experiment. 
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4.8.7. Examinations of within subject predictability and consistency 
This procedure examined the level of predictability and consistency demonstrated 
by the direction of children's level choices in relation to changes in the number of 
errors which they scored. Consistency was assessed by examining whether the 
direction of children! s level choices in relation to changes in their performance 
score demonstrated a pattern which was consistent across all points at which the 
children made level choices. For example, a child could demonstrate consistent 
behaviour by electing to increase the level of difficulty following an improved 
performance score and electing to move to an easier level of difficulty following 
an increase in the number of errors scored. A child could also demonstrate 
consistency by electing to decrease the level of difficulty following a relative 
improvement in error score but elect to increase the level of difficulty following a 
relative increase in error score. Predictable behaviour would be demonstrated only 
when children elected to increase the level of difficulty following decreases in 
error scores and decrease the level of difficulty following increases in error scores. 
These two behaviours are not mutually exclusive yet the existence of one does not 
rely on the existence of the other. As was employed with the correlational 
analyses, changes in performance score both within and between trial blocks were 
examined and no further substantiation of the present hypotheses was produced. 
4.8.8. Analysis of variance 
An analysis of variance was performed to examine possible differences between 
the groups in the amount by which their level choices, following the administered 
performance information manipulations, deviated from individual baseline levels. 
This would then provide an indication of whether the children in one group tended 
to remain nearer to their baseline levels than did those in another group and would 
provide some indication of the variability of the three groups' behaviour. Results 
from this analysis matched those of previous analyses, with no significant 
differences between groups. 
4.8.9. Individual profiles 
Two types of profile were drawn up for each child to examine whether any trends 
in the data could be identified. The first portrayed the absolute 
deviation between 
adjacent level choices at each of the six level choice points. 
From these profiles, 
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the amount of level choice variability within each subject could then be examined. 
The second profile displayed the child's actual level choices at each of the six 
response points in relation to their individual baseline level. This profile provided 
an indication of the amount by which each child's level choices deviated around 
their individual baseline level. Again, no further support for the current 
hypotheses was yielded from these profiles. 
4.9.1. Discussion 
Group 1- The behaviour of group one did not quite match apriori expectations. 
Figure 4.4 demonstrates that although behavioural responses to experimental 
disruptions were in the predicted directions, traditional levels of statistical 
significance were not reached in a subsequent analysis of this behaviour. This is 
perhaps an indication that this behaviour was only partially driven by the 
performance information with which they were presented. Previous research has 
suggested that young children are less aware, or make less use, of performance 
outcomes than children at more advanced developmental levels, particularly when 
this information refers to the individual's own level of success. Stipek et al (1984) 
demonstrated that young children's exaggerated competence perceptions can be 
lowered to approximate actual ability when the salience of the performance 
outcome is increased. Similarly, Clifford (1978) revealed that first and third 
graders' predictions of performance on a puzzle task were closer approximations 
to previous performance when visual cues provided salient reminders of these 
performances, than when such cues were not provided. It appears therefore that 
young children's behaviour in the present context is likely to exhibit changes when 
the child's performance outcome becomes a salient aspect of the situation. The 
final section of this chapter describes an experiment which explores the effects on 
young children's behaviour of increasing the saliency of their performance 
outcomes on a motor task. 
4.9.2. Group 2 
In line with current hypotheses, no significant differences were revealed between 
the number of children who elected to increase or decrease the 
level of difficulty 
at each of the response points C 1, C2, C5 and C6. 
Moreover, the behaviour 
exhibited by these children in phase one (where 
level choices CI and C2 were 
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made) was in direct opposition to that displayed by children in groups one and 
three. Whilst in groups one and three, more children elected to increase than 
decrease the level of difficulty, in group two, more children elected to decrease 
than to increase the level of difficulty at this response point. Although none of 
these differences reached statistical significance levels in the chi-squared analysis, 
they do suggest that during phase one, the behaviour of children in groups one 
and three was somewhat more predictable than that of children in group two. 
Contrary to predictions, this group did respond in a manner which was similar to 
that of groups one and three when they were presented with experimentally 
distorted performance information which suggested depressed success levels. That 
these children responded predictably to this type of performance information is a 
matter of concern when the development of achievement motivation and related 
variables such as perceptions of personal competence are considered. Group two 
seemed to be sensitive only to "negative" performance information whereas 
groups one and three appeared to be sensitive to both "negative " and "positive" 
feedback. During the developmental period experienced by group two children, 
perceptions of personal competence have commonly been shown to decline. For 
example, Stipek & Tannatt (1984) demonstrated decreases in perceptions of 
academic competence from pre-school to the third grade (the latter representing 
the age group in which most of the group two children occurred). Nicholls (1978) 
also claims that between 6&7 and 8&9 years of age, children's self concepts of 
attainment in reading demonstrate marked declines. Some authors have suggested 
that changes in the way in which children respond to failure experiences (Stipek & 
Daniels, 1988) and the child's increasing ability to incorporate failure into their 
self concept (Stipek & Hoffman, 1980; Parsons, 1982) parallel this exhibited 
decline in levels of perceived competence. Moreover, previous research (for 
example, Rholes, Blackwell, Jordan, & Walters, 1980) has revealed that children 
at this stage of development, or chronological age, are beginning to acknowledge 
and respond to the limiting effects of negative feedback, the cumulative effects of 
which, according to Stipek (1984) influence expectations for success in the future. 
The increasing uncertainty which the child experiences about their personal 
competence during this developmental period could contribute towards the 
instability of their exhibited behaviour. The doubt which these children seem to 
be 
experiencing about their personal competence levels and whether or not the 
feedback which they receive indicates failure or success, could result 
in their 
adoption of "safe" strategies. Such strategies are evidenced 
in their choice of easy 
levels of difficulty during phase one when performance 
information indicated that 
success could be easily achieved on the game. 
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The present findings suggest that children experiencing levels two and three of 
effort and ability understanding focus on feedback which indicates low personal 
ability whilst ignoring feedback which indicates that personal ability level is high. 
It is likely, as previous research has proposed, that this emphasis on negative 
feedback may contribute towards declining perceptions of personal competence. 
When the relationship between high levels of perceived competence and 
participation in physical activity is considered (for example, Weiss & Horn, 1990), 
the practical implications of this finding must be considered. During this period it 
appears that practitioners working with children in physical settings should 
increase the children's awareness of positive feedback to attempt to maintain 
perceptions of personal competence and sustain the child's participation in 
physical activity. 
4.9.3. Group 3 
Similar to groups one and two, in phase three, the numbers of children in this 
group who chose to increase and decrease the level of difficulty did not differ 
significantly from each other. The directions of their level choices in phases one 
and two matched predictions only to a certain extent, In both phases, choices 
were made in the predicted directions but only at C2 and C3 did the differences 
between frequencies yield statistically significant results. These children's more 
adult-like conceptualisations of effort and ability may contribute towards the 
relatively more predictable behaviour which they demonstrated in comparison 
with those at lower levels of this conceptual development. 
With respect to developing conceptualisations of effort and ability, the present 
study provided only limited support for the proposal (for example, Self-organising 
Systems Theory and Piaget's Equilibration Model) that behavioural variability is 
related to conceptual stage stability. To a certain extent, when the individual was 
presented with experimentally derived perturbations, decreases 
in behavioural 
variability parallelled increases in stage stability (see Hudson, 
Fazey & Fazey, 
1994a, results presented differ between this publication and those presented in the 
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present thesis as the data were re-analysed subsequent to publication). This was 
indicated by the increased predictability of childreWs behaviour in groups one and 
three, in comparison with that displayed by children in group two. However, the 
degrees of predictability and unpredictability of behaviour exhibited by these three 
groups did not reach a magnitude which indicated overwhelming support for the 
present proposals. Group two did demonstrate unpredictable behaviour by virtue 
of the fact that their behaviour in two phases was predictable whereas that 
displayed in the remaining phase was not. Groups one and three however, did not 
behave in a manner which was wholly congruent with a priori expectations. 
As is apparent from the above discussion, although a number of analyses were 
carried out on various configurations of the data, they revealed no conclusive 
support for the hypotheses which were currently under examination. Various 
explanations are offered for the weak support which these findings have provided 
for the present hypotheses in the final chapter of this thesis. 
4.10.1. An experiment to investigate the effects of increasing outcome 
saliency on young children's behavioural responses to manipulated 
performance information 
As discussed previously young children tend not to be as aware of their 
performance outcomes as are older individuals. Research has demonstrated that 
children's cognitive judgements can be modified by emphasising the outcomes of 
children's previous performance attempts. For example, Stipek et al (1984) found 
that young children's commonly high expectations for their own success were 
lowered when the saliency of their performance outcomes was increased. 
Similarly, Fazey & Evans (1994) demonstrated that, in relation to their mother's 
ratings of their performance on potentially dangerous tasks (which is reliably 
employed as a measure of actual task competence (Linford & Fazey, unpublished 
dissertation)) young children behaved in a manner which indicated that they 
possessed accurate estimates of their task competence. 
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It appears that if cognitive and affective judgements can be modified by increasing 
the saliency of performance outcomes, so can children's behaviour. This last 
section of Chapter Four describes an experiment which explores how increasing 
outcome saliency influences young children's behavioural responses to 
experimentally disrupted performance information. 
4.10.2. Subjects 
The subjects were 15 children ranging in age from 4 years &9 months to 5 years 
&3 months with a mean age of 5 years & 1.6 months. The sample consisted of 8 
girls and 7 boys. 
4.10.3. Experimental procedure 
Session I- Level of effort and ability understanding was assessed using the 
method described in previous experiments. As required, all subjects were found to 
reason at level one of this conceptual phenomenon. Children's baseline levels on 
the computer game were then obtained, also using the method described in the 
previous experiment. 
Session 2- The same experimental format and manipulations employed in the 
previous experiment were employed here (see pages 123-125 for a detailed 
description). In this experiment the saliency of performance outcomes was 
increased to enhance the children's awareness of the performance outcome 
information with which they were presented. Instructions provided on how to play 
the game were identical to those given previously but the children were also 
offered a reward for successfiil performances. They were given 10 smarties at the 
start of phase one and told that they would lose one smartie every time they made 
a beep. The number of smarties which the child lost during a trial was removed 
following that trial and before they made their decision about which level to play 
on next. If any smarties had been lost during this phase, at the start of phase two, 
these smarties were returned to the subject to again increase the number of 
smarties to 10. The same procedure was carried out at the start of phase three 
if 
any smarties had been lost during phase two. Following completion of all three 
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phases, all children received the same number of smarties, regardless of their 
performance on the game. 
Previous research (for example, Stipek et al, 1984) has indicated that offering 
children rewards for successful performance attempts effectively increases their 
awareness of the outcomes of these attempts as children subsequently base their 
future behaviour on these outcomes. The children in the present study 
demonstrated that smarties provided a suitable reward by the nature of their 
affective responses when told that they could receive them as rewards for 
successful performances. 
4.11.1. Results 
Children's responses were again allocated to one of three categories, "Increase"; 
"Decrease", or, "Same", at each of the response points Cl-C6. The frequencies of 
children in each response category at the six response points are displayed in table 
4.10. 
cl C2 C3* C4 C5* C6 N 
Increase 462937 31 
Decrease 10 8 13 4 12 6 53 
Same I102026 
N 15 is 15 15 15 15 90 
Table 4.10: Frequencies of children who chose to increase, decrease or 
stay at the same level at each of the response points (*=sign ificantly 
different) 
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Similar to previous analyses, when "Same" choices were included, the chi-squared 
analysis performed on these data was invalid as more than 20% of the expected 
frequency counts were less than 5. Therefore the "Same" choices were excluded 
and chi-squared analyses were carried out only on the "Increase" and "Decrease" 
categories. A graphical representation of these frequencies is displayed by figure 
4.7. 
The chi-squared analysis subsequently performed on these data revealed 
significant differences between the frequencies of children found in the two 
response categories, .2 (5) = 13.5111, p<0.05. Follow-up one-sample chi-squared 
analyses were then carried out to determine at which response points these 
significant differences were located. Table 4.11 displays the results of these one- 
sample analyses. 
Figure 4.7: Frequencies of directional choices 
at Cl-Cd when outcomes are made salient. 
Frequency 
Response point 
Mlncrease 
13Decrease 
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LEVEL CHOICE POINT DF CHI-SQUARED p 
112.57 >0.05 
210.29 >0.05 
318.07 <0.01 
411.92 >0.05 
515.40 <0.05 
610.08 >0.05 
Table 4.11: Results of one-sample chi-squared analyses 
These follow-up analyses indicated that, at C3 and C5, significantly more subjects 
elected to decrease than to increase the difficulty level. No other significant 
differences were found. In phase one, where they received performance 
information which suggested enhanced levels of success, more children chose to 
decrease than to increase the level of difficulty, although this result was not 
statistically significant. 
4.12.1. Discussion 
In support of predictions, the present study has indicated that young children's 
behaviour exhibits changes when performance outcomes are made salient to the 
child (see Hudson, Fazey & Fazey, 1994b, results presented in this publication 
and the present thesis differ as the data were re-analysed subsequent to 
publication). In comparison with group one in the previous experiment, when 
outcomes were made salient to children, they displayed distinctly different 
patterns of behaviour following performance information which was designed to 
indicate enhanced levels of success. Although the behaviour of neither group 
resulted in statistically significant differences between the frequencies of children 
who elected to increase and decrease the level of difficulty, a comparison between 
figures 4.4 and 4.7 reveals that the two samples displayed directly opposing 
patterns of behaviour. When performance outcomes were made salient, and 
children were presented with information which indicated success, they 
nevertheless elected to decrease the difficulty of their playing level. Irrespective of 
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the fact that performance feedback indicated that success was easily obtained, 
their behaviour infers the belief that it is not worth risking the reward offered by 
playing at more difficult levels of the game. In the remaining two phases, similar 
behaviour was exhibited by the two groups. However, when performance 
outcomes were increased in saliency, statistical levels of significance were reached 
between the frequencies of children in the two response categories at C3 and C5. 
These findings suggest that as expected, increasing outcome saliency results in 
changes in young children's behaviour. Their behavioural profile can be modified 
to more closely approximate that displayed by children in group two. It is likely 
that, under normal circumstances, their behaviour is only partially based on 
received performance outcome information. This perhaps indicates that children in 
group two and the outcome saliency group focused on preventing failure rather 
than challenging themselves with their chosen levels of difficulty. Other factors, 
which cannot be identified by the present research, may be involved and therefore 
warrant further investigation. Factors which could be examined include: the child's 
perception of their effort input and how this affects their behaviour; the child's 
interpretation of the performance information which they receive (the child may in 
fact base their decisions on performance information but may not interpret this 
information in the same way that older individuals would); the child's perception 
of what constitutes a successful performance attempt, and, the child's method of 
assessing their own ability. It seems that these children must possess some 
understanding of the level of competence required to successfully complete 
different levels of task difficulty. This is suggested by their reluctance to perform 
difficult levels of the task in an apparent attempt to gain as much reward as 
possible. An understanding of the competence required to successfully master 
different difficulty levels must be accompanied by the knowledge of whether or 
not personal competence matches this required level, as evaluation of the 
difficulty of the task involves an assessment of the personal resources available to 
meet its demands. It seems that young children may possess accurate perceptions 
of their own competence in relation to the level of the task. 
Chapter Five 
discusses previous research which has investigated the accuracy of children's 
perceptions of their own competence and Chapter Seven describes an experiment 
which addresses issues which are raised by this discussion. 
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Results of the present study also provide an initial insight into the nature of young 
children's risk taking behaviour. When a reward is made available for successful 
performances, young children are unwilling to risk losing this reward, and 
subsequently ignore performance information which indicates that success on the 
task can be easily gained. Therefore, these children appeared unwilling to 
challenge themselves. When no rewards were offered in the previous experiment, 
young children appeared to demonstrate a tendency to select tasks which did 
provide a greater personal challenge. Hence, support is offered for Heckhausen's 
(1984) proposal that in a task-choice setting involving a task of varying degrees of 
difficulty, children between 4 and 6 years of age are likely to select easy tasks to 
avoid experiencing failure. The tasks which the children were asked to perform in 
Heckhausen's (1984) study were a cognitively oriented maze task and a physically 
oriented elevator task, which are described in more detail in Chapter Six. The 
younger the child, the less likely they are to tackle difficult tasks. They only do so 
if the task possesses features which are attractive to them (Heckhausen, 1984). It 
appears that young children will only take risks if the task presents sufficient 
incentive to undertake such a risk. These results suggest that young children 
perhaps possess an inherent desire to challenge themselves but when personal 
challenge presents a risk of losing a desired incentive, the desire to be challenged 
is superseded by the desire to receive the offered incentive. The present findings 
also offer strong support for the hypothesis that young children do possess the 
capacity to evaluate their competence in relation to task demands. 
Following a review of the relevant literature in Chapter Six, Chapter Seven 
describes an experiment which further examined young children's risk taking 
behaviour in a motor task setting involving tasks which varied in their degree of 
attractiveness to the child. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. 
YOUNG CHILDREN'S 
COMPETENCE 
PERCEPTIONS. 
5.1.1. Introduction 
The experiment described in Chapter Four raised the question of how accurate 
young children's perceptions of their competence can be. Experiment four 
revealed that when material gain was used to increase children's awareness of the 
outcomes of their previous performance attempts, they effectively employed this 
information following performance attempts which resulted in failure to select 
levels of task difficulty which would ensure success. They did this by selecting 
easy task levels which did not present a challenge and therefore optimised their 
chances of obtaining material gain. Following performance attempts which 
resulted in success these children also elected to play on easy levels of the present 
task. It is suggested that this behaviour does not reflect an error ofjudgement on 
the part of these children. Rather, it indicates the complete opposite. The study 
described in Chapter Four presented children with a fixed payoff system so that 
the amount of reward received was fixed regardless of the difficulty level of the 
task on which a successful outcome was achieved. This behaviour, that is, a 
preference for easy tasks even when successful outcomes were indicated on more 
difficult levels, reflects the child's recognition of the competence required for 
successful completion of different levels of task difficulty. These children 
appeared to understand that it was a waste of their effort and resources to attempt 
difficult levels of the task as these levels require greater competence to achieve 
success than easier levels but only offer the same levels of reward as these easier 
levels. They therefore attempted easier levels of the task in order that they might 
maximise their amount of material gain. As is suggested by their behaviour, these 
children appear to understand the level of competence required to achieve success 
on different levels of task difficulty. It is likely that if they possess this knowledge 
they also possess fairly accurate knowledge about their own competence levels in 
relation to level of task difficulty. The preference demonstrated for easy tasks was 
presumably attributable to the children's inclination to gain as much reward as 
they possibly could. However, this result contradicts the findings of previous 
research (to be discussed in due course) which indicate that very young children 
tend to overestimate their own ability level and select tasks which are 
inappropriately high for this level. The following discussion will demonstrate that 
children's beliefs can be determined through an investigation of their behaviour 
and anticipates that children's beliefs about their competence on a particular task 
can be inferred from an assessment of their behaviour on this task. It appears that 
a material incentive serves to make young children's perceptions of their 
competence more realistic, revealing them to be less exaggerated than previous 
research (for example, Harter & Pike, 1984) would indicate. As a result of this, 
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Chapter Five considers research which has investigated the accuracy of young 
children's competence perceptions. Suggestions are provided why exaggerated 
competence perceptions have dominated research findings in the past and how 
accurate perceptions of competence can possibly be obtained from young 
children. 
5.2.1. Young children's exaggerated competence perceptions 
A number of studies have revealed that very young children verbalise and thus are 
presumed to possess high and exaggerated perceptions of their own competence, 
for example, Stipek (198 1) and Harter & Pike (1984). In other words, these 
children's beliefs about their competence are overestimations of their actual 
competence level. The ma ority of research has focused on children's perceptions 
of their competence in the academic domain, and, research which has examined 
these perceptions in the physical domain has produced compatible results. Some 
examples of relevant studies are provided below. 
In the course of an investigation into the self-evaluations and inter group attitudes 
of children aged between three and nine, Yee & Brown (1992) discovered that 
five year old children's self-evaluations were particularly positive in comparison 
with those made by other age groups. Similarly, their levels of self-regard were 
found to demonstrate this positive bias. Stipek & Hoffman (1980) asked children 
to estimate both their own chances of success on a specific task and those of 
another child. Although their expectations for the other child's success reflected 
this child's previous levels of success, they nevertheless overestimated their own 
chances of succeeding. Even at seven years of age, children have been shown to 
persist in overestimating their academic self attainment (Tizard, Blatchford, 
Burke, Farquhar & Plewis, 1988). In the physical domain, young children 
demonstrate overestimates of the extent of their physical toughness (Freedman, 
1975) and their running ability (Morris & Nemcek, 1982). Furthermore, Ruble, 
Boggiano, Feldman & Loebl (1980) revealed that even when feedback related to 
performance on a basketball shooting task was manipulated to indicate low levels 
of success, kindergarteners' self-ratings of ability were higher than those of 
second and fourth graders and were not related to the performance feedback 
which they received. 
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5.2.2. Explanations for exaggerated competence perceptions 
Previous research has approached this issue from two perspectives. The first of 
these examines influences within the child's external environment and the second, 
those factors which are related to the child's internal environment. 
A great deal of attention has been directed towards the feedback which young 
children receive, proposing that their interpretation and the nature of this feedback 
create an overestimation of self perceived competence. Blumenfeld, Wessels, 
Pintrich & Meece (198 1) claim that children receive more positive feedback and 
less negative feedback in the early school years than in later grades. Frey & Ruble 
(1985) also state that in the early grades, children are not encouraged to compare 
their own success levels with others' in order to assess their progress and 
achievement. Blumenfeld et al (1982) further state that the feedback generally 
given to young children refers to neatness, adherence. to rules, and, improvement, 
rather than normative comparison. This sentiment is echoed by Stipek (198 1) and 
Stipek & Tannatt (1984) who claim that early self-appraisals tend to focus more 
on social reinforcement and encouragement than objective feedback. They also 
suggest that, before five years of age, competence judgements are based on task 
mastery criteria, for example, task completion, or feedback from sianificant 
adults. It appears that the feedback which young children receive, with its focus 
on improvement and task completion and its more positive content in comparison 
with that received by older children, could contribute towards their exaggerated 
competence perceptions. Not only is the nature of this feedback likely to effect 
exaggerated competence perceptions, but also the child's own treatment of this 
feedback is likely to influence these judgements. Stipek & Tannatt (1984) suggest 
that young children may ignore feedback which indicates personal incompetence. 
This statement is supported by Harter & Pike's (1984) finding that young 
children's competence perceptions remain high, irrespective of the outcomes of 
previous mastery attempts (see also, Ruble et al, 1980) and that by disregarding 
failure information, young children can maintain their overestimated perceptions 
of their personal competence. 
When social comparison information is presented to young children, they do not 
necessarily use it for the same purpose as do older individuals. Ruble et al (1980) 
146 
demonstrated that until the fourth grade, young children's self-evaluations are 
relatively unaffected by such information. However, more recently, Butler (1990) 
has suggested that young children do make use of social comparison information. 
They do not use it to assess their ability but to confirm their already high 
perceptions of their own ability, to assess the needs of the task, and to improve 
their own task mastery. Used in this way, it is apparent that social comparison 
information can consistently be employed to infer high personal ability, regardless 
of whether this information indicates relative competence or incompetence. 
The child's beliefs about effort and ability are regarded as influential determinants 
of the exaggerated perceptions of competence which have been exhibited by 
young children. The extent to which these perceptions are influenced by the belief 
that effort is a determinant of ability, or that it is ability, as discussed in Chapter 
One, is yet to be revealed (Heckhausen, 1982). Nicholls (1989) suggests that the 
young child's inability to perceive ability as a capacity and to differentiate between 
1ccannot" from "not trying" as causal explanations for outcomes (Nicholls, 1978) 
results in the maintenance of their exaggerated competence perceptions, and 
places success under the control of the individual. As a result of their 
understanding of effort and ability, Stipek & Daniels (1988) claim that, regardless 
of their actual competence level, all children experience opportunities to receive 
positive feedback. 
It was proposed in Chapters One and Three that individuals may interpret the 
same construct in different ways. Stipek & Tannatt (1984) discuss this issue in 
relation to how young children interpret the construct of "smartness", Unlike the 
adult's understanding of "smartnese', they revealed that young children believe 
that smartness is an entity which is largely determined by the individual. In this 
study, kindergarteners were asked to provide explanations for their own stated 
levels of smartness. These explanations inferred their belief that anyone can be 
smart if they so desire. Such a belief would no doubt facilitate overestimations of 
personal competence level in relation to actual ability. Therefore, as Piaget (1930) 
suggests, young children appear to believe their desire to be, and perception of 
being, smart as sufficient justification for their smartness. This phenomenon has 
been referred to as the "wishful thinking hypothesis" which is based on an 
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approach employed in some areas of social psychology. This approach proposes 
that an individual's desires intrude upon their cognitive judgements. Subsequently, 
judgements of competence reflect the individual's desire to be competent rather 
than their actual success expectancies. Stipek et al (1984) demonstrated that 
wishful thinking was in operation when young children made judgements 
concerning expected levels of their own and another's success. They asked 60 four 
year old children to decide how they expected both themselves and another child 
to perform on the same physical task. The children were offered a reward if the 
other child about whom they were making such judgements performed well on the 
task. Contrary to findings from situations where such an incentive is not offered 
on the basis of another's success, subjects' expectations for this other child's 
success were raised to closely approximate their expectations for their own 
success level. It is apparent that their desire for the other child to succeed in order 
that they themselves might receive reinforcement intruded upon their judgement 
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about the level of success which they expected this child to achieve. As Stipek et 
al (1984) suggest, this study provides evidence that young children do not 
differentiate between their desires and their expectations. That is, they expect to 
achieve what they desire to achieve. Therefore the young child's inability to 
differentiate between their expectations and their desires could provide another 
factor which contributes towards their exaggerated perceptions of personal 
competence. 
Butler (1990) proposed that the wishful thinking hypothesis could be employed to 
explain findings from her study which compared the accuracy of young children's 
competence perceptions in competitive and mastery oriented contexts. She 
revealed that five year olds who performed a task in a competitive environment 
possessed exaggerated perceptions of their own competence. Five year olds who 
performed this task in a mastery oriented environment did not however display 
similarly exaggerated perceptions of their competence on this task (the 
characteristics of these two types of environment will be explained more fully in 
the following section). She suggests that the child's desire to succeed may have 
been greater in the competitive than in the mastery oriented environment. 
Therefore this increased desire was likely to have affected the children's beliefs 
about their competence on the task. Furthermore, because the children in the 
competitive condition wanted to win it is possible that they perceived their effort 
input to be high (Butler, 1990). At this age, the child's beliefs about effort and 
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ability (according to Nicholls, 1978) would allow them to infer high personal 
competence from their high perceived effort expenditure. 
Stipek & Hoffman (1980) found that kindergarten and first graders' ratings of 
their own ability were not related to peers' and teachers' ratings of the child's 
ability and were overexaggerates of their actual competence levels. Ratings from 
significant others of an individual's competence level provide a fairly accurate 
estimate of this individual's actual competence level (Linford & Fazey, 
unpublished). Stipek & Hoffman (1980) attributed this finding to a combination of 
internal and external factors. They suggest that these overestimated perceptions of 
competence are influenced by the young child's belief that effort expenditure, task 
completion, and ability to follow directions are indicators of personal ability level. 
Stipek & Hoffman (1980) also proposed that young children engage in critically 
assessing their peers' work before they examine their own work from a critical 
perspective. Whilst young children base their perceptions of their peers' ability on 
the feedback they see these children receive in the classroom, they base their 
perceptions of their own ability on their belief, deriving from their egocentric 
sense of self, that they possess all encompassing powers. Consequently, Stipek & 
Hoffman (1980) claim that combined, these factors could lead to the exaggerated 
perceptions of their own competence demonstrated by these young children. 
5.3.1. Research and discussions suggesting that young children can 
accurately assess their own competence 
In the previous section, statements by Nicholls (1978; 1989) were considered 
which suggested that young children's inability to perceive ability as a capacity 
and to distinguish effort from ability allow them to maintain their exaggerated 
competence perceptions. However, findings from the present research, presented 
in Chapter Two, indicate that young children may see effort and ability as distinct 
concepts, at least where academic ability is concerned. If this is the case, then it 
appears that young children's beliefs about effort and ability may not limit their 
capacity to make accurate self-evaluative judgements. Butler ( 1990) suggests that 
young children are capable of accurately assessing their competence as they do 
not select, or persist at, tasks which are beyond their ability level, Moreover, that 
young children must possess accurate beliefs about their physical competence 
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otherwise school playgrounds would be overrun with casualties as a result of 
children attempting physical feats which they have little or no chance of 
performing successfully. Similarly, Nicholls (1984) claims that if young children 
did not possess accurate estimates of their own ability, they would never be able 
to improve their personal task mastery. 
Although a large body of research has indicated that young children commonly 
possess exaggerated perceptions of their own competence level, another body of 
research exists which questions the validity of this finding. For example, Stipek & 
Tannatt (1984) revealed that from kindergarten to third grade, children's 
perceptions of their academic standing in the class were significantly related to 
their teachers' rating of their standing. Therefore these children's assessments of 
their academic standing were accurate in relation to a reliable measure of their 
actual ability. Similar results were found by Crocker & Cheeseman (1988) who 
examined the self-assessments of children between five and seven years of age. 
Other research findings, for example, Stipek & Hoffman (1980) have 
demonstrated that pre-schoolers can accurately predict success levels but do not 
employ this reasoning when making judgements about their expectations for their 
own success. They revealed that children at this age used performance 
information gained from observing the previous performances of other children to 
adjust their expectations for this child's success, but not to make similar 
predictions about their own success. As Nicholls & Miller (1984) suggest, it 
appears that young children display self-enhancing tendencies. That is, they 
possess the capacity to accurately assess competence but do not apply this 
knowledge when it is in their interests not to, for example, when assessing their 
own competence. Therefore, although children display less mature reasoning 
when judging their own competence than when making similar judgements about 
others, this is most probably a result of their self-enhancing tendencies rather than 
inadequate cognitions required for this process. This hypothesis is supported by 
research which has investigated moral reasoning. Keasey (1977) found that young 
children's reasoning about their own morals was more advanced than their 
reasoning about hypothetical others'. A number of researchers have demonstrated 
that under certain circumstances young children's competence perceptions are 
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more accurate than generally presumed. This research examines the accuracy of 
young children's competence perceptions when: past failures are made salient (for 
example, Stipek et al, 1984); objective task difficulty is emphasised (for example, 
Schneider, 1984); the environment stresses normative evaluation (for example, 
Stipek & Daniels, 1988); children perform tasks in mastery oriented environments 
(for example, Butler, 1990), and, children are asked to provide active, rather than 
verbal, indications of their perceived competence (for example, Majeres & 
Timmer, 198 1). 
Stipek et al (1984) manipulated children's performance levels and emphasised the 
children's experimentally induced failures. As a result, children's expectations for 
their own success decreased as they now based their own success predictions on 
performance information rather than their desire for success. Schneider (1984) 
also demonstrated that children's exaggerated expectations for their own success 
were lowered when the objective difficulty of the task was made salient. 
Ordinarily therefore it appears that young children ignore past failure information 
and objective task difficulty which helps them to maintain their exaggerated 
expectations for success. 
The influence of the environment on perceptions of competence was examined by 
Stipek & Daniels (1988). They measured levels of academic perceived 
competence in four groups of children including two kindergarten classes and two 
fourth grade classes. In one class from each grade an emphasis was placed on 
normative evaluation whilst this emphasis was not evident in the remaining two 
classes. Level of perceived competence was found to be related to saliency of 
normative evaluation in the classroom environment for the kindergarteners but not 
the fourth graders. Kindergarten children in the class where normative evaluation 
was made salient rated their competence lower than kindergarten children in the 
class where normative evaluation was not made salient. Moreover, in the former 
of these kindergarten classes, competence ratings were no higher than those made 
by fourth graders. Environments which place an emphasis on normative evaluation 
which would not normally be observed seem therefore to stimulate young children 
to make accurate assessments of their competence. 
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Environmental influences were also the subject of an investigation carried out by 
Butler (1990). Children aged either five, seven or ten years performed a task in 
either a task mastery oriented environment or a competitive environment. The 
task in both environments was to produce a flower made out of stickers based on 
a standard which the children were required to copy. In the task mastery oriented 
environment, the children were encouraged to produce a drawing which matched 
the standard demonstrated as closely as possible. However, in the competitive 
environment, they were encouraged to try and produce the best drawing in their 
immediate group. Butler (1990) then asked the children to judge their own copy 
and found that five year olds' competence perceptions in the task mastery 
condition were more realistic than those of five year olds in the competitive 
condition. These competence perceptions were not only realistic but were as 
accurate as the competence perceptions of the seven and ten year old children 
who performed the task in the mastery condition. Asking young children to assess 
their competence perceptions in a mastery oriented environment seems to result in 
accurate perceptions of competence. As was previously mentioned, the 
exaggerated competence perceptions found in the competitive condition were 
most likely associated with the child's beliefs about effort and ability and their 
inability to differentiate between their desires and their expectations for personal 
success. 
At first reading it appears that the findings of Stipek & Daniels (1988) and Butler 
(1990) are in direct opposition, although both studies did demonstrate that in 
some situations young children are able to provide accurate assessments of their 
own competence. However, further consideration of these two sets of results 
reveals that, although they are not directly comparable, neither are they directly 
conflicting. Butler (1990) found that young children's competence perceptions 
were more realistic when these judgements were made in a mastery oriented 
environment than when they were made in a competitive environment. Stipek & 
Daniels (1988) discovered that kindergarteners whose classroom environment 
emphasised normative evaluation provided more accurate perceptions of their 
competence than kindergarteners whose classroom environment did not 
demonstrate a similar emphasis. An initial assessment of these finding's would 
presumably lead to the conclusion that application of Butler's (1990) results to 
Stipek & Daniels' (1988) study would result in more realistic competence 
perceptions in the environment which did not stress normative evaluation. 
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Conversely, applying Stipek & Daniels' (1988) results to Butler's (1990) study 
would reveal that children in the competitive environment would display the most 
realistic perceptions of their own competence. Obviously this was not the case 
and such conclusions are not warranted, as important distinctions can be made 
between the contexts investigated in these two studies. 
A competitive context, as employed by Butler (1990), requires normative 
comparison but a normative context, as employed by Stipek & Daniels (1988), is 
not necessarily competitive. Butler (1990) emphasised competition by 
encouraging the children to produce the best copy of the standard within their 
group. This competitive emphasis required the children to make normative 
comparisons in relation to the other members within their group. Children in the 
classes which emphasised normative evaluation in the Stipek & Daniels (1988) 
study, although encouraged to assess their standing relative to peers, were not 
necessarily encouraged to compete with them. As does competition, normative 
evaluation provides opportunities to assess personal competence in comparison 
with that of others'but normative evaluation does not stress that performance 
should be superior to others' in the same way that competitive environments do. 
The differential emphasis placed on competition may have been the factor which 
resulted in differences in accuracy of competence perceptions between the two 
contexts discussed. It could be possible that an environment which stresses both 
competition and normative evaluation would result in accurate self assessment of 
competence by young children. Furthermore, although normative evaluation was 
encouraged in Butler's (1990) competitive condition she noted that the children 
did not use this information appropriately. As mentioned previously, they used 
this information to confirm their belief that their own drawing was the best, and 
not to assess the quality of their drawing. Butler (1990) cites an example of a girl 
who gave her drawing the maximum possible score, for which her explanation 
was that her flower had more petals than another child's. However, she failed to 
consider that, in comparison with the standard which the children were required 
to copy, her flower had too many petals. The main emphasis of this condition was 
winning. This emphasis appears to have stimulated children's self-enhancing 
tendencies as a result of their desire to win. It seems then, that competition 
stimulates wishful thinking and the exaggeration of personal competence in these 
children rather than the accurate assessment of personal competence. Therefore, 
although normative evaluation was encouraged in Butler's (1990) competitive 
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condition, wishful thinking demonstrated a more powerful influence on children's 
perceptions of competence. As a result, the exaggerated competence perceptions 
demonstrated by children in Butler's (1990) competitive condition are not 
unexpected, nor are the more accurate perceptions of competence found in the 
classroom which emphasises normative evaluation in the Stipek & Daniels (1988) 
study. 
Majeres & Timmer (198 1) used a behavioural measure to assess young children's 
perceptions of their physical competence and revealed that even children as young 
as two could accurately assess their own competence level. Sixty children aged 
between two and four years were presented with video sequences of physical 
tasks. Each sequence included tasks which were appropriate for children who 
have achieved different levels of motor competence. Therefore the children 
observed models performing tasks which reflected a range of developmental 
levels. The children were asked to imitate one task from each sequence which 
they wanted to perform, and which they believed they were capable of 
performing. Children's perceptions of their competence were indicated by the 
developmental level of the skill which they chose to perform. Actual competence 
level was measured by administering the gross motor section of the Denver 
Developmental Screening Test. By comparing these two measures, the authors 
were able to determine the accuracy of the children's perceptions of competence. 
A preference for novel or vigorous tasks was demonstrated, however, Majeres 
Timmer (198 1) claimed that if such tasks are not offered for imitation, children 
will choose to perform tasks which are at, orjust above, their own developmental 
level of motor competence. Although this study did not provide conclusive 
evidence in support of youna, children's ability to accurately assess their own 
competence, the results did suggest that the more competent children selected 
more advanced tasks whilst the less competent children were unlikely to imitate 
tasks which were above their level of motor development. Majeres & Timmer 
(198 1) suggest that the children's task selections were not based on an assessment 
of relative task difficulty in relation to their level of task mastery. Instead, these 
judgements resulted from their recognition of similarities in the modelled activity 
to their own, as yet, incomplete schema for that activity, as Parton (1976) 
proposes. This study provides some indication that when young children are 
required to actively demonstrate their competence, unlike when verbal assessment 
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procedures are employed, they do display accurate assessments of their own 
competence. 
Fazey & Evans (1994) demonstrated similar levels of accuracy of perceived 
physical competence in children aged between 3 and 5 years. The children and 
their mothers watched a videotaped model perform four potentially dangerous 
tasks at each of three difficulty levels. Both the child and their mother stated the 
difficulty level which they believed the child could achieve and then the child was 
asked to demonstrate this level of competence. On two of the tasks, both the 
mothers and their children provided accurate perceptions of the child's 
competence. However, on the remaining tasks, the mothers underestimated the 
child's competence whilst the children overestimated their competence. Fazey & 
Evans (1994) concluded that by presenting the children with potentially dangerous 
tasks and therefore increasing the saliency of the child's outcome on this task, 
accurate perceptions of competence were mediated on some, but not all of the 
tasks involved. However; the children's behaviour indicated that they possessed an 
understanding of their mastery level on the tasks with which they were presented. 
5.4.1. Methodological concerns when measuring perceptions of competence 
Having considered conflicting evidence concerning the accuracy of young 
children's competence perceptions, a possible explanation for these conflicting 
findings is now examined. 
The child's cognitive limitations are offered as a possible explanation for attempts 
to measure elements of self-worth in young children which have been unsuccessful 
(Harter, 1990). Other research has demonstrated that young children do possess 
the cognitive capacity to accurately assess competence (for example, Stipek & 
Hoffman, 1980; Stipek et al, 1984) but, as a result of their self-enhancing 
tendencies (Nicholls & Miller, 1984) young children do not choose to accurately 
report their own competence. Cognitive limitation does not appear to be a 
satisfactory explanation for the lack of success in assessing young children's self- 
worth using self-report measures. 
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As discussed in the previous section, research has indicated that in some 
instances, for example, when children's performance outcomes are made salient, 
or when they assess their competence in mastery oriented environments, 
perceptions of competence are accurate. It appears that some commonly used 
assessment procedures and the contexts in which these are administered may elicit 
exaggerated competence perceptions from young children. If these perceptions 
were assessed under different circumstances, greater accuracy might be 
demonstrated. This issue is examined and suggestions follow concerning a 
possible method of obtaining accurate competence perceptions from young 
children. 
Marsh et al (1984) cite a number of researchers (for example, Wylie, 1979; Burns, 
1979) who have criticised the quality of instruments which are employed to 
measure individuals' perceptions of their competence. Since these criticisms were 
made, new measures have been devised (for example, the Pictorial Scale of 
Perceived Competence and Acceptance for Young Children (PSPC), Harter & 
Pike, 1984). As the following discussion will make apparent, even these measures 
do not appear to be completely foolproof Marsh et al (1984) propose that the 
exaggerated competence perceptions revealed by some studies are an artefact of 
the instruments employed rather than a reflection of the young child's actual 
beliefs. They suggest that some measures may be assessing the child's cognitive 
ability rather than their perceived competence or related constructs. For example, 
they found a tendency, which increased with decreasing age, for children to 
provide inappropriate responses to negatively worded items on the Self 
Description Questionnaire (see for example, Marsh, Parker & Smith, 1983). 
Rather than these items measuring aspects of self-concept (a higher order 
construct related to perceived competence), they appear to measure the child's 
cognitive ability to respond appropriately to them. According to Marsh et al 
(1984) a measure employed by Bridgeman & Shipman (1978) to assess young 
children's self-esteem levels (which again, is a higher order construct related to 
perceived competence, see Chapter One), demonstrated a similar function. 
Bridgeman & Shipman (1978) examined self-esteem levels in a group of children 
aged between three and a half and nine and a half years. The highest levels of self- 
esteem were found in children between three and a half and seven and a half years 
of age. However, Marsh et al (1984) found little correlation between the two 
different measures employed with the older and the younger children. This latter 
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measure demonstrated a higher correlation with academic ability, as measured in 
later grades, than with self-concept. Therefore support was provided for Marsh et 
al's (1984) claim that this measure was assessing the child's cognitive ability and 
not their self-concept. 
Often, individuals interpret and perceive the implications of the same construct in 
different ways, as discussed in Chapter One. Blatchford (1992) considers this 
issue in relation to its possible effects on the accuracy of young children's 
competence perceptions. He cites Stipek's (198 1) study where children were 
asked to rate themselves along a continuum which ranged from the "smartest 
person in the class" to the "dumbest person in the class". As Blatchford (1992) 
points out, the connotations of such labels are likely to lead children towards the 
more desirable of these two constructs, "smartest person in the class". As a result, 
children are more likely to appear to overestimate their perceptions of 
competence than to possess accurate or under estimates of this construct when 
such labels are employed: Stipek & Tannatt (1984) state that individuals at 
different developmental levels define words such as "smart" differently from each 
other. For example, when a pre-schooler declares that they are smart they are 
likely to be referring to the fact that they are well-behaved, whereas an adult will 
refer to this construct in terms of an innate capacity (see experiments two and 
three which support this argument). When assessing children's competence 
perceptions, their definitions of the constructs involved must be carefully 
considered and not assumed to be the same as those of an adult experimenter. 
This issue was addressed initially in Chapter Two. Different interpretations of the 
same constructs by individuals at different developmental levels present the 
researcher with an inherent problem when assessing the young child's beliefs about 
ability. When the adult examines statements obtained from young children they 
interpret these statements from their adult perspective. In relation to ability, they 
evaluate the child's verbalisations from the perspective of an individual who 
perceives ability as an inherent, limited capacity. When children provide 
statements such as "He scored more because he's bigger" then the adult is not 
likely to interpret this as ability-related although it is feasible that the meaning of 
ability to this child is "size". The interpretation of children's statements from an 
adult perspective may result in findings which do not fully explain the child's 
beliefs about this construct. Although not an insurmountable problem, this does 
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present inherent difficulties when adults attempt to assess young children's beliefs 
about constructs when these beliefs differ so greatly from their own. 
Most studies employ verbal measures to assess young children's competence 
perceptions. One such measure which is widely used is the PSPC (Harter & Pike, 
1984). This instrument is presented in a structured alternative format which is 
designed to offset children's tendency to produce positively biased and socially 
desirable responses. Rather than asking children to state how well they can 
perform certain tasks, children are shown pictures of two models performing the 
same task. One of these models demonstrates greater task competence than the 
other. The children are then asked which model they are most like and to what 
extent. Harter & Pike (1984) believe that this format conveys to children that it is 
acceptable to be like either child, and indeed, have produced empirical evidence to 
support their claims. The self-enhancing tendencies of young children have been 
made wholly apparent, however, (for example, Nicholls & Miller, 1984) and the 
likelihood remains that even when presented with a structured alternative format, 
these tendencies will direct them towards identifying with the most competent 
child, and subsequently to providing overestimates of their competence level. 
Children's competence perceptions were examined in a naturalistic setting by Frey 
& Ruble (1987) and although they revealed exaggerated estimates of competence, 
their introductory discussion raises important methodological considerations. 
Studies which assess academic perceived competence typically employ interview 
based methodologies which effectively reduce the generality of the findings to the 
child's actual behaviour (Frey & Ruble, 1987). They further claim that children's 
careful consideration of interview questions may initiate a train of thought which 
is not typical and which may stimulate responses which the child would not 
normally provide. According to Korthals (1994) however, interviews do elicit the 
individual's preferred type of reasoning, yet, as demonstrated in previous 
discussion, interview contexts present interpretational problems. For instance, the 
interviewee and interviewer must possess similar perceptions of whether or not 
the class of reasoning exhibited by the interviewee is valid. Their perceptions of 
what constitutes a valid mode of reasoning may not be compatible as a result of 
developmental differences in construct interpretation. Moreover, in relation to an 
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issue which was mentioned previously, interviews may rely to a great extent on 
the child's understanding and interpretations of questions asked, and these may 
differ from the adult interviewer's. Frey & Ruble (1987) suggest that measures of 
children's behaviour on a specific task may reduce the problems encountered 
when verbalisations prove incongruent with actual behaviour. However, they do 
wam that observing behaviour on a specific task to infer perceived competence 
results in findings which have limited generality to other tasks within the domain 
under investigation. O'Sullivan (1993) has discussed the efficacy of employing 
behavioural indices to measure children's beliefs and cognitive processes. She 
discusses research which has investigated aspects of children's metamemory in 
which children's: 
beliefs are inferred from their behaviour. (p. 398) 
This approach is adopted by the present research to assess young children's 
perceptions of their competence on the task in which they are currently engaged. 
Rather than employing verbal self-report measures, which are commonly used, the 
children's perceptions of their competence were inferred, as O'Sullivan (1993) 
suggests, from their exhibited behaviour. O'Sullivan's (1993) comments provide 
ffirther support for the hypothesis that an accurate assessment of children's 
perceptions of their competence can be acquired when these judgements are 
inferred from observed behaviour. Comments from authors such as Nicholls 
(1984) and Butler (1990) and research using measures other than verbal self- 
reports (for example, MaJeres & Timmer, 198 1) indicate that young children do 
possess some understanding of their own level of capability. It seems that 
employing verbal self-report measures, which reflect adult terminology and an 
adult conceptualisation of ability, does not present the young child with an 
adequate opportunity to make valid judgements about this construct. Asking 
children to behaviourally indicate their perceptions of competence therefore 
removes the problems associated with their verbalisation and conceptualisation of 
this construct in adult-like terms. 
The present chapter has so far presented both empirical evidence which indicates 
that young children can accurately assess their competence and methodological 
factors which possibly induce exaggerated competence perceptions from young 
children. It seems that, contrary to the assumptions of previous research, young 
children's exaggerated competence perceptions may not reflect limitations of their 
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cognitive ability to make accurate competence assessments but may reflect 
limitations of the instruments commonly employed to measure this construct. For 
instance, previous research by Stipek et al (1984) has revealed that when children 
are asked to predict the outcomes of other children's performance attempts, they 
consider this child's previous successes and failures when making such 
judgements. It appears that these young children are capable of using past 
experience to form accurate assessments of competence in others even when they 
did not do so when reporting their own competence. Lack of realism in reporting 
their own competence has been attributed to the wishful thinking hypothesis, 
whereby young children's expectations are determined by their desires. Previous 
research has indicated that for accurate competence assessments to be obtained 
from young children, the context in which this construct is assessed should 
incorporate one or more of the following elements: increased saliency of previous 
performance attempts or objective task difficulty (Stipek et al, 1984; Fazey & 
Evans, 1994); a task mastery oriented environment (Butler, 1990); a context in 
which it is in the interest of the child to make accurate assessments of their ability, 
and, a behavioural measure of perceived competence on a specific task (Majeres 
& Timmer, 1981; Frey & Ruble, 1987). Two of these studies investigated 
children's perceptions of their academic or cognitive competence (Butler, 1990; 
Frey & Ruble, 1987) whilst the remainder examined children's perceptions of their 
physical or motor competence. 
The experiment which is described in Chapter Seven explored whether inclusion 
of a number of these factors in the testing environment would elicit accurate 
competence perceptions from young children. The factors which were included 
are as follows: increasing the saliency of objective task difficulty and outcomes of 
performance attempts; providing the child with an incentive to accurately judge 
their competence; inferring perceived competence from behaviour on a specific 
task. The most salient of these factors are: the behavioural index, which, it is 
expected, will elicit more accurate perceptions of competence from the children 
than are normally obtained when verbal self-report measures are employed; and 
the presence of an incentive for children to accurately assess their own 
competence. The rationale behind this hypothesis includes issues such as 
developmental differences in construct interpretation, which were discussed 
earlier in this chapter and in Chapter Two. The task which was used in the present 
experiment is the computer game which was used in experiment four but without 
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any manipulated performance information. Two groups of young children were 
employed, one which was offered a reward for successful performances and one 
which was not offered a reward. The amount of reward available increased in 
parallel with increases in task difficulty, therefore a variable payoff system was in 
operation. The children were required to reach a standard of performance on the 
level attempted, which did not vary between levels, to enable them to receive the 
reward appropriate for that level. For instance, if the required standard of 
performance was reached on level one, the child received one smartie, on level 
two, two smarties, and so on until level nine where they received nine smarties. 
Actual competence was indicated by the child's baseline level which was assessed 
using the method employed in experiment four. Children's perceived competence 
on the game was inferred from their level choice on their final trial. Comparison of 
these two measures (actual and perceived competence) indicated the accuracy of 
the children's perceived competence. 
It was anticipated that the conditions imposed in the reward group would elicit 
more accurate competence perceptions than were found in the non reward group. 
That is, their final level choices would demonstrate less deviation from baseline 
levels than the choices made by children in the non reward group. This result was 
anticipated because the variable payoff system administered was designed to 
increase the saliency of the difficulty of each level, as a higher reward will indicate 
that greater skill is required to achieve this reward. It was expected that this 
system would encourage children to make accurate, rather than inaccurate, 
assessments of their competence. In order to maximise the level of reward they 
receive the children had to select a difficulty level which was appropriate for their 
own level of competence. By choosing a level which is too difficult, the children 
are limiting their chances of success whilst choosing a level which is too easy 
means that they are losing out on the amount of reward they could achieve. To 
choose a level which is appropriate for their own competence would both 
maximýise their chances of success and minimise their chances of failure, resulting 
in the gain of the optimum amount of reward available. Furthermore, measuring 
behaviour on a specific task overcomes the problems inherent in verbal measures, 
such as: differing construct interpretations by the experimenter and child; their 
reliance on cognitive developmental level, and, the likelihood that unnatural 
responses may be elicited by verbal questioning. It was hypothesised that in a 
comparison group which was not offered similar rewards for successful task 
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performance, children's behavioural indications of their competence would not 
exhibit the same degree of accuracy. 
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CHAPTER SIX. 
YOUNG CHILDREN'S 
RISK TAKING 
BEHA VIO UR. 
6.1.1. Introduction 
Findings from the final experiment reported in Chapter Four provided some 
indication of young children's challenging, or risk taking, behaviour on a physical 
task. Although increasing outcome saliency heightened children's awareness of 
their previous performance outcomes, demonstrated by changes in their behaviour 
in comparison with the behaviour exhibited when previous performance outcomes 
were not made salient, the pattern of behaviour they displayed in response to 
performance information which was manipulated to suggest enhanced levels of 
success was somewhat unexpected. When offered a reward for successful task 
performance, even when these children were presented with high levels of 
success, they appeared unwilling to risk losing this reward by attempting tasks 
which would challenge them. This behaviour was in direct opposition to that 
exhibited when rewards were not offered. The present finding could be attributed 
to the fact that the children were offered a fixed payoff system which provided the 
same level of reward regardless of the difficulty of the task attempted. As 
Heckhausen (1984) suggests, it appears that the children selected easy tasks to 
ensure success, as success on more difficult tasks was not sufficiently attractive 
(in terms of potential reward) to result in their selection. This also suggests that 
children possess a far more sophisticated understanding of the relationships 
between task difficulty, motivation and competence than has been proposed 
previously. 
These findings reflect those of research which has investigated intrinsic and 
extrinsic factors in achievement motivation. Previous research has indicated that 
young children possess an innate desire to challenge themselves and improve upon 
their present level of mastery. For instance, Harter & Connell (1984) suggest that 
children have a desire to acquire feelings of competence and derive intrinsic 
pleasure and joy from mastery attempts which have resulted in success. Deci 
(1975) claims that individuals are motivated to feel personally competent which 
engenders the search for challenge to assess personal ability and increase this level 
of capability. Watson (1976), in a study of Little League baseball players, 
discovered that the children played baseball for the sake of the game and the 
enjoyment they derived from it rather than any adult rewards which were offered. 
However, when extrinsic rewards are offered, although they may increase short 
term learning and performance, they are likely to have a detrimental influence on 
long term interest in sporting activities (Singer & Gerson, 1980). It seems that 
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when young children are not offered rewards for performance or participation, 
they demonstrate a natural desire to succeed at the activity and attain success on 
challenging levels of that activity. It appears that extrinsic reward decreases the 
desire to meet challenges as the attainment of the reward becomes more 
motivating than the activity itself. The behaviour displayed by the children in 
experiment four supports these findings. The young child's natural desire to 
attempt challenging tasks seemed to be dampened by the presence of the fixed 
payoff reward system which was offered to them. It is possible however, that if 
young children were offered variable payoffs where the amount of reward 
available increases in proportion to increase in the level of task difficulty, their 
behaviour would differ from that revealed in experiment four. By observing 
children's behaviour when they are offered variable payoffs as rewards for 
successful performances on a physical task, various issues can be examined: the 
levels of personal challenge which young children prefer to choose; their 
understanding of the success-incentive function, which is described more fully 
later on in this chapter, and their knowledge about the relationship between task 
difficulty level, the competence required for successful task completion and the 
level of their own competence. Further support is also expected for suggestions 
made in Chapter Four that young children can employ information about their 
previous performance attempts to make decisions about their future behaviour. In 
Chapter Six an examination of research into risk taking behaviour is reported, 
discussed first from the perspective of achievement motivation theory. Following 
this general overview of the theoretical basis of risk taking, the discussion then 
focuses on empirical investigations into risk taking behaviour. Of particular 
interest is the literature relating to children's risk taking behaviour when they are 
offered variable payoff systems. Research which examines the effects of this type 
of reward system on children's risk taking behaviour when performing physical 
tasks appears to be relatively scarce with most of the empirical work cited 
concentrating on children's risk taking behaviour when they are asked to perform 
academic tasks. The theoretical proposals and empirical findings presented in this 
chapter are then employed to formulate hypotheses about young children's risk 
taking behaviour on a motor task when they are offered variable payoffs for 
successful task performance. 
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6.2.1. Theoretical approaches to risk taking behaviour 
The phenomenon of risk taking has been approached from a number of 
perspectives, for instance, the cognitive perspective, which describes risk taking 
as a conscious decision to engage in an action. The individual's resultant desire to 
perform this action is based on a mental calculation of the value and probability of 
achieving the outcome of the action (Streufert, 1986). Eysenck & Eysenck (1977) 
view risk taking as a phenomenon which is generated by impulsivity and 
Zuckerman (1979), by sensation seeking. More pertinent to the present discussion 
is the motivational approach to risk taking which mainly considers adults' risk 
taking behaviour (for example, Atkinson, 1957). Atkinson (1957) defines two 
problems concerned with behaviour which achievement motivation theories must 
address. The first is to ascertain how an individual arrives at their particular task 
choice from a number of alternative courses of action. Once the individual has 
selected a particular course of action, achievement motivation theories must 
provide an explanation for the intensity with which the action is performed and 
the individual's demonstrated task persistence. Heckhausen (1984) sees the 
expectancy-value theory, which approaches these two problems of behaviour, as 
the fundamental basis of the risk taking model. The first of these problems is 
encountered in risk taking contexts, which present the individual with a task 
choice from a number of task alternatives representing a range of difficulty levels. 
Heckhausen & Schulz (1993), when discussing adults' risk taking behaviour, claim 
that for development to occur, individuals must select novel tasks or behaviours 
which present them with an intermediate level of task difficulty. This 
recommendation is made by other authors such as Atkinson (1957) and is 
discussed further in this section. Tasks of medium difficulty optimise learning and 
skill acquisition by providing the individual with the maximum amount of 
information pertinent to aid learning. The same level of information would not be 
available by performing easy or very difficult tasks which would effectively be a 
waste of the individual's time, effort and resources (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1993). 
Although intermediate tasks provide the individual with maximum opportunities 
for learning and skill development, these tasks also incur a 50% chance of failure 
with which the individual must deal. Majeres & Timmer (198 1) provided some 
evidence that even pre-school children will tend to select tasks which are at, or 
just above, the level of development which they have currently achieved. This task 
selection presents the child with maximum opportunities to improve upon their 
current levels of mastery. 
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The adult risk taking model which Atkinson (1957) discusses presents three 
variables: expectancy; incentive, and, motive. Expectancy he defines as a 
cognitive anticipation that a particular consequence will result from following a 
particular course of action. Expectancy is most often based on the success or 
failure of previous performance attempts (Kelley, 1967), sometimes on different 
task properties, and only occasionally on social comparison information 
(Heckhausen, 1984). Incentive reflects the relative attractiveness of a goal, or the 
relative unattractiveness of a consequence which follows a particular action. 
Although incentives are often externally imposed material gains, incentive is also 
defined by intrinsic task properties, such as task difficulty, and the individual's 
own affective reactions to task success or failure. For instance, Heckhausen 
(1984) describes the incentive value of a task as the emotional reaction to success 
or failure Which is anticipated by the individual. Motive is described by Atkinson 
(1957) as an inclination towards gaining a particular type of satisfaction, through 
the achievement of a certain class of personal incentives. For example, for one 
individual satisfaction can be derived by attaining power, whereas for another, 
satisfaction is gained by Achieving affiliation to a particular membership. 
The two main assumptions of expectancy-value theory are concerned with the 
incentive value of success on a task and the task expectancy, that is, the 
probability of achieving a successful outcome on this task (Heckhausen, 1984). Its 
first assumption is that as the difficulty of the task increases, so does the incentive 
value of succeeding at that task. Secondly, that the individual's willingness to 
perform a task is a product of the incentive value and the expectancy value of this 
task. When the probability of success is low, for example, on a difficult task, 
incentive is high. Incentive is low however, on easy tasks, where the probability of 
success is high. Therefore an inverse relationship is apparent between the 
probability of succeeding on a task and the incentive value of success on this task. 
However, when the prospect of failure on a task is considered, there is evidence 
of a linear relationship between the probability of success and the humiliation 
which is experienced following failure on that task. For example, if there is a high 
probability that success can be attained but this success is not achieved, then the 
individual will experience a high degree of humiliation as a result of their task 
failure. Conversely, if the probability of achieving success on a task is low, very 
little humiliation is experienced if failure on this task follows. Therefore task 
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attractiveness demonstrates a positive relationship with task difficulty, whereas 
the unattractiveness of performance failure is a negative function of task di II fficu ty 
(Escalona & Festinger, 1944). 
Under circumstances which present external constraints on the individual to 
perform a task, adults will perform tasks at which their outcome is of greatest 
uncertainty and the probability of achieving success is 0.50. Although Atkinson 
(1957) discusses this behaviour mainly in relation to adults, he does cite research 
by McClelland (1958) which has provided evidence of these tendencies in 
kindergarten and third grade children. The individual's selection of tasks on which 
their probability of success is 0.50 represents a moderate risk and is believed to 
indicate their optimal level of challenge (Clifford & Chou, 1991). Clifford & Chou 
(199 1) list a number of theories which advocate the performance and motivational 
advantages of moderate risk taking. For example, achievement motivation theory 
(Atkinson, 1957); attribution theory (Weiner, 1980), and, intrinsic motivation 
theory (Deci & Porac, 1978). The advantages of moderate risk taking include: 
maximising task satisfaction (Harter, 1978); increasing perceptions of competence 
(Deci & Porac, 1978); providing information about personal ability (Trope & 
Brickman, 1975), and, encouraging positive responses to errors and failure 
experiences (Kim & Clifford, 1988). Cognitive developmental psychologists also 
claim that maximum cognitive development is gained by attempting tasks which 
are congruent with, or just above, individual ability level (Clifford & Chou, 1991). 
When an individual engages in moderate risk taking, ability and task difficulty are 
approximately matched and the skills and knowledge required to achieve success 
are optimally employed by the individual. Therefore, by engaging in moderate risk 
taking, according to some cognitive developmental psychologists, maximum 
cognitive gain can be achieved. 
By defining challenging goals, the individual raises their motivation and 
performance attainment levels (Mento, Steel & Karren, 1987). However, 
challenging goals will only be set when the individual sees ability as an acquirable 
skill, and not when it is viewed as relatively fixed and unchanging (Bandura, 
1977). When individuals do set themselves challenging goals, disequilibriurn 
results. As was discussed in Chapter Three, disequilibriurn is viewed by a number 
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of theorists (for example, Fogel & Thelen, 1987: Self-organising Systems Theory) 
as a necessary factor for change to occur. In the present context, this 
disequilibrium could be seen as an opportunity for the individual to assess both 
personal ability and task difficulty. This assessment may be an indication of 
uncertainties raised about ability and task difficulty by this state of disequilibrium. 
The assessment of personal ability is one of the main functions of risk taking, 
which can be predicted from a number of theories such as diagnostic and 
cognitive evaluation theory (Clifford & Chou, 1991). These authors further 
suggest that, considering this function of risk taking, these theories would support 
the proposal that higher levels of metacognitive skill will benefit the individual in 
risk taking contexts. Unsuccessful risk taking attempts can be mainly attributed to 
cognitive errors about task difficulty and ability (Streufert, Streufert & Denson, 
1983). Streufert et al (1983) claim that when young children's risk taking efforts 
are unsuccessful, they can be partially explained by this cognitive error. Young 
children are more likely to make such risk taking errors as they have less 
experience of risk taking and less metacognitive skill or knowledge than older 
individuals. However, Clifford, Chou, Mao, Lan & Kuo (1990) suggest that the 
administration of item by item feedback can ameliorate the effect which limited 
metacognitive skill has on the success of children's risk taking attempts. This 
feedback regime will partially eliminate the influence of metacognitive skill on risk 
taking error as it provides the individual with immediate information about the 
degree of compatibility evident between the difficulty level of their task choice 
and their personal ability. Therefore in a context which offers item by item 
feedback, the child's behaviour is more likely to reflect their willingness to take 
risks rather than their misjudgements about task difficulty and personal ability 
(Clifford et A 1990). 
6.3.1. Risk taking and variable payofT systems 
Despite the theoretical attention which has been paid to the advantages of 
moderate risk taking, Clifford et al (1990) claim that the risk taking phenomenon 
has received relatively little empirical consideration, particularly in relation to 
academic tasks. A similar conclusion can be drawn concerning empirical 
investigations of young children's risk taking behaviour on physical or motor 
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tasks. One aspect of risk taking which Clifford and her colleagues have invested a 
great deal of effort into investigating is the effect of variable payoffs on children's 
academic risk taking. A variable payoff system is one in which the amount of 
reward offered increases in parallel with increasing task difficulty. Fixed payoffs 
on the other hand offer the same amount of reward regardless of the level of task 
difficulty on which success is achieved. Clifford (1988) noted that when fixed 
payoffs are offered, a developmental decrease in children's academic risk taking is 
observed. However, when children are offered variable payoffs for success on 
academic tasks, a developmental increase in risk taking is apparent (Clifford et al, 
1990). When external constraints (such as pressure exerted on the individual by 
significant others to achieve) are removed, Clifford et al (1990) suggest that 
variable payoffs may serve to completely eliminate the developmental decrease in 
risk taking manifest when fixed payoff systems are employed. 
The discussion now turns to the research evidence pertaining to risk taking in 
academic contexts which -has been produced by Clifford and colleagues. In 1988, 
Clifford demonstrated that fourth, fifth and sixth graders, who were presumably 
anticipating a fixed payoff system, elected to perform items which were, on 
average, 6-18 months below their objectively measured achievement levels. In a 
later study (Clifford, Lan, Chou & Qi, 1989), third, fourth and fifth grade children 
who were offered variable payoffs selected tasks which were more or less 
congruent with their achievement levels, as defined by standardised test scores. 
Some evidence of a developmental increase in risk taking was observed, which 
Clifford et al (1989) attributed to the variable payoff system which was in 
operation. Clifford et al (1990) cite a number of theories which would support the 
proposal that under variable payoff conditions, an increase in risk taking will be 
exhibited. These include: diagnostic theory (Trope, 1975); cognitive evaluation 
theory (Deci & Porac, 1978), and, self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1977). Clifford 
et al (1989) suggest that a simple explanation for this finding can be obtained from 
Meyer's (1973) information-maximisation principle. Meyer (1973) proposes that 
individuals can gain a maximum amount of information about their ability when 
they perform tasks on which their outcome is at its most uncertain. As variable 
payoff systems maximise the availability of information relevant to assessing 
personal ability, such payoff systems may induce an increase in risk taking by 
effecting the information-maximisation principle in subjects. Following this, 
Clifford et al (1990) went on to investigate academic risk taking in fourth, sixth 
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and eighth graders when a variable payoff system was offered to the children. 
Generally, results from this study were inconclusive. However, Clifford et al 
(1990) did reveal that subjects at all ages took more risks on the less familiar, 
spatial tasks they performed than on the quantitative tasks administered, with 
which they were more familiar. A further investigation which examined academic 
risk taking in only fourth grade students showed that, as was demonstrated in 
earlier studies, these children were unwilling to take moderate risks (Clifford & 
Chou, 1991). 
It appears that, irrespective of the advantages of moderate risk taking which are 
described by various motivation theories, this behaviour is relatively rare. Risk 
taking behaviour did increase in the Clifford & Chou (199 1) study, when children 
selected and performed tasks in a non evaluative, game playing context compared 
to when they performed tasks in a context which was going to be evaluated. 
Not only do variable payoffs increase the individual's desire to increase their level 
of skill, they also result in increased metacognitive knowledge. As risk taking 
increases under such conditions, this implies that academic risk taking requires an 
application of metacognitive skill (Clifford et a], 1990). Under normal 
circumstances, it is presumed that children choose to perform tasks which they 
"know they know". However, when offered variable payoffs, children are 
encouraged to select tasks which they are capable of performing without any 
errors. In other words, under variable payoff systems, children demonstrate a 
tendency to perform at the highest level of risk possible which will not result in 
error. According to Clifford et al (1990), the variable payoff effect should be 
examined over a range of developmental levels, cultures and task types to explore 
the magnitude of its influence on risk taking behaviour. 
6.4.1. Young children's risk taking behaviour 
The previous discussion has mainly considered the risk taking behaviour of adults 
and older children, however, the following discussion focuses on this behaviour in 
very young children. Heckhausen (1984) states that risk taking contexts present 
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the individual with a dilemma. They have to decide whether to maximise success 
through the selection of very easy tasks or whether to maximise their incentive by 
electing to perform difficult tasks. As the risk taking model would predict, 
Heckhausen (1984) proposes that adults solve this dilemma by choosing tasks on 
which they have intermediate probabilities of success but that children employ 
different strategies to adults to maximise success depending on the context (task- 
choice or goal setting) in which they are asked to perform. Heckhausen (1984) 
does not discuss the risk taking behaviour of adults in relation to task choice and 
goal setting contexts. Previous research (for example, Atkinson, 1957) indicates 
that adults will select tasks of intermediate difficulty although their task selection 
depends more on whether the motive to succeed or to avoid failure is strongest in 
the individual. 
In a task choice context, children are faced with a number of tasks which are 
ordered in degrees of difficulty, one of which the child must choose to perform. 
For example, Heckhausen, (1984) describes one such task which he used in his 
own experiments. The children were presented with a number of elevators, the 
first with two levels, the second with three, the third with four, and so on. The 
children were required to push a cushion to raise a figure on the elevator as far up 
the elevator as they possibly could. Heckhausen (1934) manipulated the levels to 
which the figure could be moved by the child. On the easier tasks which had fewer 
levels, the figure could be elevated to the top level, whereas on the more difficult 
tasks which had more levels, the figure could only be elevated a certain distance 
up the elevator. Therefore, in task choice contexts, the child is presented with a 
number of discrete alternatives of the same task which differ in their level of 
difficulty. In repetition choice, which is a particular type of task choice context, 
the children perform the whole range of tasks and are then required to select the 
task which they want to perform next. In this repetition choice context, children 
focus on the probability of success or failure and the majority of pre-schoolers, 
who do not yet understand the success-incentive function, demonstrate a 
preference for easy tasks (Ruhland & Feld, 1977). The success-incentive function 
refers to the individual's anticipated emotional reaction to the success or failure of 
a performance attempt (Heckhausen, 1984) (see page 166). Knowledge of the 
relationship between success and incentive requires antecedent knowledge about 
related factors: an understanding that degrees of task difficulty exist; an 
appreciation of personal competence level; the realisation that outcome can be 
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attributed to personal competence; an understanding of the relationship between 
competence and outcome which is based on task difficulty; the generation of 
positively self-evaluated affect following success based on the knowledge that the 
outcome attempt was attributable to personal competence (Heckhausen, 1984). 
Ruhland & Feld's (1977) findings were replicated by Heckhausen (1984) with 
children aged between four and six years who did not yet understand the success- 
incentive function but had mastered the expectancy function. Expectancy refers to 
the probability of succeeding on a particular task and is based mainly on 
information about the relative success or failure of previous performance attempts 
(Kelley, 1967). Eighty percent of the children in Heckhausen's (1984) study 
initially performed easy tasks. They only selected difficult tasks when task features 
were salient. However, when both functions were understood (the success- 
incentive and expectancy functions), only between fifty and sixty percent of these 
children selected easy tasks. By the second trial of testing, the children who did 
not understand both functions persisted in their preference for easy tasks. On this 
trial, almost eighty percent of the children who did understand both of these 
functions also demonstrated a similar preference for easy tasks. Therefore an 
understanding of the success-incentive function creates higher levels of risk taking 
in young children. Following feedback which indicates failure, these children, like 
the less cognitively mature children (with respect to the success-incentive 
function) ensure success by engaging in low risk behaviour. Results from the 
experiment which examined young children's behaviour when the outcomes of 
their previous performance attempts were made salient to them and which is 
described in the previous chapter support these findings. The present study 
indicated that when young children were offered extrinsic rewards for achieving 
success which did not vary in relation to the difficulty level of the task attempted, 
they modified their behaviour and demonstrated a preference for easy tasks. This 
seems to suggest that these children understand that more difficult tasks require 
greater competence for their successful completion. The children also appeared to 
base their task choice on the possibility of receiving extrinsic reward rather than 
on achieving success on the most difficult task on which success was likely. The 
intrinsic reward of succeeding on difficult tasks seemed to be overshadowed by 
the children's desire to receive material gain. 
In the other context in which risk taking is less commonly examined, the goal- 
setting context, a different pattern of behaviour 
is exhibited by young children. In 
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this context, task difficulty varies along a continuum and children are asked to 
select the difficulty level which they wish to attempt to achieve within this 
continuum. Heckhausen (1984) also presented children with the elevator task in a 
goal setting paradigm. In this context, the children were presented with only one 
elevator, comprising a number of different levels. The children were then asked to 
choose a level to aim for within this one elevator rather than choosing one 
elevator from a number on offer which explicitly represented different levels of 
difficulty. Under goal-setting circumstances, Heckhausen (1984) has 
demonstrated that children focus on the incentive value of success, unlike in task 
choice settings where they focus on the relative success or failure of previous 
performance attempts. He attributes this to the fact that the goal-setting context 
presents a continuum of task difficulty and discrete easier alternatives are not 
explicitly offered to the children. Subsequently they direct their attention to the 
most difficult level as this task provides the greatest incentive value of success. An 
alternative explanation is that young children are unable to judge task difficulty 
and ability correctly, as both children who did and did not understand the success- 
incentive function preferred to perform challenging tasks on their first trial of 
testing. It is possible that increased experience on the task then allows them to 
judge more accurately what level of difficulty is appropriate for their own level of 
ability, manifest in their more adult like risk taking behaviour as discussed below. 
In goal-setting contexts, children between the ages of four and six years initially 
chose difficult tasks which represented a high level of risk (Heckhausen, 1984). 
However, by the second trial, Heckhausen (1984) observed that fifty percent of 
the children demonstrated a preference for easier tasks, setting their targets below 
their attained level on the task. According to Heckhausen (1984), in goal-setting 
contexts, where children tend to focus on the incentive value of success, they 
solve the expectancy-incentive dilemma in a similar manner to adults, by selecting 
tasks on which they have an intermediate probability of success. In summary, 
Heckhausen (1984) proposes that in task choice contexts, pre-schoolers will 
initially select easy tasks whereas in goal-setting contexts they will initially select 
difficult tasks. 
However, in a study by Fazey & Evans (1994) which presented pre-school 
children with real physical risk on four different gross motor tasks, the children 
elected to perform levels of task difficulty which were congruent with or above 
their mothers' assessments, or expectations, of their competence. On one of the 
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tasks the children did overestimate the level which they chose to perform and 
were unable to successfully complete this level of difficulty. In this context, the 
incentive to take risks appeared to be interrialised as the children were not 
encouraged in any way to take risks. Results of this study indicate that when real 
physical risk is involved, pre-school children will tend to select levels of difficulty 
which offer them realistic levels of personal challenge. According to Heckhausen 
(1984), an understanding of the competence level required for successful task 
completion appears to be the mediating connection between expectancy and 
incentive values of success; in other words, the understanding that more difficult 
tasks require greater competence to produce a successful performance, and that 
such tasks present higher levels of success incentive. Higher success incentive 
results from the greater positive affect which is experienced on successful 
completion of difficult tasks compared with success on easier tasks. This positive 
affect presumably derives from the knowledge that high levels of competence 
were required to achieve success on difficult tasks and that this success can be 
attributed to personal ability. Harter (1985b) and Phillips (1984) have discussed 
how the accuracy with which children judge their own competence influences 
their preference for challenging tasks. Harter (1985b) has demonstrated that when 
children underestimate their own competence level, they prefer to participate in 
relatively easy tasks rather than those tasks which would present them with an 
intellectual challenge. Of greater concern is Phillips' (1984) finding that even 
when children's academic competence has been objectively assessed as high, those 
with low perceptions of their competence define lower achievement standards for 
themselves and possess low expectations for their own success. However, it is 
probable that overestimated perceptions of personal competence are equally 
dangerous. Individuals who overestimate their own competence are likely to 
select tasks which are beyond their level of achievement from which failure is 
likely to result. 
Pre-schoolers do exhibit a developing tendency to base the incentive value of a 
task on their perception of the task's level of difficulty (Heckhausen, 1984). For 
instance, Heckhausen (1984) has demonstrated that these children experience 
more positive affect following success on difficult than on easy tasks. However, 
the understanding that failure incentive increases with decreasing task difficulty 
develops at a later date. Contrary to expectations, when this function is 
understood, Heckhausen (1984) found that the majority of six year olds displayed 
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greater negative affect following failure on difficult tasks than on easy ones. Valid 
judgements about the incentive value of a task require accurate assessments of 
task difficulty and personal competence by the individual as these two factors are 
determinants of both expectancy and successful task completion (Heckhausen, 
1984). Heckhausen (1984) does claim however that young children are capable of 
defining personal goals which reflect the maximum product of incentive value and 
expectancy. This implies that, as the risk taking model would predict, young 
children can employ their knowledge to take moderate risks, just as older 
individuals would do. Further research is required to ascertain when an 
understanding of the success-incentive function first develops. As Heckhausen 
(1984, p. 29) states, this research should examine: 
... at what age and under what conditions children co-ordinate expectancy and incentive to reliably arrive at a realistic risk taking.... 
Furthermore, that empirical investigation should explore whether the removal of a 
material incentive offered for successful task completion affects the pattern of risk 
taking behaviour revealed when such incentives are offered. 
The level of children's success expectancies is the central focus of a phenomenon 
known as maximising which Kreitler & Zigler (1990) investigated in relation to 
children's risk taking behaviour. Examining children's maximising behaviour 
commonly involves presenting them with a task choice from three options which 
are offered. Selection of only one of these tasks results in intermittent 
reinforcement. Therefore sometimes when this option is chosen, the child receives 
reinforcement, yet at other times, selecting this task does not lead to 
reinforcement. If children are to receive the maximum amount of reinforcement 
available, it follows that they must always select the option which provides them 
with partial reinforcement. This strategy is referred to as maximising. A 
motivational approach, which focuses on the child's expectancy of success, has 
been adopted to explain this phenomenon. Success expectancies are related to the 
child's willingness to accept a relatively small payoff rather than attempting to 
gain a higher level of reinforcement. The motivational perspective would predict 
that children who have low success expectancies will be prepared to accept a 
smaller payoff and subsequently demonstrate more maximising behaviour than 
children whose expectancies of success are high. Empirical support for this 
proposal has been provided by Ollendick, Balla & Zigler (197 1), who manipulated 
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the success and failure of children's performance attempts. When children 
experienced manipulated task failure, greater maximising behaviour was evident 
than when they experienced outcomes which had been manipulated to result in 
success. It can be presumed that previous success experiences raised the child's 
expectancy for future success and less maximising was demonstrated by these 
children as they were not willing to accept partial reinforcement. They therefore 
selected tasks other than the partially reinforced one, in an attempt to gain near 
maximum reinforcement. However, failure outcomes lowered children's success 
expectancies and resulted in a willingness to accept partial reinforcement, manifest 
by their greater tendency to opt for the task which provided only partial 
reinforcement. 
It is apparent that maximising behaviour is an indication of both conservatism and 
low success expectancies. In accordance with this, Kreitler & Zigler (1990) 
hypothesised that, when the relationship between risk taking and expectancy of 
success is considered, risk taking is likely to demonstrate a negative relationship 
with maximising behaviour. They investigated this hypothesis with two groups of 
children, one aged between 5 and 6 years and one aged between II and 12 years. 
To assess their risk taking, the children performed a mirror-drawing task which 
involved drawing a line within the boundaries of a convoluted path. The children 
had to perform the task under three conditions, and each time they had to make a 
choice of whether to opt for task parameters which would make the task more 
difficult, resulting in greater reward, or to opt for the parameter which would 
make the task easier but offered less reward. The three conditions were as 
follows, the children had to choose between: drawing the line between the borders 
when they were 4 mm (difficult option) or 8 mm (easy option) apart; using a pen 
or a brush to draw the line, and, performing the task in an allotted time of either 
two or four minutes. Maximising was measured by asking the children to select 
one of three knobs in order to gain marbles as reinforcement. One of these knobs 
provided reinforcement two thirds of the time it was chosen whereas no 
reinforcement was provided whenever the child chose either of the remaining two 
knobs. Their results indicated that the older children took more risks than the 
younger age group. However, as Kreitler and Zigler (1990) predicted, for both 
age groups, risk taking was negatively related to maximising. They concluded that 
this result effectively demonstrated the relationship between risk taking and 
success expectancy. In short, the higher the child's success expectancy, the more 
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likely they were to take risks and subsequently engage in less maximising 
behaviour than children whose success expectancies were lower and were less 
willing to take risks. 
Although research which investigates young children's risk taking behaviour on 
physical or motor tasks appears to be fairly scarce, to date, examinations of 
children's general risk taking have revealed that patterns of risk taking behaviour 
vary depending on the context in which they are assessed. When children are 
asked to select tasks in a goal-setting context, they initially opt for the most 
difficult task from the continuum presented, a choice which subsequently incurs a 
high risk of failure. However, when children are asked to choose from tasks which 
are presented in a task choice context, their behaviour displays a different pattern. 
The pattern of behaviour displayed by children in task choice contexts further 
depends on their understanding of the success-incentive function. Once this 
understanding has developed, children are aware that greater incentive is attached 
to success on difficult tasks than to success gained on easier tasks. Subsequently, 
children who understand this function initially select difficult tasks in the task 
choice situation, a choice which reflects high risk behaviour (Heckhausen, 1984). 
Following the receipt of failure information about this performance, on the second 
trial of testing, the majority of these children then select easier tasks which involve 
less risk and increased chances of success. Before an understanding of the 
success-incentive function has developed, children display a somewhat different 
pattern of risk taking behaviour in task choice contexts. They do not initially 
select difficult tasks but opt for easy tasks from the start, a preference which has 
been shown to endure throughout their choice of task on the second trial of 
testing (Heckhausen, 1984). It appears therefore that in a task choice setting, the 
pattern of risk taking behaviour exhibited by young children depends to a large 
extent on their understanding of the success-incentive function. 
After presenting this research evidence, Heckhausen (1984) outlines two related 
issues which require further investigation. He states firstly that the conditions 
under which children combine the expectancy and success-incentive functions to 
reach a level of realistic risk taking behaviour should be determined. Secondly, 
that research should consider the effects on children's risk taking behaviour of 
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removing material incentives which are normally offered for successful 
performances. In the present experiment (described in the following chapter), one 
group of children was offered such an incentive whilst another group was not. 
This second group provided a comparison group which enabled children's risk 
taking behaviour to be assessed when they were offered no material incentive to 
succeed on the present task and provides information about children's risk taking 
behaviour when the incentive to succeed is intrinsic. The former issue which 
Heckhausen (1984) discusses was addressed in relation to children's risk taking 
behaviour when a variable payoff system was in operation in a task choice 
context. It was anticipated that under these conditions, young children would 
display a pattern of behaviour which indicated that they have successfully 
combined the expectancy and success-incentive functions to eventually result in 
behaviour which reflects a realistic level of risk taking. The pattern of behaviour 
which was predicted for the reward, but not the non-reward group is similar to 
that exhibited in task choice contexts by children who understand the success- 
incentive function. This hypothesis was based on the assumption that the variable 
payoff system offered to these children would increase their awareness of the 
success-incentive function, regardless of whether their normal cognitive 
development allows them to understand this function. By offering the children 
more reward for successful performances on difficult than on easy levels of the 
computer game, they should then associate greater incentive value with success 
on difficult levels than on easier ones. As Heckhausen (1984) revealed, when 
children understand the success-incentive function, these children are initially 
expected to select very difficult tasks which present them with a challenge beyond 
their own level of capability. As a consequence of information which indicates 
failure on this performance attempt, the children are then expected to select very 
easy tasks, which are below their level of capability. These tasks present the child 
with very little challenge yet ensure that a small amount of reinforcement will be 
achieved. With continued performance attempts, the children are expected to 
reach the realistic level of risk taking which Heckhausen (1984) believes should be 
demonstrated. Realistic risk taking behaviour will be indicated by the children's 
selection of difficulty levels which are compatible with their own ability level on 
the final trial of testing. Selection of this level presents the child with an optimal 
level of challenge and the opportunity to receive the maximum amount of 
reinforcement if successful. The present research hypothesised that, when 
presented with a variable payoff system, young children are capable of employing 
both the expectancy and success-incentive functions to exhibit behaviour which 
indicates a realistic risk taking strategy. That is, they possess a sufficiently 
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accurate understanding of their competence to gain reward by choosing 
appropriately-challenging levels of the task. 
The issues which have been discussed in this and the preceding chapter, although 
afforded separate consideration, do in fact demonstrate a relationship. Previous 
research by Kreitler & Zigler (1990) has revealed that an individual's willingness 
to engage in high risk behaviour is related to their level of expectancy for their 
future success. They observed less maximising behaviour, which provides an 
indication of high levels of success expectancy, in children who demonstrated a 
preference for challenging tasks which involved a high level of risk of failing. 
Therefore children whose success expectations were high attempted more 
challenging tasks as these tasks offered greater potential reward than less 
challenging ones. Presumably, their high expectations for success, indicated by 
less maximýising behaviour, led them to believe that they were capable of achieving 
success on these difficult tasks. Similarly, an individual's perception of their own 
competence is logically related to the level of their expectation for their own 
future success. The higher the individual's perception of competence, the more 
likely they are to expect to achieve success in the future. Conversely, the lower 
the individual's perception of competence, the more likely they are to expect that 
failure will result from future performance attempts. 
Bandura (1989) discusses the relationship between an individual's perceived self. 
efficacy (a situational variant of perceived competence) and their willingness to 
attempt tasks which present them with a personal challenge. Perceived self. 
efficacy affects motivation in several forms (Bandura, 1989). Individuals base 
their adopted levels of challenge, how much effort they expend into achieving 
their goals and how long they are prepared to persevere when faced with failure 
partially on their perceived level of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986). Cervone (1989) 
has demonstrated that the higher the individual's perceived self-efficacy, the 
longer they will persevere on difficult and unsolvable problems. Similarly, 
Bandura. & Wood (1989) revealed that individuals with high self-efficacy set 
themselves more challenging goals than comparison others whose self-efficacy 
was relatively low. The high self-efficacy individual is also more committed to 
achieving these goals than their low self-efficacy counterparts. Therefore it is 
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presumed that realistic risk taking and the adoption of realistic levels of challenge, 
indicated by the selection of tasks which present the individual with an optimum 
level of challenge and the opportunity to receive the maximum amount of reward 
they are capable of, reflects a realistic perception of personal competence. Further 
support for this proposal is provided by Heckhausen (1984). He claims that the 
mediating connection between the expectancy and success-incentive functions is 
an understanding of the competence required for successful task completion. In 
other words, to develop an awareness of both the probability of success on a task 
and the incentive value of this task, the individual must firstly be aware of the 
competence required for successful completion of this task. An understanding of 
these two functions is likely to result in realistic risk taking behaviour. This 
behaviour is manifest in the selection of tasks which present the individual with 
maximum challenge and the opportunity to gain the maximum amount of reward 
they are capable of achieving. Consequently, if realistic risk taking behaviour is 
exhibited, this implies that the individual is capable of employing both the 
expectancy and success-incentive functions and subsequently, of assessing the 
competence required for successful task completion. Furthermore, if individuals 
do display realistic risk ta ' 
king behaviour, by selecting tasks appropriate to their 
own ability level and which present them with maximum uncertainty of whether 
they will fail or succeed, this will indicate to some extent that they are capable of 
accurately assessing their own competence. 
In the present experiment the nature of children's risk taking behaviour is 
therefore expected to provide information not only related to this issue but 
support for the hypothesis, stated in Chapter Five that young children are capable 
of accurately assessing their competence. As outlined earlier, children who were 
offered variable payoffs for successful task performances were expected initially 
to choose difficult tasks, which present a high level of risk and personal challenge. 
On the second trial, they were expected to select very easy tasks which presented 
them with both low levels of risk and challenge. This pattern of behaviour on the 
first two trials was anticipated because the variable payoff system was expected to 
heighten the children's awareness of the success-incentive function, and such 
awareness ordinarily results in this pattern of risk taking behaviour in task-choice 
contexts. As children continued to select different levels of difficulty, it was 
hypothesised that their final level choice would closely approximate their own 
ability level. In so doing, these children would be displaying what Heckhausen 
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(1984, p. 29) refers to as, "realistie' risk taking behaviour. Behaviour of this 
nature requires an understanding of the success-incentive and expectancy 
functions, for which an understanding of the competence necessary for successful 
task performance is a prerequisite. Therefore, if on the final level choice, realistic 
risk taking behaviour is observed, this will provide further support for the 
hypothesis that young children are capable of making accurate judgements of their 
personal competence. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN. 
EXPERIMENT 5- AN EX4MINA TION OF 
YOUNG CRILDREN'S RISK TAKING 
BEHA VIO UR AND THE A CCURA CY OF 
THEIR BEHA VIO VRA LL Y INDICATED 
PERCEPTIONS OF COMPETENCE ONA 
MOTOR TASK. 
7.1.1. Introduction 
Chapters Five and Six discussed research pertaining respectively to the accuracy 
of children's perceptions of their own competence and the nature of their risk 
taking behaviour. The present chapter describes an experiment which investigated 
both these issues in a motor task context. Hypotheses concerning the first issue, 
the accuracy of children! s perceived competence, will be dealt with first. This will 
be followed by a consideration of the pattern of risk taking behaviour which 
young children are expected to exhibit and finally, how childrens risk taking 
behaviour can support hypotheses made about the accuracy of young children's 
perceived competence. In the experiment which is described below, children aged 
between 4 and 6 years were asked to play the computer game used previously but 
with only accurate performance information provided. Their actual competence 
was measured by their baseline level on the game. This was an objective measure 
indicating the level of difficulty most appropriate for the child's own competence. 
Their perceived competence was measured by their choice of difficulty level on 
trial five (the final trial in the session). Accuracy of perceived competence could 
then be assessed by measuring the absolute deviation between these two 
measures. 
The children were randomly divided into two groups- a reward group and a non 
reward group. The children in the reward group received variable payoffs for 
successful performances whereas those in the non reward group received no 
rewards for performance. A performance was designated as successful when the 
child scored five or less errors on any one trial. This criterion error level was 
applied regardless of the difficulty of the current level on which the child played, 
The reward system provided increasing levels of reward for success as the 
difficulty level of the task attempted increased. It was hypothesised that on trial 
five, children's level choices in the reward group would demonstrate less deviation 
from their baseline levels than that exhibited by children's final level choices in the 
non reward group. The deviation between these two measures can provide an 
indication of how realistic the child's perceived competence is, in relation to their 
objectively measured level of competence. This hypothesis was based on the 
findings of previous research which are discussed in Chapter Five and which 
indicate that, contrary to widespread assumption, under certain conditions, young 
children are capable of providing accurate assessments of their own level of 
competence. 
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Certain factors have been shown to be effective in eliciting accurate perceptions 
of competence from young children. These factors include: increasing the saliency 
of objective task difficulty and performance outcomes, and employing a 
behavioural measure to assess perceived competence on a specific task. By 
offering variable payoffs for successful performance attempts, it is anticipated that 
the salience of objective task difficulty will be increased. This reward system is 
expected to increase the children's awareness of the outcomes of their 
performance attempts. Tangible rewards which are received following success but 
not failure are expected to increase the saliency of the children's performance 
outcomes by directing their attention to the relative success and failure of 
previous performance attempts. The children are then able to determine whether 
these attempts were successful or not by the amount of reward they have gained. 
Previous research has shown that tangible rewards for successful performance 
attempts increase the saliency of these outcomes and subsequently, children base 
their future behaviour on previous performance outcomes (for example, Stipek et 
al, 1984). Employing a behavioural index to measure perceived competence on a 
specific task is expected to result in more accurate perceptions of competence by 
reducing the limitations presented by the use of verbal measures (see Chapter Five 
for a discussion). 
The task and conditions which are described above were used in the present 
examination of children's risk taking behaviour when they were offered variable 
payoffs for successful task performance. Two aspects were investigated, as 
suggested by Heckhausen (1984). The first of these was an examination of the 
conditions under which children combine the expectancy and success-incentive 
functions to result in realistic risk taking behaviour. The second issue which was 
addressed was the nature of children's risk taking behaviour when material 
incentives were not offered for successful performance attempts. It was 
anticipated that the children in the reward group would display realistic risk taking 
behaviour when they were offered variable payoffs for task success, increasing 
awareness that greater incentive value of success is associated with more difficult 
levels of the task than with easier ones. Children in the reward group were not 
expected to immediately display realistic risk taking 
behaviour. Based on the 
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findings of previous research, as discussed in Chapter Five (see Heckhausen, 
1984), a pattern of behaviour was expected to be displayed by subjects in the 
present study which is as follows: initially, as a result of the variable payoff system 
increasing the children's awareness of the success-incentive function, they were 
expected to select very difficult levels of the game; following failure on these 
levels, which does not result in the receipt of reward, on their second trial, these 
children were then expected to select very easy tasks; with continued performance 
attempts, by the fifth and final trial the variable payoff system was expected to 
stimulate these children to choose levels which approximate their own level of 
competence and to arrive at what Heckhausen (1984) describes as realistic risk 
taking behaviour. More realistic risk taking behaviour will be indicated by lesser 
deviation of final level choices from baseline levels in the reward group than that 
expected to be exhibited by the children in the non reward group. Predictions 
differed however concerning the nature of the behaviour which children in the non 
reward group would display. Because they were not offered variable payoffs for 
successful task performance they were not expected to demonstrate the same 
awareness of the success-incentive function as children in the reward group. As a 
result, they were expected to select easy tasks on both their first and second trials, 
as Heckhausen (1984) suggests. On their fifth trial their level choices were 
expected to deviate more from their baseline levels than those of children's in the 
reward group. If, as hypothesised, this is the case, it would provide an indication 
that, as was expected, these children did not display realistic risk taking 
behaviour. In comparison to the children in the reward group, those in the non 
reward group were expected to select relatively easier levels on their first trial and 
on their fifth trial they were expected to demonstrate relatively less realistic risk 
taking behaviour. 
At the beginning of this introduction it was suggested that when children are 
offered variable payoffs for successful performance attempts, the nature of their 
risk taking behaviour can provide additional 
information about the accuracy of 
their perceived competence. A possible relationship exists between risk taking 
behaviour and perceived competence on a particular task, as suggested by 
Bandura (1989) and Weiss & Horn (1990). For example, these latter authors 
revealed that girls who underestimated their physical competence 
demonstrated a 
preference for tasks which did not present them with a challenge. 
It seems that if 
risk taking behaviour is realistic then 
levels will be chosen which present the 
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individual with optimal levels of challenge and are most appropriate for the 
individual's competence level on that task. Heckhausen (1984) states that for an 
individual to engage in realistic risk taking they must have developed an 
understanding of both the expectancy and success-incentive functions and that the 
mediating connection between these two functions is an understanding of the 
competence required for successful task completion. If the individual can assess 
the level of competence required for successful task completion and demonstrates 
realistic risk taking behaviour, they must also be capable of accurately assessing 
their own level of competence. Thus if realistic risk taking behaviour is displayed 
by children in the reward group, as is expected, this finding will provide further 
support for the hypothesis that under the conditions imposed, children can provide 
accurate assessments of their own competence if the conditions encourage them 
to do so. Despite having the capacity, if task conditions do not encourage 
accuracy (as in the non-reward group) then young children may not display 
behaviours congruent with their abilities. 
7.2.1. Subjects 
Thirty one children from two primary schools were employed as subjects in this 
experiment. The children were randomly selected for participation and randomly 
allocated to one of two groups- a reward group, or a non reward group. There 
were ten boys and six girls in the reward group. They ranged in age from 4 years 
&3 months to 6 years &2 months with a mean age of 5 years &4 months. The 
non reward group comprised of seven girls and eight boys whose mean age was 4 
years &9 months. Their age range was 4 years &3 months to 5 years &9 
months. 
7.2.2. Experimental procedure 
Both groups of children played the computer game used in experiment four. The 
performance information which they received provided accurate information 
about the child's performance on the game. Children were firstly familiarised with 
the game through verbal instruction and two practice trials on level two. Once 
children's understanding of the aims of the game had been established, their 
baseline performance levels were obtained, as described in Chapter Four. 
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The two groups then performed five trials on the game, the difficulty levels of 
which they chose themselves. The children were asked to choose the level of 
difficulty which they wanted to play on next before each trial. The child's 
understanding of the relative difficulty of this chosen level was then checked. The 
children were asked whether they wanted to move to an easier or a more difficult 
level, and to identify this level. They were then asked to show the experimenter 
this difficulty level on one of two scales. The non reward group used the sliding 
arrow scale described in experiment four and the reward group used the scale 
which is shown in figure 7.1 (the rationale for employing different scales will 
shortly be made apparent). The non reward group simply played five trials on the 
game and only received feedback generated by the game. However, the reward 
group was given smarties for a successful performance on a trial, immediately 
following that trial. They were told that if they reached a required standard of 
performance, which did not vary between levels and which allowed the subjects to 
make no more than five errors, they would receive a number of smarties as a 
reward. The amount of reward available was in direct proportion to the difficulty 
of the level attempted. If the required standard was met at level one, the child 
would receive one smartie, at level two, two smarties, and so on, until level nine 
when they would receive nine smarties. Following each level choice, children were 
questioned to check whether they understood how many smarties they would 
receive following success on their chosen level. As figure 7.1 shows, smarties 
were drawn next to the different difficulty levels to aid the children's 
understanding of how many smarties they would receive if they successfully 
completed this level. Some children's initial difficulties with this system 
necessitated that actual smarties be placed on top of those drawn on the scale to 
ensure that all subjects understood the nature of this variable payoff system. 
7.3.1. Expected results concerning risk taking behaviour 
With the presence of a variable payoff incentive children in the reward group were 
initially expected to challenge themselves by selecting levels which were too 
difficult for them and higher than their baseline. Following almost inevitable 
failure on this level, they were then expected to display relatively cautious 
behaviour on trial two and play on levels which were much easier than the levels 
attempted on their first trial. By the final trial, trial 
five, these subjects were 
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expected to have learnt to play on a level which maximises their chances of 
success and does not deviate greatly from their baseline level. Children in the non 
reward group were not expected to display this pattern of behaviour. Therefore 
their initial level choices were not expected to deviate greatly above their baseline 
and such a drastic reduction in level choice on trial two, comparative to the level 
chosen on trial one, was not anticipated. Similarly, their level choices on trial five 
were expected to display greater deviation from their baseline levels than that 
exhibited in the reward group. 
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Figure 7.1: Scale used with the reward group 42 Im 
iss 
7.3.2. Expected results concerning the accuracy of perceived competence 
It was hypothesised that the conditions under which children in the reward group 
played the game (that is, an incentive to accurately assess competence; increased 
saliency of performance outcomes and objective task difficulty, and, behaviourally 
indicating their perceived competence on a specific task) would elicit accurate 
perceptions of personal competence. Only the latter condition was a feature of the 
task for children in the non reward group. Therefore they were expected to 
provide less accurate estimates of their own competence on the game than did 
children in the reward group. 
7.3.3. Dependent measures 
Only subjects' behaviour on trials one, two and five was of interest, therefore their 
behaviour on trials three and four was excluded from any analysis. It was not 
possible to use actual level choice as the dependent measure as this procedure 
would not control for individual differences in baseline levels. Therefore the 
following procedure was employed to determine the dependent measures to be 
used in statistical analyses. As no trials had been previously performed, the 
dependent measure on trial one was calculated by subtracting the child's baseline 
level from their level choice on trial one. This score could be either negative or 
positive and therefore provided an indication of whether subjects chose a level 
which was easier or more difficult than their baseline, and to what extent these 
two levels differed. On trial two, the dependent measure was calculated by 
subtracting the child's level choice on this trial from their choice on trial one. 
Again, this indicated the direction of their choice on trial two, in relation to the 
level played on trial one, and how much these two levels differed from each other. 
However, on trial five, the dependent measure was obtained by calculating the 
absolute difference between children's level choices on this trial and their baseline 
level. This measure provided an indication of the degree to which level choices on 
trial five deviated from baseline levels but not in which direction this deviation 
occurred. This method was employed to obtain an indication of both the accuracy 
of the child's perceived competence and how realistic their risk taking behaviour 
was. Baseline levels, as discussed earlier, were used to indicate the level of 
difficulty appropriate for the individual. Therefore, the amount by which the 
child's final level choice deviated from their 
individual baseline level would 
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provide an indication of whether they selected levels which were compatible with 
their ability level and presented them with an appropriate level of personal 
challenge. The direction of this deviation was also calculated to examine if 
differences existed between the two groups' preferences for levels above or below 
their baseline levels. 
7.4.1. Results 
An initial analysis was carried out to assess whether gender influenced children's 
behaviour. A two-way ANOVA (gender by choice) with repeated measures on 
the second factor was performed on the dependent measure, deviation score, as 
described previously. Gender had two levels and choice had three (trials one, two, 
and, five). Neither the gender main effect nor gender by choice interaction were 
significant, F(1,87)=1.394, p>0.05, and F(2,87)=0.098, p>0.05, respectively. 
Although the choice main effect was found to be significant, F(2,87)=5.105, 
p<0.05, this result was not followed up at present as it was subject to further 
investigation in subsequent analyses. Based on these results, gender was not 
included as a factor in the analyses which follow. This finding supports those of 
Arenson (1978) and Clifford et al (1990) which revealed that gender does not 
affect risk taking behaviour. 
7.4.2. Examining risk taking behaviour over trials one and two 
A2x2 two factor ANOVA (group by trial) with repeated measures on the last 
factor was performed on the dependent measure, deviation, described above. Both 
factors had two levels, reward group and non reward group, and trials one and 
two, in the first and second factors, respectively. This analysis revealed a 
nonsignificant group main effect (F(1,29) = 0.10, p>O. 05), however, as table 7.1 
demonstrates, both the trial main effect and the group by trial interaction were 
significant. 
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SOURCE OF VARIATION SS DF rVIS F SIG. OF F 
WITHIN CELLS 449.89 29 15.51 
TRIAL 116.21 1 116.21 7.49 0.010 
GROUP BY TRIAL 66.53 1 66.53 4.29 0.047 
Table 7.1: Results of two-way ANOVA performed on deviation scores at trials 1&2 
, icant 
interaction ScheM's follow-up test was used to further examine this signif 
and it revealed that for the reward group the mean deviation score on trial one 
was significantly greater than the mean deviation score on trial two (p<0.05). 
There were no other significant differences. Table 7.2 provides the means and 
standard deviations of the deviation scores for each group at trials one, two and 
five. Figure 7.2 shows a plot of these mean values to demonstrate clearly the 
group by trial interaction. which was revealed. An examination of the mean 
deviation scores (see table 7.2) indicates that the trial main effect resulted from 
significantly greater deviation scores on trial one than on trial two. This result 
appears to reflect children's awareness of performance feedback in both 
experimental groups. Having, on average, selected levels above their individual 
baselines, the children received relative failure feedback and subsequently, on trial 
two, selected levels on which success was significantly easier to achieve. 
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Figure 7.2: Plot of mean deviation scores of reward 
and non reward groups over trials one and two. 
Trial 
GROUP 
Reward group 
Non reward group 
TRIAL I TRIAL 2 TRIAL 5 
mean sd mean sd mean sd 
RENVARD 2.000 3.367 -2.813 3.331 2.000 1.5492 
NON REWARD 0.133 3.889 -0.533 2.669 3.333 2.1931 
Table 7.2: Deviation means and standard deviation of the mean for both 
groups at trials 1,2 &5 
Unlike subjects' deviation scores on trials one and two, their scores on trial five 
represented the absolute number of units which their final level choice deviated 
from individual baseline levels. Therefore a separate analysis was performed on 
the deviation scores recorded at trial five. A one-way ANOVA (group by 
deviation) was carried out, the first factor comprising of two levels (reward group 
and non reward group). This analysis revealed differences between the groups at a 
probability level which closely approached traditionally employed significance 
levels, as table 7.3 shows. The reward group deviated less from baseline levels 
than the non reward group as can be seen in table 7.2. Conventionally, probability 
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levels which are greater than either 5% or 1% result in the rejection of the 
alternative hypothesis in favour of the null hypothesis. If these conventional levels 
are strictly adhered to then the present findings would report no significant 
differences as p>0.05. However, the author is of the opinion that this 
straightforward rejection of a probability level of 0.059, simply because it falls 
0.9% short of conventional criteria, would be foolhardy. This belief is supported 
by early writings on the subject of statistical significance by Rozeboorn (1960). 
Rozeboorn (1960, p. 416) discusses the traditionally adopted levels of 5% and 1% 
as so steeped in tradition that they have developed, 
the status of a religious conviction. 
This convention, although widely employed, is, however, based, in Rozeboom's 
(1960) opinion, on levels of significance which were originally determined in an 
arbitrary manner. The steadfast adoption of these levels leaves the researcher with 
very little room for manoeuvre, as the procedure allows only disconfirmation or 
confirmation of the hypothesis with no continuum of alternatives available in 
between. As a result, based on this procedure, the matter becomes one of all or 
nothing rejection or acceptance of the null hypothesis. This seems a short-sighted 
method to adopt if, for example, a probability level of 0.04 will indicate significant 
differences whereas one of 0.06 will indicate no significant differences, when the 
very small difference between these two values is considered. Rozeboorn (1960) 
supports this belief and states that hypothesis testing should involve determining 
the extent to which the individual believes in their propositions and not an all or 
nothing approach to acceptance of this proposition. Rozeboorn (1960) further 
suggests, amongst other things, that actual probability levels should be reported. 
It appears that to reject a probability level of 0.059 would result in ignoring a 
result of some significance. Therefore, the present study will accept the 
probability level of 0.059 as one which indicates a result which is of statistical 
significance. 
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SOURCE DF SUM OF MEAN F RATIO F PROB. 
SQUARES SQUARES 
BETWEEN GROUPS 1 13.7634 13.7634 3.8626 0.0590 
WITHIN GROUPS 29 103.3333 3.5632 
TOTAL 30 117.0968 
Table 7.3: Results of one-way ANOVA performed on the deviation scores of both 
groups on trial 5 
An examination of the mean deviation scores (see table 7.2) indicates that as 
expected the deviation of level choices from baseline levels at trial five was 
significantly greater in the non reward than the reward group. It appears that 
when offered variable payoffs, young children will initially challenge themselves 
and subsequently risk gaining no reward at all in order to obtain the maximum 
amount of reward available. However, following failure on this challenging level 
their behaviour changes drastically, becoming overly cautious, to ensure that some 
reinforcement is received, however small. Only five subjects in the reward group 
did not experience failure on trial one, and all of these subjects had elected to play 
on a level lower than their designated baseline. The variable payoff system did not 
encourage them initially to present themselves with a challenge which could have 
jeopardised their chances of receiving a reward. However, having received 
reinforcement for their performance on trial one, unlike the other subjects, these 
five children logically attempted a more challenging level on trial two. By trial 
five, the children in the reward group, having experienced the effects of both risky 
and cautious behaviour on the amount of reinforcement received, appear to have 
learnt to maximise their chances of success. The children's behaviour on trial five 
infers that they realise that in order to maximise gain and minimise loss they must 
play on a level which presents neither too great nor too little of a challenge. That 
is, one which is close to their own baseline level and which demonstrates their 
realistic risk taking behaviour. 
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7.5.1. Examining the accuracy of children's perceptions of competence 
The one-way ANOVA performed on deviation scores on trial five was used to 
address this issue. Actual competence was measured by the child's baseline level 
and their perceived competence was indicated by their level choice on trial five. 
The discrepancy (measured in absolute units) between these two measures, that is, 
the child's deviation score, provided an indication of the accuracy of their 
perceived competence, in relation to their actual competence, on the game. As 
expected, the mean deviation from baseline level on trial five was greater in the 
non reward group than the reward group (see table 7.3). Therefore it appears that 
the conditions under which the reward group played the game resulted in more 
accurate task level choice, in comparison to that displayed by children in the non 
reward group. A chi-squared analysis was performed on the frequencies of 
children in the two groups (shown in table 7.4) who selected levels above, at, and 
below their own baseline levels. This analysis revealed no significant differences 
between the two groups, X2 (1)= 1.5511, p>0.05, indicating that the direction of 
deviation did not differ between the two groups. The deviations which occurred 
were no more likely to be above or below baseline levels in the reward than the 
non-reward group, and vi. ce-versa. 
Above/at baseline Below baseline Total 
Reward group 11 5 16 
Non-reward group 78 15 
Total 18 13 31 
Table 7.4: Frequencies of children in the reward and non reward groups who 
selected difficulty levels abovehit or below their baseline levels on trial rive 
7.6.1. Discussion 
Children's risk taking behaviour on trials one and two 
In the reward group, children demonstrated an initial preference for difficult levels 
which presented them with a challenge, but on their second trial they selected easy 
levels which did not represent similar levels of personal challenge. With their first 
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two level choices, these children have therefore demonstrated the pattern of risk 
taking behaviour which Heckhausen (1984) predicts will be demonstrated in task 
choice contexts by children who understand the success-incentive function. An 
examination of children's behaviour in the non reward group provides a suitable 
method of addressing the nature of children's risk taking behaviour when material 
incentives are not provided for successful performance attempts and the only 
possible incentive to succeed can be intrinsic. The behaviour of these children 
provided only partial support for predictions apriori. As expected, in relation to 
children in the reward group, those in the non reward group selected relatively 
easier levels on their first trial. Contrary to predictions, although these levels were 
relatively easier than those chosen by children in the reward group, children in the 
non reward group selected levels which were above their baseline levels. 
However, the extent of this deviation was not as great as that demonstrated by the 
reward group (compare the reward group's mean deviation of 2.000 with the non 
reward group's of 0.133). In relation to their first trial choice, on their second 
trial, children in the non reward group demonstrated a preference for relatively 
easier levels. However, the decrease in level choice between trials one and two 
was not as great as that demonstrated in the reward group and did not yield 
statistically significant results. 
These findings indicate that in a task choice setting, the pattern of behaviour 
exhibited by children who are not offered material incentives is the same as that 
exhibited by children who are. Seemingly, intrinsic incentives mediate the same 
pattern of risk taking behaviour as do material ones. However, one significant 
difference does exist between the nature of children's risk taking behaviour in 
these two contexts. It appears that when material incentives are not offered, 
compared with when they are, young children are less likely to display behaviour 
which indicates extreme risk followed by extreme caution. One explanation for the 
similarity in behaviour exhibited by children in the two groups could be that the 
children in the non reward group did understand the success-incentive function. 
This suggestion echoes that made (see Chapter Five) in relation to the proposed 
incongruence between children's capacity to accurately assess their own 
competence and their capacity to verbalise these 
judgements. Results from the 
present experiment indicate that both groups of young children possess the 
capacity to understand the success-incentive 
function. The variable payoff system 
offered to children in the reward group appeared to 
heighten their awareness, and 
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use, of their knowledge of this fiinction to select appropriate levels of challenge, 
in comparison with the behaviour displayed by children in the non reward group. 
However, the variable payoff system did appear to stimulate the children in the 
reward group to run the gamut of risk taking behaviour, moving from levels 
which present high levels of risk to those which present virtually none. The more 
extreme risk taking behaviour which was exhibited by the children in the reward 
group can therefore be attributed to the variable payoff system which they were 
offered for successful task performances. These results infer that the variable 
payoff system employed in the reward group increased the children's awareness of 
the success-incentive function, resulting in extremes of risk taking behaviour. 
7.6.2. Children's risk taking behaviour on trial flive 
On their final trial, in comparison with those of children in the non reward group, 
children's level choices in the reward group demonstrated significantly less 
deviation from their baseline levels. Through the selection of levels which 
approximated their competence level and which presented them with optimal 
levels of both challenge and potential reward, children in the reward group 
eventually demonstrated realistic risk taking behaviour. Again, it can be inferred 
that this realistic risk taking behaviour was elicited by the variable payoff system 
which was offered to children in the reward, but not the non reward, group. It 
appears that by offering children variable payoffs for successful task performance, 
they can successfully combine the success-incentive and expectancy functions to 
arrive at realistic risk taking behaviour. Considering the motivational and 
performance advantages (for example, Atkinson, 1957) of realistic risk taking 
behaviour, these results have implications for educational practices such as the 
reinforcement schedules which are employed in these contexts. This issue will be 
discussed in greater detail in the discussion which follows this chapter. 
7.6.3. The accuracy of children's perceptions of their own competence 
Children in the reward group chose more realistic levels of task difficulty than did 
those children in the non reward group. These level choices were used as a 
behavioural index of children's perceptions of their Competence on the motor task 
used in the present study (see Chapter Five for justification of the suitability of 
this measure). Findings indicated that the children in the reward group provided 
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more accurate perceptions of their task competence than those in the non reward 
group. The variable payoff system was employed to increase the salience of both 
objective task difficulty and the outcomes of childreWs previous performance 
attempts. Previous research has demonstrated these as factors which stimulate 
young children to demonstrate that they can accurately assess their own 
competence. Moreover, variable payoff systems encourage children to choose 
tasks appropriate to their individual ability (Clifford & Chou, 199 1). This finding 
contradicts those of studies (for example, Stipek, 198 1) which employed verbal 
measures of perceived competence and revealed that young children tended to 
overestimate their own competence levels. Having revealed that young children 
are capable of accurately assessing their own competence, the present study lends 
support to studies by Majeres & Timmer (198 1) and Fazey & Evans (1994). 
Majeres & Timmer (198 1) revealed that, when asked to choose a task appropriate 
to their developmental level, young children do demonstrate accurate perceptions 
of their motor competence. Similarly, Fazey & Evans (1994) demonstrated that 
when faced with potentially dangerous tasks, young children behaved in a manner 
which suggested that they can accurately assess their own level of physical 
competence. The present findings also support claims made by Nicholls (1984) 
and Butler (1990) that young children must be capable of accurately assessing 
their own competence if they are to improve upon their current level of mastery 
and prevent injury in physical settings. 
It seems that young children possess more accurate perceptions of their 
competence than the findings of studies which have employed verbal measures 
would suggest. The exaggerated perceptions of competence revealed by such 
studies could be attributed to the verbal measures which they used rather than the 
child's actual beliefs about their personal ability. However, it was not the 
behavioural measure alone which elicited accurate perceptions of competence in 
the present study, as children's behaviourally indicated competence perceptions in 
the non reward group were not as accurate as those exhibited by children in the 
reward group, but also the task conditions. Realistic risk taking requires that the 
individual understands the competence required for successful task completion. 
Knowledge of this prerequisite to realistic risk taking behaviour therefore infers 
knowledge of one's own level of competence in relation to the difficulty of the 
task attempted. These results are in conflict with suggestions made by previous 
authors, for example, Harter (1990). She suggested that young children's 
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exaggerated perceptions of their own competence can be attributed to their 
limited cognitive capacity to comprehend the relationship between their own 
resources and the demands of the task. The present findings infer instead that 
these exaggerated competence perceptions may be a product of the limitations of 
the verbal measures which are commonly employed to assess this construct and of 
the nature of the tasks presented to young children. 
Results of this study can be presented in support of findings from experiment two 
and points which are raised in this thesis. Experiment two revealed that the young 
child's equation of effort and ability may not accurately reflect their beliefs about 
these constructs but instead may represent an artefact of the methodology used to 
assess this conceptual development. Additionally, that young children's capacity to 
verbalise ability and ability related factors may be limited when they are discussing 
outcomes on physical tasks. Moreover, a number of interview responses from 
experiment one indicated that when asked about ability, young children may 
interpret these questions differently from adults. Considering these findings, it 
appears that verbal measures may not represent the most appropriate 
methodology for assessing young children's beliefs about personal competence 
and the construct of ability. It seems that a behavioural index will provide a more 
reliable method of measuring young children's perceptions of their competence. 
When personal reward is contingent upon the accurate assessment of competence, 
children will apply their understanding of their personal competence and select 
levels of task difficulty which are appropriate for them. However, considering the 
findings of experiment two, it cannot be inferred from the results of experiment 
five that young children understand ability in the sense of an inherent capacity. 
Ability is unlikely even to exist as a separate entity for the young child. As 
mentioned previously, they appear to understand that individual limits of 
achievement exist but not that these limits are defined by an inherent capacity 
which defines ability in the adult sense. The limited capacity to verbalise ability is 
likely to have led to the exaggerated competence perceptions found by previous 
research which has commonly employed verbal measures to assess perceived 
competence. It appears that unless behavioural measures are employed in 
conjunction with appropriate tasks, then young children's competence perceptions 
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cannot be adequately assessed and research findings may not accurately reflect the 
child's beliefs. The present findings suggest that under certain circumstances, for 
instance, the presence of a variable payoff system, very young children do 
demonstrate an understanding of the following: the relationship between success 
and incentive on different levels of task difficulty; the competence required to 
achieve success on these different levels, and, whether or not their competence 
matches this required level. Although the efficacy of employing behavioural 
indices to measure young children's conceptualisations has been previously 
discussed in Chapter Five, the disadvantages of such methods must also be noted. 
Frey & Ruble (1987) suggest that, whilst observing behaviour on a specific task 
may reduce the problems of incongruence between verbalised and actual 
behaviour, this method reduces the generality of experimental findings. The 
present results can only indicate that in this context, involving a motor task, 
young children appear to possess the capacity to provide accurate assessments of 
their own competence and to engage in realistic levels of risk taking behaviour. 
Future research should examine the generality of these findings to children's 
perceptions of their competence in other areas within the physical domain and in 
other domains of competence. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT. 
DISCUSSION, 
IMPLICATIONSAND 
FUTURE RESEA R CH 
DIRECTIONS 
8.1.1. Introduction 
This thesis was primarily concerned with the developmental changes involved in 
children's understanding of the relationship between effort, ability and outcome in 
assessing competence in the physical domain. An examination was made of the 
qualitative changes displayed by children's reasoning and whether or not this 
conceptual understanding exhibits alternate periods of stability and instability 
which a number of developmental theorists have proposed are characteristic of 
developmental change. Experiments were conducted to explore: young children's 
use of effort and ability as explanations for performance outcomes and their 
understanding of these concepts; how increases in outcome saliency affect young 
children's choices of task difficulty; whether or not young children can accurately 
assess their own competence on a motor task, and their capacity to utilise task 
difficulty, personal competence and the incentive value of success on different 
levels of the task to select appropriate levels of personal challenge. The research 
work used behavioural measures rather than self-report, following concerns about 
the use of verbal measures of self-perceived competence with young children. A 
number of observations which resulted from this empirical work prompted a 
discussion of methodological issues which are involved in the measurement of 
young children's conceptual understanding. 
8.1.2. The Theoretical Perspective 
Instead of adopting a single theoretical basis to underpin the research carried out 
in this thesis, an eclectic approach has been adopted. This draws upon salient and 
convergent aspects of different developmental theories which were discussed in 
Chapter Three. Whilst the distinctions between these theoretical perspectives have 
been previously acknowledged, this section will clarify how the current thesis has 
used pertinent features of these different theories to provide a particular 
perspective on developmental change. An examination is then made concerning 
the extent to which current empirical findings have provided support for this 
integrated approach to developmental change. 
Most research employs only one or a limited number of theoretical frameworks as 
its underpinning basis. Adopting such an exclusive theoretical approach may 
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ignore the valuable contributions which other theoretical approaches can offer the 
research and may lead to the conclusion that different theoretical perspectives 
offer mutually exclusive positions on the nature of developmental change. In so 
doing, this may limit the extent to which proponents of theoretical approaches 
other than that employed ina particular piece of research feel they are able to 
accept empirical findings which are underpinned by a school of thought different 
from their own. In this thesis, a number of approaches to developmental change 
have been integrated based on the premise that each approach has an integral 
contribution to make to understanding developmental change and no one of these 
theories can provide an adequate explanation in and of itself. Whilst the 
theoretical approaches adopted in this thesis employ a variety of different 
descriptors for developmental change, they all suggest common patterns and 
mechanisms of developmental change. These have been merged in the present 
thesis to provide what appears to be a plausible explanation for developmental 
change. 
Salient aspects of these theories which require consideration here are as follows: 
developmental change involves alternating periods of stability and instability; 
instability is required to effect movement to a higher developmental state, and, 
behavioural variability can be employed as an index of developmental stage 
stability. The developmental theories which provide the main basis for this 
integrative approach are: Self-organising Systems Theory (Fogel & Thelen, 
1987); Piaget's Equilibration Model (see Boden, 1979), and, Erikson's 
Psychosocial Theory of Development (see Newman & Newman, 1991). 
Regardless of the developmental phenomenon under consideration, for instance, 
movement or conceptual development, all these theories describe fluctuation in 
the stability of the particular phenomenon, resulting in a pattern of developmental 
change which exhibits alternating periods of stability and instability (see Chapter 
Three for more detailed discussion of these proposals). For Fogel &' Thelen 
(1987), this fluctuation occurs when excessive perturbations from the norm shift 
the attractor state away from its current, stable location towards a more unstable 
position and then on to further stability at a 
higher developmental state. Piaget 
(see Boden, 1979) describes this fluctuation in relation to the equilibrium and 
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'disequilibrium 
which is experienced during different developmental stages. During 
movement between stages, the individual experiences disequilibirium, which, 
through the process of equilibration is restored to equilibrium. This procedure 
occurs numerous times during developmental change and results in the 
manifestation of alternate equilibrium and disequilibrium. From Erikson's 
perspective (see Newman & Newman, 199 1), similar fluctuations in stability are 
demonstrated when the individual, having resolved an experienced conflict at one 
lifecycle stage, encounters a different conflict which creates a period of 
disequilibriurn before movement into a further state of equilibrium is achieved on 
the resolution of this conflict. 
Whilst all these theorists recognise the organism's inherent desire for stability, 
equilibrium or the tendency to reduce dissonance and conflict, indicated by lack of 
dissonance, conflict or congruence between internal and external information, they 
also recognise the essential role which periods of instability play in the process of 
developmental change. That instability is a mechanism involved in developmental 
change is a feature of all the theories discussed here. Fogel & Thelen (1987) see 
the amplification of natural fluctuations which moves the system away from its 
stable attractor state as a necessary component of developmental change, moving 
the system towards a higher developmental state. For Piaget (see Boden, 1979), 
this required instability is manifest in the discrepancies which occur between 
internal and external information creating instability and the need to reduce these 
discrepancies to effect developmental change. Erikson's Psychosocial Theory (see 
Newman & Newman, 1991) offers a similar interpretation in that experienced 
conflict between bipolar constructs is required to initiate their resolution and 
subsequent movement to a higher developmental state. Hence, this alternating 
pattern serves a central purpose to the process of developmental change. It is the 
periods of instability, or disequilibrium, or conflict, described above which effect 
the system's movement to a higher developmental state. If the system did not 
encounter this period of instability then it would remain at the previous stable, but 
lower, state of development and more advanced states of greater stability could 
not be achieved. 
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Behavioural responses to unexpected or extreme perturbations from the norm can 
be used as an index of the stability of the organism's current developmental state 
(Thelen (1989) and Piaget (see Boden, 1979)). During stable developmental 
states, due to the stability of the attractor state or the fact that no discrepancies 
exist between internal and external information, the individual is expected to 
display invariant behaviour in relation to others from the same developmental 
level. However, when experiencing unstable developmental states, the individual 
is expected to display behaviour which varies in relation to that displayed by 
individuals experiencing stable developmental states. This is accountable to the 
relative instability of the attractor state and the discrepancies which exist between 
internal information and information received from external sources. Thelen 
(1989) also proposes that empirical investigations can employ this relationship 
between behaviour variability and stage stability to identify the relative stability of 
developmental phenomena throughout different stages of their development. 
Having integrated these proposals to derive the perspective on developmental 
change which has been adopted in this thesis, it was then suggested that this 
approach can be employed to describe one of the issues investigated in this 
thesis. That is, whether or not acknowledged stable and unstable phases of this 
developing conceptual understanding would be mirrored in behavioural outputs 
measured at these different phases of development. Behaviour in this context was 
was identified as choice of task difficulty level on a motoric task on which 
performance feedback information Was manipulated. If assumptions made from 
this integrative approach are correct, then relative stability of conceptual 
understanding would be evidenced by similar levels of relative stability of 
behaviour. 
These proposals were examined in an empirical investigation described in Chapter 
Four. Thelen's (1989) method of assessing stage stability in relation to behavioural 
variability by administering an appropriate context manipulation was employed in 
this investigation. Results of this study can be used an index of whether or not this 
integrative approach is suitable to describe developmental change, in relation to 
this particular phenomenon, and whether or not assessing behavioural variability is 
an appropriate method of assessing the stability of conceptual 
development. 
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Considering the limited support which was revealed for these proposals it seems 
that, although appealing from a theoretical perspective, adopting such an 
integrated approach to development is more difficult to demonstrate empirically. 
The difficulties encountered could be attributed to the inherent problems incurred 
in attempting to link conceptual, or cognitive, stability with behavioural 
variability. It is possible that the inconclusive findings encountered in this thesis 
are attributable to these methodological difficulties, instead, they could be 
attributable to the problems, experienced on a theoretical level, of integrating 
different theoretical approaches. Although the different theories which contributed 
to this integrative approach do demonstrate convergence on issues salient to the 
present thesis, it is feasible that their differences are too great to accommodate an 
integrative approach of this nature. What is evident from the results of both 
theoretical discourse and empirical investigation presented in this thesis is the 
need to further explore the efficacy of this approach as a means of describing 
developmental change. - 
8.2.1. Discussion of findings 
Empirical investigations revealed that young children's achievement related 
behaviours, and their understanding of various achievement related constructs may 
be more advanced than was previously presumed. Various findings from the 
present thesis can be presented in support of this claim, which seem also to 
suggest that the context in which both behaviour and understanding are assessed 
influences the young child's capacity to verbalise, or apply their knowledge of, the 
constructs involved. When young children are offered variable payoffs for 
successful task completion, they seem capable of adopting levels of challenge 
which are appropriate for their own level of task competence. This behaviour 
suggests that they are able to accurately assess personal competence, the 
competence required to achieve success on different 
levels of task difficulty, and 
the relationship between these two factors. In addition, young children's capacity 
to verbalise ability demonstrated a level of sophistication which is not normally 
associated with such young children (for example, 
Nicholls, 1978). In an academic 
context from which all effort cues had been removed, children 
between the ages 
of 4 and 6 years employed ability related explanations 
for performance outcomes. 
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This finding appears to infer that very young children must possess an 
understanding of ability, not in the same way as do adults, but as a construct 
which is distinct from effort. Findings from a number of investigations raised 
concerns about methodologies which are employed to examine young children's 
conceptual understanding. These empirical observations suggest that researchers 
may need to revise the suitability of verbal measures which are used for this 
purpose and examine their own assumptions about the child's understanding which 
may influence the experimental designs which they employ. This thesis also 
indicated that children's understanding of the relative contributions of effort and 
ability to performance outcomes on physical tasks demonstrates the same 
developmental pattern which was revealed by Nicholls (1978). Although 
proposals were made in this thesis that this conceptual understanding 
demonstrates alternate periods of stability and instability, only limited empirical 
support was provided for these suggestions. 
8.2.2. Young children's use, and understanding, of ability as an explanation 
for performance outcomes 
Hypotheses were made which suggested that the young child's synonymous use of 
effort and ability (for example, Nicholls, 1978) may not reflect their actual 
understanding of these concepts but may be an artefact of the tangible and explicit 
effort cues which children are presented with when their understanding of these 
concepts is assessed, and developmental differences in construct interpretation. 
Previous research (for example, Stipek & MacIver, 1989) has demonstrated that 
significant others emphasise the importance of effort to the young child and tend 
to reward children for the amount of effort they have expended to achieve an 
outcome, rather than the success level of this outcome attempt. Particularly where 
physical tasks are concerned, during which the effort expenditure of the actors is 
wholly apparent to the subjects, it is likely that the young child will focus their 
attention on these tangible effort cues. Young children are also unlikely to 
interpret "ability" and "being good at something" in the same way that the adult 
does. When discussing this issue, the adult experimenter is referring to an inherent 
capacity which determines level of ability. However, young children are more 
likely to be referring to "being good" in the sense of exhibiting good behaviour 
and following instructions. This results in the 
belief that an individual who is seen 
to work continuously at a task is "good" or 
is the "best" at this task. It appears 
that the child is not referring to ability in the way that the adult does when they 
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state that someone is good at something, but more probable that the young child 
is referring to socially acceptable behaviour. It is possible that this developmental 
'difference in construct interpretation, rather than the child's actual understanding 
of the concepts involved, results in the young child's use of effort and ability as 
interchangeable concepts. In support of this hypothesis, both Kelly (1955) and 
more recently, Korthals (1994) discuss the fact that individuals at different 
developmental levels interpret the same events and constructs in different ways. 
Sirrfflarly, Harter (1983), Stipek et a] (1984), and Stipek & MacIver (1989) have 
all suggested that the young child's perception of ability may differ widely from 
the adult's. Based on the proposal that the effort cues shown in the methodology 
used to assess effort and ability understanding may falsely become the focus of the 
child's attention and result in developmental differences in construct 
interpretation, cHdren were asked to discuss performance outcomes in the 
absence of any effort cues whatsoever. They were shown pictures of two children 
performýing physical tasks in experiment two and academic ones in experiment 
three. All effort cues had been removed and one child was shown to achieve a 
higher level of success than the other. The subjects were then asked to explain 
these performance differences. 
When verbal and visual effort cues were removed, young children did not provide 
any effort-related explanations for performance differences on either academic or 
physical tasks but they did provide some explanations which were interpreted as 
ability-related in the academic domain. This was unexpected. When asked to 
explain performance differences on physical tasks, no explanations which could be 
construed as ability-related were provided, although some children did employ 
ability-related explanations when asked to discuss performance differences on 
academic tasks. With the exception of two of these children, the remainder were 
unable to substantiate their explanations in terms of ability, for example, "Because 
she's clever". The child's understanding of the concept of ability therefore requires 
clarification. Although it seems that young children can conceptualise the 
existence of ability independently from effort 
(at least in relation to academic 
tasks), their capacity to verbalise their understanding of this construct does appear 
to be limited. They do not seem to use ability synonymously with effort, yet the 
domain which they are asked to consider appears to affect their statements about 
cause of outcome. When discussing physical tasks, young children 
do not 
verbalise their ideas about cause of outcome 
in a way which can be interpreted 
207 
from an adult's perspective of ability, although this seems to be more easily 
achieved by the child when they are discussing academic tasks. It may be that the 
young child focuses on readily available, concrete constructs rather than more 
abstract ones which are not directly observable and are more difficult for them to 
understand. Their interpretation of ability appears to be based more on 
behavioural conduct than on ability as a capacity. Effort is the only factor 
available on which children's judgements about behavioural conduct can be based 
in the methodology employed to assess effort and ability understanding. It seems 
that as a result of this, young children appear to equate effort and ability in their 
verbalisations, although present findings indicate that they may actually use effort 
and ability independently from each other. This suggestion is supported by claims 
made by Blumenfeld et a] (198 1) (discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two) that 
the young child bases effort judgements on behavioural conduct and ability 
judgements on effort expenditure. 
It is evident from the current findings that young children can use ability in their 
verbal explanations for performance outcomes on academic tasks. However, the 
extent to which this finding can provide information about the young child's 
understanding of ability in relation to effort and outcome is unclear. It was 
suggested in Chapter Two that verbal responses can provide some indication 
about the individual's understanding of the concepts they are discussing. 
However, an examination of this nature cannot produce conclusive evidence 
about the child's understanding and future investigations are required which 
directly address the nature of this understanding, rather than making inferences 
from verbalised reasoning. If children's verbalised reasoning can be employed to 
some extent to make inferences about their conceptual understanding, the present 
results perhaps suggest that the young child's understanding about effort and 
ability differ from those revealed by previous research. The absence of effort 
related explanations in general and the young child's limited use of ability related 
explanations for performance differences on academic tasks indicate that they may 
not believe effort and ability to be synonymous with each other. They may 
perceive ability as a concept which is distinct from effort, suggesting that their 
ideas about these concepts could be more advanced than was previously 
presumed. Children at this level of conceptual development would not normally be 
expected to employ abstract constructs such as ability 
in their verbal responses 
(for example, Nicholls, 1978). This finding supports Harter's (1986) statement 
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that although young children possess a general feeling of self-worth (a construct 
of a similar abstract nature to ability), they are unable to verbalise these beliefs in 
a manner which can be interpreted from an adult perspective. In summary, these 
experiments have provided direct evidence of children's use of effort and ability in 
their explanations for performance outcomes but this research does not do more 
than suggest that although they may perceive these as discrete constructs, their 
capacity to differentiate clearly between these outcome attributions does appear to 
be limited. Further research is required into this area. 
The children's verbalised responses did demonstrate some domain specificity. it 
seems that young children do not employ effort or ability when explaining 
performance outcomes on physical tasks in the absence of effort cues. However, 
although effort was not employed as a referent in relation to academic tasks, 
young children did use ability as an explanation in this context. This domain 
specificity was unexpected when one considers that the developmental continuum 
of effort and ability understanding demonstrated between the ages of 4 and 13 
years at the start of the present research, and discussed in the following section, 
did not reveal any differences between the physical and academic domains. Recent 
studies by Smith & Whitehead (1994) and Walling & Duda (1994) also explored 
developing conceptualisations of effort and ability in the physical domain with 
similar results. Future research is necessary to fully explain how the young child 
uses effort and ability as explanations for performance outcomes, their 
understanding of these concepts and how and why their perceptions and use of 
these constructs appear to differ between the academic and physical domains, One 
factor which could have contributed towards this finding is task familiarity. The 
academic task which children were shown was one with which they were very 
familiar. Using such a task was advantageous in that all the children possessed a 
good understanding of its characteristics and how success could be achieved on 
this task. It is unlikely that the physical task which was shown to the children 
represented the same level of task familiarity. The children who were shown 
pictures of the academic task may have 
been more capable of formulating and 
verbalising their ideas about ability in relation to this task as a result of their 
greater task familiarity. The extent to which task 
familiarity affected these results 
does however, appear to be limited. Responses from children who were shown 
the physical task indicated that they possessed a comprehensive understanding of 
the nature of this task (for instance, suggesting that one model scored more than 
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the other because they had a bigger hoop to aim for). This indicates that they 
understood which variables would increase or decrease the difficulty level of the 
game and a full understanding of the task and its requirements. The effects of task 
familiarity on the child's use of ability in their verbal responses should be examined 
to elimýinate this as a possible source of the domain specificity which was revealed 
by the present research. Similarly, a more powerful research design would be to 
use the same group of children to discuss performance outcomes on both 
academýic and physical tasks. This was overlooked in the present research and 
remains a major criticism of this study. 
-Administering a test-retest methodology may support present proposals that 
children's beliefs can be inferred from their verbal responses. If children are asked 
to explain differences in performance outcomes on two separate occasions, the 
consistency of their responses may indicate whether or not these responses reflect 
their understanding of the concepts involved. If these responses are consistent, 
then it is likely that they reflect the child's beliefs rather than situationally specific 
explanations which are unrelated to their understanding of these concepts. It was 
suggested in Chapter Two that young children provide statements which, 
although not ability-related from the perspective of an adult who perceives this 
construct as a capacity, may represent the child's understanding of ability. It seems 
that future research should investigate whether or not children's explanations for 
performance outcomes which relate, for example, to size, reflect their 
understanding of ability. 
8.2.3. Developmental changes in effort and ability understanding in the 
physical domain 
Based on the assumptions of multidimensionality (for example, Baltes, 1987) and 
domain specificity (for example, Harter, 1985a), research findings from One 
domain of competence cannot be directly extrapolated and applied to other 
competency domains as developmental changes in one domain may not mirror 
those demonstrated in others. Prior to conducting this research, empirical 
investigation had only explored developmental changes in effort and ability 
understanding when children were asked to apply this 
knowledge to academic 
tasks (see Nicholls, 1978). The first experiment carried out in this thesis examined 
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the developmental changes involved in effort and ability understanding when 
children were asked to apply their conceptual knowledge to physical tasks. The 
developmental pattern which was revealed was then compared with that 
demonstrated previously by Nicholls (1978) when children were asked to discuss 
performance outcomes on academic tasks. Results of this investigation indicated 
that this conceptual understanding progresses through the same four hierarchically 
ordered levels, regardless of whether children are asked to apply their knowledge 
to academic or physical tasks. Similar to Nicholls' (1978) finding, different levels 
dominated between certain age ranges. For instance, the majority of children 
tested who displayed level one reasoning, located at the base of the hierarchy, 
were between four and six years of age. Considerable support was provided for 
Nicholls' (1978) suggestion that chronological age can indicate only the 
approximate level of conceptual development which has been achieved. This was 
demonstrated by variation in the levels of conceptual understanding achieved by 
children of the same chronological age. For example, one nine year old child had 
already achieved level three reasoning, some were still found to reason at level 
one, whereas the majority of nine year olds were found to reason at level two of 
this continuum. 
Findings of recent research which explored children's effort and ability 
understanding in the physical domain (see Smith & Whitehead, 1994; Walling & 
Duda, 1994) are congruent with those in this study. Smith & Whitehead (1994) 
examined conceptual development in 31 boys aged between 8 and 13 years. The 
subjects were shown videos of two children taking basketball shots whilst 
expending different amounts of effort. As in Nicholls' (1978) study, both models 
were shown to score the same or the model who expended the least effort was 
shown to score more than the model who displayed the greatest effort input. 
Children's responses to interviews about the videos indicated that their reasoning 
about effort and ability demonstrated the same developmental trajectory which 
was revealed previously when children were asked to apply their knowledge to 
academic tasks (see Nicholls, 1978). Their results revealed that the 
different levels 
of understanding dominated the same age ranges, whether reasoning 
is applied to 
academic or physical tasks. The present research 
has extended this study to 
include both younger subjects and female subjects. Smith & Whitehead (1994) did 
suggest that future research should examine younger children's understanding of 
these concepts and that children should be asked not only to 
discuss performance 
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outcomes on either physical or academic tasks but on both academic and physical 
tasks. The present author also makes this recommendation following the 
investigation into children's effort and ability understanding in relation to physical 
tasks which is described in Chapter Two. Walling & Duda (1994) did adopt this 
approach in their recent study of the developmental changes which are involved in 
this conceptual understanding. They asked 144 male and female subjects aged 
between 5 and 13 years to discuss performance outcomes on both academic and 
physical tasks. In both contexts the children were shown films of two children 
applying unequal effort whilst scoring the same, or during which the child 
applying less effort scored higher than the harder working one. In the academic 
context the children were seen performing maths problems and in the physical 
context the task involved throwing beanbags at a target. Walling & Duda (1994) 
then compared the children's responses to interview questions about the two sets 
of films. As did Smith & Whitehead (1994) and findings from the present 
research, they revealed that children's understanding about effort and ability 
concepts progresses through the same four levels of reasoning, regardless of 
whether they are asked to apply their reasoning to academic or physical tasks. 
Walling & Duda (1994) also revealed a fifth level of this understanding which 
precedes the original four levels and which included children who did not 
recognise who was the hardest working child in the films which they were shown 
and who did not refer to effort or ability in their verbal responses. The present 
study did not identify a similar level of understanding but the proposal that such a 
level exists does seem valid, although further investigation is obviously required 
into this issue. The present study would support a proposal of this nature as some 
children who were questioned, whilst they did refer to ability and effort, attributed 
higher effort input to the wrong child in the films. It does appear likely that some 
children may be experiencing a level of conceptual development during which 
effort and ability understanding is even less sophisticated than that demonstrated 
by children at level one, as Walling & Duda (1994) suggest. Although their study 
does extend that of Smith & Whitehead (1994) by the inclusion of children of 
both genders and those below the age of 8 years, and by asking children to discuss 
outcomes on both academic and physical tasks, an 
American subject group was 
presumably employed. Therefore, the present 
investigation, which employed 
British children as subjects provided support for the cross-cultural validity of 
these findings. 
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As development is seen by many theorists (for example, Baltes, 1987) as a life- 
long process, it is unlikely that the development of effort and ability understanding 
ceases with the achievement of level four reasoning. An interesting question to 
address would be whether, as can be suggested from the theoretical approaches 
adopted by, for instance, Baltes (1987), this conceptual development continues 
beyond adolescence when, in Piagetian terms, the final stage of cognitive 
structuring is achieved. 
8.2.4. Young children's beliefs about various achievement-related constructs 
and their achievement-related behaviour 
Young children's behaviour on a motor task was examined to assess the levels of 
personal challenge which they prefer to adopt. The present research hypothesised 
that when children were offered variable payoffs for successful performances on a 
motor task, they would demonstrate realistic levels of challenging, or, risk taking 
behaviour. This hypothesis was based on the following properties of variable 
payoff systems which: emphasise task difficulty level; associate higher incentive 
levels with difficult tasks; increase opportunities to assess personal competence, 
and offer opportunities for the individual to demonstrate their competence. it was 
proposed that variable payoffs would allow young children to effectively combine 
the success-incentive and expectancy functions to select levels of task difficulty 
which presented them with appropriate levels of personal challenge. In experiment 
five, two groups (reward and no reward) of young children performed a motor 
task. The risk taking behaviour of these two groups of children was compared, 
and, as expected, by the final trial of testing, children who were offered variable 
payoffs exhibited more realistic risk taking behaviour than those who were not. It 
was concluded that children appear able to combine the success-incentive and 
expectancy functions to employ realistic risk taking strategies and select 
appropriate levels of personal challenge when they are offered variable payoffs for 
successful task performances. These have generally 
been considered to be 
sophisticated cognitive operations which are beyond the capabilities of young 
children. 
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Children's ability to accurately assess their own competence was also investigated 
using this risk taking paradigm. The experiment described in Chapter Four which 
examined young children's behavioural responses to manipulated performance 
information when the outcomes of their performance attempts were made salient, 
provided some indication that young children possess fairly accurate knowledge 
of the level of their own competence in relation to different levels of task 
difficulty. These young children, when offered rewards for successful performance 
attempts to increase the salience of their performance outcomes, appeared to be 
reluctant to challenge themselves, even when performance information indicated 
that success on the task could be easily achieved. The nature of the reward system 
was such that the reward available was fixed, regardless of the level of difficulty 
on which success was achieved. By selecting easy levels of task difficulty, these 
children appeared to recognise that performing easier levels would increase their 
chances of receiving reinforcement as these levels require relatively less 
competence for their successful completion than more difficult levels of the game. 
if young children possess an understanding of the competence required to result in 
success on different levels of task difficulty, as these results suggest, it is possible 
that they understand whether or not their own competence level matches that 
required by the level of task difficulty attempted. "Easy" and "difficult" task 
definitions require an assessment of resources available, therefore suggesting that 
the individual possesses the capacity to accurately assess their competence in 
relation to task requirements. These results support previous evidence produced 
by Stipek & Tannatt (1984) concerning the child's knowledge about variables 
such as relative task difficulty and the criteria they employ to evaluate ability. 
They revealed that, unlike conclusions from previous research (for example, 
Nicholls, 1978), kindergarten and first grade children did compare performance 
levels and consider task difficulty when making judgements about individuals' 
levels of achievement. Many of the pre-school children also employed task 
difficulty criteria and social norms when substantiating their judgements. In 
accordance with the present findings, these results indicate that young children do 
possess some understanding that greater ability is required to succeed on difficult 
than on easy tasks. Stipek & Tannatt (1984) do comment however, that their 
results are not directly comparable with those of previous research, 
for instance, 
Nicholls (1978). Stipek & Tannatt (1984) used a qualitative interview based 
methodology whereas previous research has mainly employed quantitative 
methodologies. Differences in methodology also 
limit the extent to which the 
present findings and those of Stipek & 
Tannatt (1984) are directly comparable. 
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Findings from the present research which provide information about young 
cHdren's knowledge of relative task difficulty are based mainly on measurement 
of their behaviour, which reflects a more quantitative approach. Stipek & Tannatt 
(1984) also suggest that the mature beliefs which the children in their study 
exhibited could be attributed to the strong academic orientation of the school 
which the subjects attended and to the fact that these children provided ratings 
about classmates with whom they were very familiar whereas other studies have 
asked children to make their evaluative judgements about unfamiliar children. 
By examining young children's level choices in the absence and presence of a 
variable payoff reward system, further support was provided for suggestions made 
previously that young children possess the capacity to accurately assess their own 
competence. With the incentive of a variable payoff system, young children 
selected task difficulty levels which presented them with optimal levels of 
challenge in relation to their own task competence, unlike those who were not 
offered similar rewards. The realistic risk taking behaviour demonstrated by 
children in the reward group simultaneously provides further support for the 
proposal that young children are capable of accurately assessing their personal 
competence. To engage in realistic risk taking behaviour requires knowledge of 
the competence needed for successful task completion (Heckhausen, 1984). If an 
individual possesses this knowledge it can be logically inferred that they recognise 
whether or not their competence matches the level required to achieve success on 
the task. Hence, it appears that, given the present circumstances, young children 
are capable of providing accurate assessments of their personal competence on a 
motor task. Their behaviour indicates an understanding of the competence 
required to successfully complete different levels of task difficulty and whether or 
not their own competence level matches that required by the level of task 
difficulty attempted. This behaviour also suggests that young children possess the 
capacity, which they can effectively employ in the presence of a variable payoff 
system, to understand the association between incentive value of success and level 
of task difficulty. 
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8.2.5. Methodological concerns when assessing young children's conceptual 
understanding 
Previous discussion suggested that young children possess only a limited capacity 
to verbalise their understanding about abstract constructs such as ability in a form 
which can be interpreted from an adult perspective. It was also proposed that 
developmental differences in construct interpretation influence the way in which 
subjects', particularly young children's, responses to interview questions are 
interpreted, and the conclusions which are drawn from their responses. The 
present research findings seem to suggest that in an appropriate environment, 
young children can demonstrate developmentally-advanced achievement-related 
understanding and behaviour. In order to yield findings which accurately reflect 
young children's achievement-related understanding and behaviour, revision of 
both commonly employed methodologies and assumptions is required. 
Considering children's limited capacity to verbalise their beliefs and the problems 
associated with developmental differences in construct interpretation, it seems 
that verbal interview-based methodologies may not be the most suitable for 
assessing young children's beliefs about ability and related constructs, however 
carefully they are conducted. 
Based on the findings of previous research which are discussed in Chapter Five, it 
was suggested that observing children's behaviour may represent a more suitable 
method of investigation than verbal interview-based methodologies as this method 
does not rely on the child's language development and developmental differences 
in construct interpretation are not encountered. The efficacy of this proposal was 
examined in an experiment which is described in Chapter Seven in relation to 
young children's perceptions of their own competence on a motor task and their 
understanding of relative task difficulty and the incentive value of succeeding at 
these different levels. Research which has employed behavioural measures of 
perceived competence has indicated that young children are capable of assessing 
their own competence, for example, Majeres & Timmer (198 1) and Fazey & 
Evans (1994). Other empirical investigations, for example, Stipek et al (1984) 
have indicated that providing the child with an incentive to accurately assess 
competence produces a context in which accurate competence estimates can be 
obtained. Verbal measures taken in a context which does not provide the child 
with an incentive to accurately assess their competence may not elicit responses 
from children which accurately reflect their beliefs about their own competence. 
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This study used a behavioural measure in a context in which it was in the child's 
own interest to judge their competence accurately, enabling young children to 
provide accurate assessments of their own competence on a motor task. It 
appears that the inaccurate competence perceptions revealed by previous research 
may reflect the verbal measures which they have employed and the lack of 
incentive for the child to make accurate judgements of their own competence 
rather than the child's cognitive limitations. This result supports the findings of 
studies conducted by Fazey & Evans (1994) and Majeres & Timmer (1981) and 
statements made by authors such as Nicholls (1984) and Butler (1990) who 
suggest that young children can provide accurate estimates of their own 
competence. 
Children's behaviour also indicated that they can, given the correct circumstances, 
demonstrate fairly advanced understanding of task difficulty and the incentive 
value of success on different levels of task difficulty. Results of the present 
experiment would perhaps have received further support if an additional group 
had been included to provide verbal assessments of their competence on the task. 
The accuracy of this group's competence perceptions could then be compared 
directly with the accuracy of those provided by children in the remaining two 
groups. Further empirical evidence is required to support the proposal made in 
this thesis that behavioural measures can be employed to accurately assess young 
children's conceptual understanding. 
The researcher's assumptions about the results they will find also need to be 
acknowledged in this revision of methodology. These assumptions are likely to 
affect both the experimental design which is employed and the manner 
in which 
the researcher subsequently interprets their findings. For example, by presenting 
individuals with explicit effort cues when assessing their understanding of effort 
and ability, it seems that the researcher is 
imposing their own assumptions about 
how individuals at different developmental levels will use this construct as an 
explanation for performance outcomes. This thesis underlines the 
importance of 
not unquestioningly accepting the assumptions made 
by other researchers or even 
the assumptions which determine our own research 
design. The finding that effort 
is not the predominant explanation for outcome chosen 
by young children was a 
217 
surprising result in experiment three and calls into question inferences drawn from 
work which has investigated the effort/ability concept development. In situations 
where young children have been offered (and expected to use) explicit effort cues 
in a task performance, they have complied. This research suggests that the young 
child's use of effort may not reflect their actual understanding of this construct, 
but instead, the focus of their attention, as defined by the experimenter's own 
assumptions. Experimental designs would demonstrate greater validity if they 
were constructed to disprove rather than prove the experimentees assumptions. 
The way in which verbal responses are interpreted also depends on the 
experimenter's assumptions about how an individual at a particular developmental 
level construes the concepts they are discussing. Interpretations and subsequent 
conclusions may reflect these assumptions and may not accurately reflect the 
individual's, young children's in particular, understanding of the concepts under 
discussion. The fact that the adult experimenter possesses an understanding of 
ability which differs from the child's also confounds this issue. The adult 
experimenter bases their conclusions about the nature of children! s statements on 
their own criteria forjudging this construct. This can provide information about 
the child's capacity to verbalise their understanding in a form which is 
interpretable from an adult perspective of ability but makes assessment of the 
child's capacity to verbalise their beliefs about ability based on their own criteria 
niore difficult. The problems with a priori assumptions are exemplified by the 
present thesis in the experiment which is described in Chapter Four. The criteria 
which were employed to allocate children to their different experimental groups, 
although initially appearing appropriate for this purpose were subsequently 
questioned. Basing criteria for group allocation on previous research findings may 
perhaps have been erroneous and may have contributed towards the non 
significant findings which were produced by this investigation. 
8.2.6. The stability and instability of different developmental periods of 
effort and ability understanding 
The second approach to developmental changes 
in effort and ability understanding 
assessed whether or not this conceptual understanding 
demonstrated a pattern of 
developmental change which is described by a number of theorists. Such theorists 
include Fogel & Thelen (1987), Piaget, Gesell, Kelly (1955) and Erikson. AJI 
these theorists share a common view on one aspect of the nature of 
developmental change, describing this as a process which 
involves alternate 
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periods of stability and instability. This approach to development provided the 
theoretical basis for examining developmental changes in effort and ability 
understanding. Chapter Four described an experiment which examined whether or 
not this theoretical approach could be applied to the developmental continuum 
demonstrated by the child's changing beliefs about effort and ability. It was 
suggested that levels one and four of effort and ability understanding represent 
stable periods of this conceptual development whilst levels two and three 
represent unstable periods. 
Findings from this experiment provided only limited support for the hypotheses. 
Although children at levels one and four exhibited behaviour which could be more 
easily predicted than that exhibited by children who had achieved levels two and 
three, statistical analyses did not demonstrate conclusive evidence in support of 
the proposals made. Although an appealing suggestion that theoretical proposals 
about stability and instability can be employed to describe the developmental 
changes involved in effort and ability understanding, the method which was used 
does not appear to be sufficiently sensitive to detect these possibly small, 
transitory and bi-directional shifts in stability. Explanations for this limited support 
and possible directions for future research which explores this issue are discussed 
below. 
it may be that present proposals concerning the stability and instability of the 
different levels of this conceptual development are incorrect. It could prove more 
fruitful to examine the behaviour of children who have achieved levels two and 
three independently from each other. This would enable an assessment of the 
stability of each individual level of this understanding which may indicate that 
levels two and three demonstrate differential levels of stability. Treating children 
who have reached these two levels as the same group in the experiment described 
in Chapter Four may have obscured any differences which exist between the 
stability of these two levels of understanding. 
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As was discussed previously in Chapter Three, many developmental theorists 
suggest that a period of disequilibrium, is required for developmental change to 
occur. During this period, the organism must reduce the dissonance experienced 
between internal and external information to restore equilibrium and achieve a 
higher developmental state. Piaget discusses cognitive development involving a 
shift from stability at a lower developmental state to an unstable transition period 
during which internal and external information are no longer congruent, to a 
stable period at a more advanced developmental level where experienced conflicts 
between internal and external information are now resolved. Other theoretical 
perspectives, for example, Dynamic Systems Theory (Fogel & Thelen, 1987) also 
view deviation from a stable to an unstable state as a prerequisite for change. 
Considering the instability which individuals experience between different 
developmental states, it seems likely that these transition points represent periods 
of instability whereas stable periods are experienced during different levels of this 
conceptual understanding. In dynamic systems theory terms, the control 
parameter which effects this movement from stability to instability and through to 
further stability can be either internal or external to the individual. Stipek & 
Tannatt (1984) state that the nature of feedback provided to children in their 
educational environment changes quite markedly from one grade to another. They 
also claim that changes in the child's cognitive processing abilities which occur 
between four and eight years of age should influence how they process and 
interpret this feedback. The nature of received feedback and the way in which it is 
processed by young children represents a possible control parameter which is 
involved in developmental changes in children's understanding of effort and 
ability. It is possible that identifying periods of effort and ability understanding 
which demonstrate differential stability requires an examination of the transition 
points experienced between two adjacent levels. The four levels of effort and 
ability understanding may represent stable stages of this conceptual development 
whereas unstable stages may be experienced during the transition points between 
different levels. Future research should identify children who are currently 
experiencing these transition periods in addition to different levels of this 
conceptual understanding. The behavioural predictability of these children can 
then be examined to determine whether or not effort and ability understanding 
does demonstrate alternate periods of stability and instability, during levels of 
understanding and transition points between these 
levels, respectively. 
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it is possible that children who have achieved levels one and four of the 
continuum of effort and ability understanding, although at relatively more stable 
levels than those experiencing levels two and three, may not have reached 
sufficiently stable levels of this conceptual development to demonstrate behaviour 
which would support the predictions made. Adults may represent a group which 
has reached a sufficiently stable level of this conceptual understanding to exhibit 
behaviour which more closely matches the present predictions. An examination of 
the behavioural predictability of adults in response to context manipulations could 
be carried out to examine the validity of this proposal. 
Although the children! s levels of effort and ability understanding were assessed 
empirically and using a procedure which has previously been validated in current 
investigations, the possibility remains that some of the children were classified at 
the wrong level of conceptual development. This comment is particularly apt in 
the light of findings discussed in Chapter Two which indicated that, in some 
circumstances, children do use ability-related statements as explanations for 
performance outcomes at an early age. The inclusion of children who were 
perhaps wrongly classified could have obscured any effects resulting from the 
behaviour of children who were allocated to their correct experimental group. 
Children were allocated to their experimental groups on the basis of the proposed 
stability of their conceptual schemata. These proposals were based on criteria 
suggested by both Nicholls' research (1978) and results of the initial experiment 
conducted in this thesis. Although these criteria did appear to be suitable, 
considering the findings from experiments two and three, these classification 
criteria may not have been wholly appropriate. For 
instance, experiment two 
examined young children's use of effort and ability 
in their verbal explanations for 
performance outcomes on physical tasks. Suggestions were made on the 
basis of 
their verbalisations about how these young children perceived the meaning of 
ability in relation to effort. It was proposed that very young children may not 
perceive effort and ability as interrelated concepts 
but instead as distinct from 
each other. Therefore, basing proposals about schema stability at 
different levels 
of effort and ability understanding on the 
findings of previous research may have 
resulted in incorrect proposals. Considering 
the findings of experiments two and 
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three, the child's schema about effort and ability requires further investigation to 
clarify exactly how young children perceive these concepts and the relationships 
between them. The proposals made about schema stability may have been 
erroneous and behavioural predictability may not have matched apriori proposals 
as a result of employing incorrect criteria as the bases for proposals about schema 
stability. 
However, children's use of effort and ability in their verbal explanations for 
performance outcomes did demonstrate domain specificity. Results of experiments 
two and three revealed that they appear to be capable of employing ability in their 
verbal explanations for performance outcomes on academic but not on physical 
tasks. In the light of this domain specificity, if the relative stability of different 
levels of effort and ability were re-examined, the criteria for classifying children 
into their experimental groups may need to be re-assessed. If future research was 
to examine the stability of effort and ability understanding concerning academic 
tasks, different criteria may be required to both classify children to their 
experimental groups and to make proposals about the stability of their schemata. 
As young children have been shown to be able to verbalise their ideas about 
academic ability, their schema may not be as stable as was previously suggested. 
A different method to that which was based on Nicholls' (1978) procedure to 
assess effort and ability understanding and which presented the children With 
explicit effort cues may prove more appropriate for allocating children to their 
experimental groups. The above proposals relate at present only to research which 
examines the stability of effort and ability understanding in the academic domain. 
Research which investigates this issue in relation to children's understanding of 
these concepts in the physical domain does not necessitate the adoption of 
different criteria on which to base group allocation and proposals about schema 
stability as no ability-related explanations were provided in relation to 
performance outcomes on physical tasks. It seems that if the domain specificity of 
these beliefs can be resolved then this will indicate whether or not these criteria 
require alteration to investigate the stability of children's effort and ability 
understanding in the physical domain. 
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As mentioned previously in Chapter Two, a fairly common occurrence was that 
children exhibited characteristics of two adjacent levels of reasoning but that they 
were then classified according to which one appeared to dominate their reasoning. 
It is likely therefore that a child undergoing a transition phase between levels three 
and four could have been classified as experiencing level four. Therefore the 
instability of their behaviour may have confounded the results if transition periods 
do represent periods of instability, as is suggested above. 
Generally, this thesis has revealed that young children's conceptions of 
achievement-related constructs are more sophisticated than has been previously 
presumed. Young children appear to be capable of employing academic ability as 
a referent in their verbal explanations for performance outcomes; accurately 
assessing their own competence under certain circumstances, and adopting 
challenges which are appropriate for their skill level by utilising accurate 
judgements about task difficulty level and the probability of success on different 
tasks. It has also demonstrated that, as is well known, methodological concerns 
are particularly salient in research with young children and researchers must be 
prepared to challenge both their own and others' assumptions. 
8.3.1. Implications for practice 
Experiment one demonstrated the developmental changes which are involved 
when children apply their knowledge of effort and ability to physical tasks. Similar 
age boundaries to those suggested by Nicholls (1978) were observed between the 
four levels. However, considerable variation was demonstrated in the level of 
understanding achieved by individuals of the same chronological age suggesting 
that chronological age, is not an accurate predictor of level of conceptual 
development. These individual differences in conceptual understanding must be 
recoosed in instances where the child's beliefs about effort and ability may 
influence their motivation to participate and achieve, for example, when providing 
children with feedback about their performance attempts in terms of effort 
expenditure and ability level. Feedback received 
from significant others is a major 
influence on the individual's subsequent participation in an activity (Vallerand & 
Reid, 1984), particularly where young children are concerned (Horn & Weiss, 
1989). Practitioners working with children should therefore provide the child with 
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feedback information which is congruent with the child's own schema of beliefs 
about effort and ability to facilitate their continued participation and motivation. 
identifying developmental level is not an easy task, as has been demonstrated in 
this thesis, but a sensitivity to both behavioural and verbal cues is important. 
Findings from experiments two and three raised concerns about the suitability of 
different methodologies for assessing the nature of young children's conceptual 
understanding. The developmental differences in construct interpretation and 
verbalisation which were revealed by these studies indicated that using verbal 
measures may not be the most appropriate method of assessing young children's 
understanding. Verbal measures rely on construct interpretation and a capacity to 
verbalise the constructs under investigation. To obtain an accurate assessment of 
the young child's understanding there must be congruence between the adult 
experimenter's and the child subject's interpretations of the constructs involved. 
As behavioural indices ameliorate the problems associated with verbal measures 
they may represent a more suitable method of assessing young children's 
conceptual understanding. Results of experiment five supported the suggested 
efficacy of behavioural measures for assessing young children's beliefs about their 0 
own level of motor competence. When a behavioural measure was employed in 
conjunction with an incentive for the child to accurately assess their own motor 
competence, young children did provide accurate estimates of this measure. It 
appears that the overestimated competence perceptions revealed by previous 
research may be attributable to limitations of the methodologies which these 
studies have employed rather than limitations of the child's cognitive capacity. 
Domain specificity of young children's beliefs about ability in relation to effort and 
their capacity to verbalise these beliefs was also revealed by current investigations. 
This finding demonstrates the multidimensional nature of developmental change 
and supports previous claims, for example, Duda 
(1987), that achievement -related 
beliefs in one domain may not always mirror those exhibited in other competency 
domains. As a result, further evidence is provided to support previous statements 
that empirical investigations which examine children's conceptual understanding 
must consider each domain separately. 
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Experiment five also investigated the present proposals that a variable payoff 
system would encourage young children to demonstrate realistic risk taking 
strategies and adopt appropriate levels of personal challenge. As predicted, more 
realistic risk taking behaviour was exhibited by children who were offered variable 
payoffs for successful task performances than by those who were not. This finding 
has implications for the type of reinforcement schedules which should be offered 
to young children. The motivational and performance advantages of realistic risk 
taking have been demonstrated (for example, Atkinson, 1957), and the present 
study has indicated that variable payoff systems will stimulate children to choose 
task levels which represent levels of challenge and risk appropriate for their ability 
level. If, in educational settings, children were offered variable rather than fixed 
payoffs they may be more likely to select tasks which present them with 
appropriate levels of personal challenge. The fixed payoff system which was 
employed in the experiment described in Chapter Four reduced the children's 
willingness to take risks. This suggests that such a reward system, which is 
commonly employed in educational settings, may not be the most effective 
method of encouraging children to attempt tasks which present them with optimal 
levels of personal challenge. Perhaps this could be offered as an explanation for 
the declines in positive self-evaluations which are commonly observed during the 
early school grades (for example, Stipek, 1984). If young children receive the 
same amount of reward for successfully completing tasks of different levels of 
difficulty, it is likely that they will select tasks which do not present a challenge, 
when extrinsic rewards are involved, as these tasks present the highest likelihood 
of obtaining reinforcement. By attempting tasks which do not present themvvith a 
challenge, the children are then effectively reducing their chances of improving 
upon their present level of mastery. This lack of skill improvement could then 
contribute towards the child's declining perceptions of competence and positive 
self-evaluations. 
8.4.1. Conclusion 
This research has provided information about issues concerned with young 
children's achievement-related understanding and 
behaviour and has highlighted 
various problems associated with research which 
investigates very young 
children's conceptual development. Experiments which explored the 
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developmental changes involved in effort and ability understanding demonstrated 
that knowledge of these concepts can be generalised from the physical to the 
academic domain (lending support to recent research which explored this issue by 
Smith & Whitehead, 1994 and Walling & Duda, 1994), but in some instances this 
conceptual understanding does display domain specificity. Although the 
progression of this conceptual development which was revealed when children 
were asked to apply their understanding to physical tasks mirrored that previously 
demonstrated when they were asked to discuss academic tasks (Nicholls, 1978), 
domain specificity of young children's use, and possibly their understanding of, 
ability as a cause of outcomes was revealed. These findings underline the need for 
separate consideration of different competency domains and for future research to 
examine' the domain specificity of children's use, and their understanding, of ability 
in relation to performance outcomes. Explorations of young children's use, and 
their understanding, of ability, their perceptions of their own competence and their 
risk taking behaviour suggested that they may possess fairly advanced knowledge 
about the following: personal competence and its relationship with task difficulty-, 
the incentive value of success on different levels of task difficulty; how to 
Optimise success levels through appropriate task selection, and the existence of 
the concept of ability. However, these same experiments also highlighted the 
limitations involved when investigating young children's conceptual development. 
These appear to derive mainly from developmental differences in construct 
interpretation and reflect the limitations of the child subject, the adult 
experimenter and the methodologies which are commonly employed in this 
research. The child has difficulties verbalising their understanding of abstract 
constructs in forms which are interpretable from an adult perspective. This is 
exacerbated by employing methods to investigate this understanding which 
require the child to verbalise their beliefs and by the adult's interpretation of the 
child's responses from their own developmental perspective and the imposition of 
their apriori assumptions on the experimental design. Although providing 
encouraging information about the level of understanding which young children 
appear to have achieved, findings from this thesis also indicate that caution is 
required to avoid the inherent complications involved in attempts to further 
understand young children's conceptual understanding. 
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Appendix 
Film 1: 
I'm going to show you a film of two children playing a game. The film will show 
you how they both play this game. What they have to do is stand behind this line 
and throw beanbags into this hoop. They have a minute to see how many 
beanbags they can throw into the hoop. 
[Questions were then asked to assess whether the subject understood the 
requirements of the game] 
Now, I'll put these cards here to show you that they both threw 10 beanbags into 
the hoop. This is a pretty good score. 
[The subjects were then asked whether the children scored the same or differently 
and whether they'd done well or not] 
Now, let's watch the film where they both got 10 beanbags in the hoop. You look 
and see if you think one is better at this game and if one tries harder or not. Think 
about two things. Does one try harder and is one better at this game? 
Film 2: 
Let's watch another film of the same children playing a different game. This time 
they have to stand behind the line and throw beanbags into this bin. They have to 
see how many beanbags they can throw into the bin in a minute. 
[Questions were then asked to assess whether the subject understood the 
requirements of the game] 
I'll put these cards here again to show you that this time they both scored 2, they 
both got 2 beanbags in the bin, which is a pretty poor score. 
[The subjects were then asked whether the children scored the same or differently 
and whether they'd done well or not] 
Now, let's watch the film where they both got 2 beanbags in the bin. You look 
and see if you think one is better at this game, forget about the other one, and if 
one tries harder or not. Think about two things. Does one try 
harder and is one 
better at this game? 
Film 3: 
The last game is a bit more complicated so listen careffilly, then we'll watch the 
film of how the two children play this game. Again, they 
have to stand behind the 
line and throw beanbags at this target. If the beanbag 
lands in the middle of the 
target they score 3 points, if the beanbag lands 
in the next circle, they score 2 
points, and if it lands on the outside circle they score 
I point. They have to score 
as many points as they can in a minute. 
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[Questions were then asked to assess whether the subject understood the 
r-equirements of the game] 
I'll put these cards here again to show you what they scored on this game. This 
girl/boy scored 24 which is a really good score. This girl/boy only scored 6 which 
is not a very good score. 
[The subjects were then asked whether the children scored the same or differently 
and whether they'd done well or not] 
Now, let's watch the film where she/he scored 24 and she/he only scored 6. You 
look and see if you think one is better at this game, forget about what happened in 
the other games, and if one tries harder or not. Think about two things. Does one 
try harder and is one better at this game? 
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developmental changes involved in effort and ability understanding demonstrated 
that knowledge of these concepts can be generalised from the physical to the 
academic domain (lending support to recent research which explored this issue by 
Smith & Whitehead, 1994 and Walling & Duda, 1994), but in some instances this 
conceptual understanding does display domain specificity. Although the 
progression of this conceptual development which was revealed when children 
were asked to apply their understanding to physical tasks mirrored that previously 
demonstrated when they were asked to discuss academic tasks (Nicholls, 1978), 
domain specificity of young children's use, and possibly their understanding of, 
ability as a cause of outcomes was revealed. These findings underline the need for 
separate consideration of different competency domains and for future research to 
examine'the domain specificity of children's use, and their understanding, of ability 
in relation to performance outcomes. Explorations of young children's use, and 
their understanding, of ability, their perceptions of their own competence and their 
risk taking behaviour suggested that they may possess fairly advanced knowledge 
about the following: personal competence and its relationship with task difficulty; 
the incentive value of success on different levels of task difficulty; how to 
optimise success levels through appropriate task selection, and the existence of 
the concept of ability. However, these same experiments also highlighted the 
limitations involved when investigating young children's conceptual development. 
These appear to derive mainly from developmental differences in construct 
interpretation and reflect the limitations of the child subject, the adult 
experimenter and the methodologies which are commonly employed in this 
research. The child has difficulties verbalising their understanding of abstract 
constructs in forms which are interpretable from an adult perspective. This is 
exacerbated by employing methods to investigate this understanding which 
require the child to verbalise their beliefs and by the adult's interpretation of the 
child's responses from their own developmental perspective and the 
imposition of 
their apriori assumptions on the experimental design. Although providing 
encouraging information about the level of understanding which young children 
appear to have achieved, findings from this thesis also 
indicate that caution is 
required to avoid the inherent complications 
involved in attempts to further 
understand young children's conceptual understanding. 
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